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I. Introduction
This was the last full year of the Wachtler era.' During
Chief Judge Wachtler's tenure at the helm of the state's highest
* Associate Professor, Albany Law School, Union University. The author is
indebted to his research assistants, John D. Powell and Mitchell Tacy, whose diligence, loyalty, and good ears were invaluable in compiling the data, calculating the
figures, and preparing the tables and graphs; to research assistants Christine L.
Kenefick, Katheryn L. Clune, and Bridgette Burrowes, who also helped with this,
as well as other pieces; to Michelle Sasso, who typed this manuscript, and others,
with extraordinary speed and meticulousness; and to his wife Karen and children,
whose support and patience are essential to every writing.
Finally, this Review is again-and always-for Raffaela Bonventre, his
mother.
1. On November 10, 1992, then-Chief Judge Sol Wachtler resigned from the
Court. See Josh Barbanel, ChiefJudge of New York State is Arrested in Extortion
Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at 1; Josh Barbanel, Chief Judge Quits Post in
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tribunal he left an unmistakable mark on the Court, its philosophical direction, and thus the fundamental law of New York. 2
This Review, covering 1991, especially when combined with the
inaugural Review, s which studied the state constitutional decisions of 1990, affords a revealing look at the Court of Appeals'
treatment of fundamental rights and liberties in the latter part
4
of Wachtler's chief judgeship.
The inaugural Review triggered considerable reaction.
Some in high places, including current and former members of
the Court, 5 were quite upset. They apparently took offense at
the author's observations that the Court under Wachtler was
retrenching on rights and libertiess that voting records of the
individual judges revealed a distinct ideological spectrum,7 and
that the Court was deciding many significant constitutional issues in superficial unsigned opinions.8 Others in high placesfar outnumbering those who were upset-and many others in
the bar, academia and the media approved and offered encouragement and support. 9
New York in Extortion Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1992, at Al. Judge Judith S.
Kaye was subsequently elevated to fill the resulting vacancy in the Court's center
seat. See Gary Spencer, Kaye Is Selected Chief Judge by Governor, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
23, 1993, at 1; Gary Spencer, Unanimous Vote for Kaye as State's New ChiefJudge,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 1993, at 1.
2. See generally Vincent M. Bonventre, State ConstitutionalAdjudication at
the Court of Appeals, 1990 and 1991: Retrenchment is the Rule, 56 AiB. L. REV.
119 (1992); Peter Galie, Modes of ConstitutionalInterpretation: The New York
Court of Appeals' Search for a Role, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 225 (1991).
3. Vincent M. Bonventre, Court of Appeals - State Constitutional Law Review, 1990, 12 PACE L. REV. 1 (1992).
4. For related discussions, see Bonventre, supra note 2, at 121 (claiming that
after a few years into Sol Wachtler's tenure as Chief Judge, the New York Court of
Appeals began back-pedaling on rights and liberties); Vincent M. Bonventre, Tilting the Scales of Justice, EMPIRE ST. REP., June 1992, at 21, 24 (stating that the
Court of Appeals had become "increasingly unsympathetic to rights and liberties"
during the latter part of Wachtler's tenure as Chief Judge).
5. See, e.g., John Caher, Albany Law Faculty Defends Right to Write: Colleagues Rally for Untenured Professor,TIMES UNION (Albany), June 12, 1991, at A1; John Caiher, Court CritiquePrompts Controversy Over Academic Freedom, SUNDAY TIMES UNION (Albany), Aug. 18, 1991, at B-6; Thought Police at Albany Law,
TIMES UNION (Albany), June 13, 1991, at A-10; see also Joseph Bellacosa, A Letter
of Appeals, EMPRE ST. REP., Aug. 1992, at 8 (reacting to a related magazine piece).
6. See Bonventre, supra note 3, at 52-53.
7. Id. at 50-52.
8. Id. at 53-54.
9. Many current and former members of the Court of Appeals personally communicated their approval to the author and expressed dismay at the hostility
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Moreover, the Review-and no doubt the hostile reaction as
well-seemed to generate substantial interest in the Court's
constitutional decisionmaking and direction. The author was
deluged with requests for related articles, follow-up studies,
and personal presentations. 10 And general circulation newspapers," as well as legal ones, 12 have been reporting the findings
of studies originally undertaken for the Review or for related
subsequent pieces.
During the past two years, whatever else the author has
written about the Court has been tied to the first Review, substantively and in the minds of readers. Indeed, as though
everything else has been a footnote to that initial article, the
most frequently asked question seems to have been: "Are You
Writing Another Pace Law Review Piece?" This second Review
is the author's response. Hopefully, it will help sustain the interest apparently sparked by the first, i.e., interest in state constitutional decisionmaking at New York's highest court, and
how that decisionmaking affects the fundamental freedoms of
those who live in this state.
With that in mind, the purpose here, much like before, is to
focus on issues pertinent to state constitutional adjudication.
others were directing against a critical analysis of the Court's work. The author's
own colleagues at Albany Law School, members of law and political science faculties around the country, members of the bar throughout the state, and journalists
and other commentators were, almost uniformly, very supportive of the author's
work and were aghast at the animosity to academic freedom displayed by some
who are, or were, responsible for enforcing freedom of expression.
10. See, e.g., Vincent M. Bonventre, The New York Court of Appeals: An Old
Tradition Struggles with Current Issues, 22 PERSP. ON POL. ScI. 149 (1993);
Bonventre, supra note 2; Vincent M. Bonventre, State ConstitutionalRecession:
The New York Court of Appeals Retrenches, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 1
(1991); Bonventre, supra note 4; Vincent M. Bonventre & John D. Powell, Changing Course at the High Court, EMPIRE ST. REP., Mar. 1994, at 55.
11. See, e.g., John Caher, Cuomo's High Court is Steering Rightward, Study
Concludes, SUNDAY TIMES UNION (Albany), June 2, 1991, at B-2; John Caher, Kaye
Leading Top Court to Left, Study Says, TIMES UNION (Albany), Oct. 31, 1993, at A1; William House, Court Tilt is in Cuomo's Hands: Nomination DeadlineNears;
Experts Eager to See Effect on Civil-LibertiesCases, REPORTER DISPATCH (Gannett
Suburban Newspapers, White Plains, N.Y.), May 11, 1992, at A-i; Kevin Sack,
Cuomo's Choice to Head the Court of Appeals: A Judge's Judge - Judith Smith
Kaye, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993, at B2.
12. See, e.g., Gary Spencer, Dust Settles After a Year of Turmoil: As Court
Recovers from Last Term Experts Assess Its Future Direction, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 1,
1993, at S2; Daniel Wise, Study Finds Court of Appeals Becoming More Conservative, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 1991, at 1.

3

356

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:353

There are surveys of New York cases in other publications:
some are limited to the Court of Appeals, others not; some are
devoted to state constitutional issues, others review the judicial
output of New York State generally. 13 There is no need to duplicate those efforts, and that is not the objective here. Rather,
while this Review does take account of every Court of Appeals
ruling that involves a substantial question of state constitutional right, its particular aim is to examine the Court's decisionmaking in those cases and, in that way, to better
understand the Court itself, its constitutional jurisprudence,
and that of its members.
Discussion of the cases thus focuses on matters especially
pertinent to adjudication of state constitutional claims. These
include the Court's methodological approach(es) to state constitutional issues, 14 its jurisprudence(s) of state authority and individual rights, its view(s) of federalism and the role of a state
high Court in the federal system, the dynamics and philosophical differences between New York's high tribunal and the
Supreme Court of the United States, and the dynamics and differences within the Court of Appeals itself. Accordingly, the decisions which underscore or provide insight into these sorts of
considerations are highlighted.
Part II of this Article examines the state constitutional
rights and liberties decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals
in 1991. First the decisions involving rights of the accused will
be discussed, then those dealing with civil liberties and equality. Part III explores the voting statistics of the individual
judges and the Court itself for 1991, and compares these figures
with those for 1990 (the focus of the previous Review). Observations are then drawn from the numerical tallies, the Court's decisions, and the individual judges' opinions.

13. For example, the New York Law Journalpublishes a special annual report
on the Court of Appeals which includes summaries of Court of Appeals opinions in
all areas of the law; Touro Law Review publishes an annual issue on New York
State constitutional law covering decisions from all New York courts; the Syracuse
Law Review publishes an annual survey of New York law which reviews developments in virtually every area of the law and includes decisions from all New York
courts.
14. See Galie, supra note 2.
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-

357

1991

A. Criminal Justice
The criminal cases decided by the Court in 1991 raised a
host of state constitutional issues, including warrantless arrests, probable cause, show-up identifications, fair trial, the
right to be present, the critical stages of trial, the right to counsel, and pro se defense. Perhaps the most significant cases for
state constitutional adjudication were People v. Harris15 and
People v. Jackson.16 Each involved the interplay of various policies and interests, and each provided insights into the Wachtler
Court.
Harrisinvolved the relation between a warrantless arrest,
a subsequent confession, a ruling by the United States Supreme
Court, 1 7 and New York's right to counsel.' 8 Jackson examined
New York's Rosario rule, 19 its progeny, requiring automatic reversal for violations, 20 the constitutional or quasi-constitutional
underpinnings of both, and the statute governing postjudgment
motions. 2 ' The judges' disagreements in these two cases are
particularly telling. They reveal much about the Court's internal divisions over independent state constitutional decisionmaking, including its very legitimacy,2 2 as well as the Court's
general treatment of rights-protective precedents in the latter
years of the Wachtler era. The discussion of 1991 criminal
15. 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991).
16. 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991).
17. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (reversing the prior Court of
Appeals ruling in People v. Harris, 72 N.Y.2d 614, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1988) (suppressing a confession on the basis of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution)).
18. Harris,77 N.Y.2d at 435, 570 N.E.2d at 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
19. See People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883, 213
N.Y.S.2d 448, 450 (1961) (holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to examine
the prior statements of prosecution witnesses).
20. See, e.g., People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446, 354 N.E.2d 801, 387
N.Y.S.2d 62 (1976).
21. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 440.10 (McKinney 1983) (authorizing vacatur
of a prior conviction on the basis of improper prosecutorial conduct that prejudices
the defendant's case).
22. Divisions over the legitimacy of independent state constitutional decisionmaking culminated publicly the following year in People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474,
593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992); see infra note 602 and accompanying
text.
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cases involving pretrial safeguards begins with the Court's decision in Harris.
1.

Pre-TrialSafeguards

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, 23 which
reversed the Court of Appeals' earlier decision, 24 the New York
Court in People v. Harris(HarrisII)25 again ruled that the confession in question must be suppressed 2 6-this time basing its
decision on the state constitution.2 7 In its first consideration of
the case, the Court of Appeals, applying federal law only, held
that the defendant's station house confession, given subsequent
to his arrest by police officers who unlawfully entered his apartment without a warrant, must be suppressed as the product of a
Payton violation. 28 A narrow five to four majority at the
Supreme Court disagreed. 29 Although the entire Court did
agree that the entry and arrest violated the Fourth Amendment-based Payton rule,30 the majority held that the ensuing
3
confession at the precinct did not have to be suppressed. '
The Supreme Court's rationale was twofold. One, the confession was deemed not the result of the Payton violation, apparently on the ground that any causal connection between the
two was broken when the police and the defendant left the defendant's apartment.3 2 Two, exclusion of the confession would
have little or no deterrent value because the police had probable
23. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
24. People v. Harris, 72 N.Y.2d 614, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1988)
(HarrisI).
25. 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991).
26. Defendant had given three statements. The first was made in his apartment following the arrest; the second at the police station an hour later; the third
on videotape, also at the police station. The first statement was suppressed as the
fruit of the poisonous arrest; the third was suppressed as involuntary. These rulings were not challenged. Only the second statement, therefore, was at issue in
HarrisI. Id. at 436, 570 N.E.2d at 1052, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
27. Id. at 435, 570 N.E.2d at 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
28. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures prohibited warrantless, nonconsensual entries into a felony
suspect's home to arrest him. Id. at 589-90.
29. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. at 14.
30. Id. at 21-23.
31. Id. at 21.
32. Id. at 14.
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cause to arrest the defendant, and thus, they did not need to
enter his home illegally-in violation of Payton-to interrogate
him. 33 In short, according to the Supreme Court, "[i]t is doubtful therefore that the desire to secure a statement from a crimi34
nal suspect would motivate police to violate Payton." Of
course, as the four member dissent at the Supreme Court em35
phasized, that is precisely what the police did do.
Notwithstanding the federal ruling, however, the Court of
Appeals' majority in HarrisII concluded, as a matter of state
constitutional law, that the special interplay between search
and seizure protections and New York's right to counsel rules
36
required that the statement be suppressed.
In an opinion authored by Judge Richard D. Simons, the
Court explained that the right to counsel attaches in New York
when an arrest warrant is issued. 37 Criminal proceedings must
be commenced to obtain a warrant, and under New York's "indelible" right to counsel rule, 38 a suspect may not thereafter be
questioned in the absence of an attorney.3 9 Hence, because police may not question an uncounseled suspect arrested with a
warrant, "they have every reason to violate Payton"-i.e., to
arrest him without a warrant-and thereby attempt to "circum40
vent the accused's indelible right to counsel."
If the police in Harris had obtained a warrant, as they
should have, they would not have been permitted, under New
York's right to counsel rules, to question the defendant without
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id. at 22 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the police's conduct constituted a "knowing and intentional constitutional violation").
36. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
37. Id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705; People v. Blake, 35
N.Y.2d 331, 339-40, 320 N.E.2d 625, 631-32, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 890-91 (1974)).
38. Under the so-called "indelible" rule, the state constitutional right to counsel, once attached, cannot be waived in the absence of counsel, regardless of how
voluntary, knowing, understanding, or deliberate the suspect's attempted waiver
might be. See People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 165, 385 N.E.2d 612, 618, 412
N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978). The term "indelible" was adopted by the Court in the
opinion by then-Judge Lawrence H. Cook. Id.
39. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706 (citing People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 221-22, 440 N.E.2d 1344, 1346, 424
N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (1980)).
40. Id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
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an attorney being present. 41 Surely the police "should not enjoy
greater latitude,"42 argued Judge Simons, simply because they
violated Payton and illegally fetched the defendant without a
warrant. 43 Hence, the HarrisII majority deemed it necessary to
suppress statements elicited incident to Payton violations in order to discourage unlawful warrantless entries and arrests and,
in turn to preserve the integrity of New York's right to counsel
rules."
The dissenters in HarrisII questioned the "New York right
to counsel angle . . . [claimed by the majority] to be needed to
serve some newly perceived special deterrent objective." 45
Judge Joseph W. Bellacosa, joined by Chief Judge Sol Wachtler,46 saw no basis for suppressing the confession. 47 In the dissenters' view, suppression would not deter Payton violations: it
was only speculative that the police intended to violate defendant's Payton rights or his New York right to counsel, the police
were under no obligation to obtain a warrant at any particular
time, and the evidence showed that the police only intended to
locate the defendant and then obtain the necessary arrest
48
warrant.
The majority responded to those observations by reminding
the dissenters of the facts:
41. Id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. In concurrence, Judge Vito J. Titone recalled his concurring opinion in
Harris1, 72 N.Y.2d at 625-26, 532 N.E.2d at 1235-36, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8 (Titone,
J., concurring), in which he disagreed that federal law required suppression, but
nevertheless voted with the majority to suppress the confession on the basis of the
Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Conyers, 68 N.Y.2d 982, 503 N.E.2d 108,
510 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1986) (holding that statements following an illegal arrest must
be excluded unless sufficient attenuation breaks the causal connection between the
arrest and the statements); he agreed "wholeheartedly" with the majority's analysis in HarrisII based on the New York right to counsel rules. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d
at 441, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Titone, J., concurring).
45. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 444, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
46. The same two judges dissented in HarrisI, 72 N.Y.2d at 626, 532 N.E.2d
at 1236, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (Wachtler, C.J., dissenting).
47. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 445, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
48. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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The trial court found as a fact that the three officers went to the
apartment to take defendant into custody, that with guns drawn
they blocked the exits from the apartment, knocked on the door
and, when defendant answered the knock, entered the apartment
and arrested him. It concluded on this evidence that "no more
clear violation" of Payton could be established. Three reviewing
courts have accepted that finding: the Appellate Division, which
left [the trial court's] factual findings undisturbed; this Court and
49
the United States Supreme Court.
Regarding the appropriate remedy for a Payton violation,
the dissenters' reliance on the Supreme Court's "common sense
analysis" 5 0 missed the majority's point. The dissent's own excerpt from the Supreme Court's opinion makes this clear. "Suppressing a station house statement obtained after a Payton
violation will have little effect on the officers' action," the
Supreme Court majority had opined, because police "need not
violate Payton in order to interrogate the suspect."5 ' But, while
that might be true under federal law, it is not true under New
York law.
As the Court of Appeals majority explained, compliance
with Payton does preclude police questioning under New York
law: the state right to counsel is attached when an arrest warrant is obtained, and thus, under the "indelible" rule, the arrestee may not be interrogated even if he consents, at least until an
attorney is at his side.5 2 There is, therefore, considerable incentive for police investigators to violate Payton, i.e., to forego obtaining a warrant, in order to prevent New York's right to
53
counsel from attaching with its restrictions on interrogation.
Hence, some countervailing disincentive is necessary in New
York-lest New York's right to counsel be circumventable with
49. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 436 n.1, 570 N.E.2d at 1052 n.1, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
703 n.1 (citations omitted). The majority continued: "Indeed, the statement obtained in the apartment, although voluntary for Fifth Amendment purposes, was
suppressed because the entry was unlawful and the parties no longer challenge
that ruling." Id.
50. Id. at 446, 570 N.E.2d at 1058, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 709 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
51. Id. at 445, 570 N.E.2d at 1058, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 709 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (quoting New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. at 20).
52. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 439-40, 570 N.E.2d at 1054-55, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
705-06.
53. Id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
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impunity, indeed circumventable by unconstitutional warrantless intrusions.
The dissenters' protest, that the police questioning at issue
was permissible because New York's right to counsel had not
attached in the absence of an arrest warrant, 54 proved the majority's point. With the required arrest warrant, questioning
would be prohibited; surely then, without the required warrant,
questioning could not be tolerated. But validating the defendant's station house statement would be doing just that. More
than that, it would be rewarding noncompliance with the constitutional warrant requirement and approving the successful
avoidance of the New York right to counsel rules.
Significantly, the majority noted that "the police were [apparently] motivated by just such considerations." 55 The police
had probable cause to arrest the defendant early on, but they
chose not to secure a warrant. 56 Instead, they knowingly violated department rules by entering the defendant's apartment
and arresting him without a warrant, and then they proceeded
57
to question him without an attorney.
Perhaps the dissenters were more on target with their contention, borrowed from the Appellate Division, that the Payton
violation did not, in fact, induce the defendant's station house
statement. 58 The intermediate appeals court had denied suppression of the statement on the ground that "any taint resulting from an illegal arrest was removed by the lapse of time...
and the rereading of Miranda warnings." 59 Judge Bellacosa
elaborated: "The record evidence supports and confirms this key
chain of attenuating events: the change of scene from a 'protected' dwelling to 'unprotected' precinct; intervening passage of
about one hour's time; and renewed warnings by the police authorities and new waivers by defendant." 60
54. Id. at 444, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
55. Id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 446, 570 N.E.2d at 1058, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 709 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Harris, 124 A.D.2d 472, 507 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1st Dep't 1986)).
59. Harris,124 A.D.2d at 475, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
60. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 446, 570 N.E.2d at 1058, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 709 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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Judge Bellacosa protested that there was "no justification
for conclusorily sweeping aside these facts. . . ." The dissenters

could not, he added, "comprehend the majority's determination
apparently made as a matter of law and 'sound policy, justice
and fundamental fairness.'-61 It is certainly debatable whether
the majority's ruling was as unjustified and incomprehensible
as Bellacosa claimed. But he was undoubtedly correct that the
majority's conclusion, that the Payton violation fatally tainted
the defendant's statement, was not simply a determination of
fact. The majority itself was clear on this point. Its ruling was
not a factual finding of "taint," but a legal determination.62
According to the majority, the break in causal connection
between the Payton violation and the defendant's statement,

63
i.e., the "attenuation," was "insufficient as a matter of law."

The explanation given was revealing:
Based on the facts found by the courts below, we determine that
the causal connection between the illegal arrest and defendant's
statement in the police station was not sufficiently attenuated
from the Payton wrong because of the temporal proximity of the
arrest and the statement, the absence of intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct.64

That last factor, the "purpose and flagrancy of the police
misconduct," has nothing to do, of course, with the fact of taint
or attenuation. But it is critical to the consideration of "sound
policy, justice, and fundamental fairness." The brazenness of
the police misconduct-the clear violation of Payton and department rules; the deliberate decision to forego a warrant, to sidestep the right to counsel rules, and to question the defendant;
and the coercive entry into the apartment with guns drawn and
exits blocked to effect the defendant's arrest-could not go unanswered in the majority's view.6 5 To deter such misconduct,
61. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296,
303, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986) (a majority opinion that
was also authored by Judge Simons), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987)).
62. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 441 n.3, 570 N.E.2d at 1058 n.3, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
706 n.3.
63. Id. at 441, 570 N.E.2d at 1058, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
64. Id. at 440-41, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706 (emphasis added).
65. This intolerance of official misconduct and insistence on accountability is
characteristic of Judge Simons. See, e.g., People v. Ohrenstein, 77 N.Y.2d 38, 54,
565 N.E.2d 493, 501, 563 N.Y.S.2d 744, 752 (1990) (Simons, J., dissenting); In re
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and to protect the search and seizure and counsel rights of New
York citizens, statements obtained as a consequence of Payton
violations would have to be suppressed. 66
Apparently then, according to the majority, the more willful
the misconduct, the more compelling is the need to suppress.
Police incentives and motivations were, for that reason, important considerations in the majority's opinion. 67 And the "flagrancy" of the unconstitutional conduct was thus a crucial
component in determining attenuation and taint.68
However strong the disagreements over the merits in Harris II, the Court was even more deeply and profoundly divided
over the very concept of state constitutional decisionmaking.
The majority insisted that there were "sufficient reasons" to apply the state constitution "unconstrained by a contrary
Supreme Court interpretation of the federal counterpart." 69
But the dissenters denounced the majority's "affront" to the
"United States Supreme Court's opinion declaring the law of the
land."70 The majority determined that "the Supreme Court's
rule is not adequate to protect New York citizens from Payton
violations because of our right to counsel rule." 71 But the dis-

senters derided the notion that some "relevant 'local' or 'paro-

Greenfield, 76 N.Y.2d 293, 300, 557 N.E.2d 1177, 1180, 558 N.Y.S.2d 881, 885
(1990) (Simons, J., dissenting); In re Fuchsberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 639, 658 (N.Y. Ct.
Jud. 1978) (Simons, J., dissenting).
66. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 439, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
67. Id. at 436 n.1, 438, 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1052 n.1, 1053-54, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
703 n.1, 704-05.
68. Id. at 441, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706. The majority's treatment of flagrant misconduct is reminiscent of the Court's decision in People v.
Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). In Isaacson,
then-Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, writing for the majority, reasoned that the "reprehensible police action," though not amounting to entrapment of the defendant, violated "traditional notions of justice and fair play" and thus mandated dismissal of
the charges. Id. at 514, 522, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715, 720.
69. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 437-38; 570 N.E.2d at 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 704;
see also id. at 441, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Titone, J., concurring)
(stating that the New York right to counsel rules "justify applying our own state
attenuation analysis").
70. Id. at 443, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
71. Harris1I, 77 N.Y.2d at 439, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
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chial' interest of New York justifi[ed]" a state rule different than
72
the federal.
Regardless of the merits of the Court's substantive decision
in Harris II, the heated argument over the very legitimacy of
rendering an independent state-based decision is startling. Independent state constitutionalism is a venerable tradition at
the New York Court of Appeals. 73 Moreover, it is axiomatic in
our federal system of government that the Court of Appeals,
like other state high courts, "is bound to exercise its independent judgment and is not bound by a decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States limiting" the protection of individual
rights. 74 In fact, New York has historically been a national
leader in enforcing individual rights under the state constitu75
tion regardless of the trends in federal law.

To be sure, the Court of Appeals during the latter years of
the Wachtler era moved in a direction similar to that of the
Supreme Court; it was generally retrenching on rights and liberties. 76 But until HarrisII, every member of the high tribunal
seemed at least to recognize that the Court of Appeals was not
bound to follow the Supreme Court's lead. No member had argued that it was somehow improper or illicit for the New York
72. Id. at 443, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see also discussion infra notes 593-602 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Vincent M. Bonventre, State Constitutionalismin New York:
A Non-Reactive Tradition, 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 31 (1989); Peter J.

Galie, State ConstitutionalGuarantees and Protectionof Defendants' Rights: The
Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFF. L. Rv. 157, 192-94 (1979); Judith S. Kaye,
Dual Constitutionalismin Practiceand Principle,61 ST. JOIN's L. REV. 399 (1987).
74. See People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 384, 46 N.E.2d 329, 331 (1943). See
generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., The State
Constitution, A Criminal Lawyer's First Line of Defense, 57 AL. L. REV. 271
(1993).
75. See William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Chief Judge Charles S.
Desmond, 36 BUFF. L. Rxv. 1, 3 (1987); Peter J. Galie, State Supreme Courts, Judicial Federalismand Other Constitutions, 71 JUDICATURE 100, 103 (1987). See generally William Wiecek, State Protection of Personal Liberty: Remembering the
Future, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 371
(Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991); Edward S. Corwin, The Extension of JudicialReview in New York: 1783-1905, 15 MICH. L. REV. 281 (1917).
76. See Bonventure, supra note 2; Bonventure, State ConstitutionalRecession:
The New York Court of Appeals Retrenches, supra note 10; see also Carl Swidorski,
The New York Court of Appeals and Civil Liberties: An Assessment of Recent Decisions, 3 ST. CONST. COMMENTARIES AND NOTES 1 (1991).
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court to exercise independent state constitutional judgment, and
thereby, reach a different result than that reached by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its federal constitutional
77
judgment.
But in HarrisII, the dissenters did just that. They seemed
to be arguing, in fact, that the Court of Appeals had no choice
but to reach exactly the same result as the Supreme Court. Referring to "the standard mandate from the United States
Supreme Court for 'proceedings . . . in conformity with [its]
judgment' [and] 'not inconsistent with [its] opinion,'" the dissenters complained that "the majority today proceeds 'inconsistently' and not 'in conformity' with" the Supreme Court's
78
decision.
Of course, a state court does not run afoul of a federal constitutional decision when it protects individual rights more
than the Supreme Court requires; federal constitutional law
simply establishes standards below which no state can fall in
80
safeguarding individual liberties. 79 That is rudimentary.
Lest it be thought that the dissenters were merely overstating their position, other passages in the dissenting opinion confirm their discomfort with independent state decisionmaking.
"It is the epitome of institutional egocentricity, a kind of Copernican view of the judicial universe," the dissenters fumed, for
the majority "to reject the United States Supreme Court's anal77. Indeed, both dissenters in HarrisIf had previously written approvingly of
the Court of Appeals' exercise of independent state constitutional judgment to protect rights left unprotected, or less protected, by Supreme Court decisions. See,
e.g., Joseph W. Bellacosa, The New York Constitution: A Touch of Class, N.Y. ST.
B.J., Apr. 1987, at 14; Sol Wachtler, Our Constitutions - Alive and Well, 61 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 381 (1987); Sol Wachtler, Constitutional Rights: Resuming the
States'Role, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSP., Summer 1989, at 23. See also Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986) (Wachtler, C.J.).
78. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 443, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
79. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 304, 501 N.E.2d 556, 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 913
(1986), on remandfrom 475 U.S. 868 (1986); Arcara v. Cloud Books Inc., 68 N.Y.2d
553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986), on remand from 478 U.S. 697
(1986). See generally Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
80. See People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 504-06, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1347-48, 583
N.Y.S.2d 920, 938-40 (1992) (Kaye, J., concurring).
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ysis" of the rule against warrantless entries, and to reject as
well the "Supreme Court's latest interpretation of the deterrence and application breadth of that rule [sic]." 8 ' The majority
"rejects the analysis, wisdom and experience" of the United
States Supreme Court, 82 complained the dissenters, and "relegates that Supreme Court's work to an academic judicial
exercise."83
To the dissenters, the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court under the Federal Constitution are, at the least,
presumptively accurate as interpretations of the state constitution-even though the latter is a different charter, serving a different purpose, governing a different sovereignty and populace,
and reflecting different influences, customs, traditions, and policies.84 This notion of presumptive accuracy or validity has been
so thoroughly debunked in the literature and in the courts, including the Supreme Court itself,8 5 that one wonders how and
81. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 447, 570 N.E.2d at 1059, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see also infra note 599.
82. Id. at 442, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. at 447, 570 N.E.2d at 1059, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Judge Bellacosa is certainly correct that the Supreme Court's decision was
relegated to an "academic judicial exercise." But that is not an argument against
independent state adjudication. Rather it is one of the strongest arguments for
independent adjudication the first time around, i.e., for the state court to decide
the case in the first instance on adequate and independent state grounds and
thereby obviate Supreme Court review and the attendant waste of judicial resources at the Supreme Court, as well as at the Court of Appeals on remand. The
"reactive" use of state constitutional law-on the rebound after reversal and remand by the Supreme Court-was a prevailing approach to independent adjudication in the Wachtler era. See Galie, supra note 2, at 236; Bonventre, supra note 73,
at 51-54. For criticisms of the reactive approach see Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance
on State Constitutions: Away From a ReactionaryApproach, 9 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1 (1981); see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 735-39 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also infra notes 586-87 and accompanying text.
84. See Judith S. Kaye, A Midpoint Perspective on Directions in State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 17 (1988); Hans A. Linde, Does The
"New Federalism"Have a Future?, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 251 (1991).
See generally Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State
Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165 (1984); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Robert F. Williams,
Methodology Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 143 (1986-87).
85. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 505, 593 N.E.2d
1328, 1347, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 939 (1992) (Kaye, J., concurring); State v. Kennedy,
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why the dissenters could actually embrace it. That, they do not
explain. The dissenting opinion seems simply to assume that
the Supreme Court's decision somehow preordains the state
constitutional result.
In any event, a close reading of the dissenting opinion suggests another driving force behind its position. There is a not
too subtle anger and frustration in the dissent that law enforcement is being unreasonably hampered; that arbitrarily imposed
technicalities are interfering with crime control. 86 This view of
the dissenters is reflected quite vividly in the voting records of
both Judge Bellacosa and Chief Judge Wachtler which, for the
last few years of the Wachtler era, were heavily pro-prosecution
and rather unsympathetic to criminal defense claims. 87 In Harris II, Judge Bellacosa clearly expressed their shared position
about law enforcement and the rights of the accused at issue
when he wrote:
This case is not about the police invading the defendant's
dwelling. They had legal and constitutional probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a heinous murder and they
did what society expects its law enforcement officials to do: they
set out to locate and apprehend the suspected murderer....
...Why should law enforcement officials be "deterred" by a
court ruling that unfairly brands them in belated hindsight as flagrant wrongdoers and circumventers of the law... ?8
At issue then in Harris II were two fundamental questions
that philosophically, and emotionally, divided the Court. How
much deference, if any, should the Court of Appeals give to a
66 P.2d 1316, 1322 (Or. 1983) (Linde, J.); Nomination of Justice William Hubbs
Rehnquist: Hearings on the Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be
Chief Justice of the United States Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1986) (testimony of William H. Rehnquist); Lawrence G.
Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 959, 973-76 (1985); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme
Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 389-97 (1984).
86. See generally HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION

153-73, 227-38 (1968) (delineating the "crime control" and "due process" models of
criminal justice).
87. See infra notes 534-41 and accompanying text.
88. Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 443, 447, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 1059, 568 N.Y.S.2d
at 707, 710 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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ruling of the United States Supreme Court when deciding an
issue of state constitutional rights and liberties? And how are
the needs of law enforcement to be balanced against the rights
of the accused, especially when those rights are willfully violated by law enforcers? For the majority, deference to the
Supreme Court's decision was unwarranted because it would
leave fundamental state constitutional rights too vulnerable to
violation. For the dissenters, the Supreme Court's wisdom and
experience struck the correct balance in favor of law enforcement where the intrusion on the accused's liberties was
inconsequential.
These are perennial questions. They were bitterly argued
in Harris II, but they are present, one or both, in most state
constitutional criminal cases. Often times these questions lie
89
below the surface, but they are nevertheless present.
In another decision adjudging the validity of warrantless
police action, a divided Court of Appeals in People v. Rosario9°
extended the so-called "fellow officer" rule to auxiliary police.
Under the rule, a police officer with no firsthand knowledge is
entitled to make a warrantless arrest on the strength of probable cause information transmitted to him on the basis of a fel89. Other 1991 decisions placing limits on warrantless detentions were: People v. Felton, 78 N.Y.2d 1063, 1065, 581 N.E.2d 1344, 1345, 576 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90
(1991) (upholding, in a unanimous memorandum, an Appellate Division finding
that the defendant's unlawful striking of an officer who attempted to restrain him
physically without constitutional justification did not attenuate the illegality of the
stop sufficiently to render the ensuing arrest and incidental search lawful); People
ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 77 N.Y.2d 422, 426-27, 570 N.E.2d 223, 224-25, 568
N.Y.S.2d 575, 576-77 (1991) (upholding, in a unanimous per curiam decision, as a
purely factual finding, the determination of the Appellate Division, in turn affirming two trial court determinations, that pre-arraignment detention in New
York County beyond 24 hours is unjustified in the absence of an acceptable explanation on the ground that the steps leading to arraignment can generally be accomplished well within 24 hours after a warrantless arrest). In Maxian, the Court
of Appeals and the Appellate Division both avoided a constitutional ruling as unnecessary. See id. at 427, 570 N.E.2d at 225, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 577; People ex rel.
Maxian v. Brown, 164 A.D.2d 56, 66-67, 561 N.Y.S.2d 418, 424 (1st Dep't 1990).
Compare Maxian with County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1670
(1991) (holding as a matter of federal constitutionallaw that warrantless detention
is presumptively valid under the Fourth Amendment if judicial determination of
probable cause is made within 48 hours of arrest) and Jenkins v. Chief Justice, 619
N.E.2d 324, 334-35 (Mass. 1993) (holding that, under the Massachusetts constitution, warrantless arrest must usually be followed by judicial determination of
probable cause within 24 hours).
90. 78 N.Y.2d 583, 585 N.E.2d 766, 578 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1991).
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low officer's observations. 9 1 The status of the fellow officer, as a
police officer, is deemed under the rule to justify the arresting
officer's reliance on the relayed information. 92 The Rosario majority, in an opinion by Judge Fritz Alexander, held that auxiliary police, such as those trained in the New York City
Auxiliary Police Program to "assist the police in crime deterrence by their uniformed presence," 93 qualify as fellow officers
whose information may be relied upon under the rule.
The majority's rationale was one of cautious practicality
and law enforcement efficiency:
Applying the rule to [auxiliary police] is consistent with the underlying rationale of the "fellow officer" rule and furthers the objective of aiding the police in law enforcement.
We recognize that the training of auxiliary officers is not as
extensive as that required of police officers. However, the training they receive and the purposes they serve in aiding law enforcement provide sound policy reasons for applying the "fellow
officer" rule to auxiliary officers and militate against denying the
police the benefit of their aid and assistance .... 94.
In lone dissent, Judge Vito J. Titone seized upon the acknowledged disparity in the qualifications, experience, and
training of auxiliary officers as contrasted with that of members
of the regular police force. 95 Eligibility requirements for participation in the auxiliary police program are minimal; auxiliary
officers receive a small fraction of the instruction given to police;
and unlike police, their regular duties do not include making
arrests and their judgments are rarely tested in court.96 In
short, according to Judge Titone, "there is simply no basis for
inferring that the 'special skills' possessed by police officers that
91. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); People v. Lypka, 36
N.Y.2d 210, 213, 326 N.E.2d 294, 296, 366 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (1975).
92. See People v. Petralia, 62 N.Y.2d 47, 51-52, 464 N.E.2d 424, 426, 476
N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (1984); People v. Horowitz, 21 N.Y.2d 55, 60, 233 N.E.2d 453, 455,
286 N.Y.S.2d 473,.476-77 (1967).
93. Rosario, 78 N.Y.2d at 587, 585 N.E.2d at 768, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
94. Id. at 588, 589, 585 N.E.2d at 768, 769, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 456, 457 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 593, 585 N.E.2d at 771-72, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
96. Id. at 592-93, 585 N.E.2d at 771-72, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
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enable them to make a fair probable cause assessment in light
of the known facts are also possessed by auxiliary police
97
officers."
In expanding the "fellow officer" rule, the majority in Rosario emphasized the goal of "better enabling law enforcement to
do its job."9 8 But in the view of the dissenter, the majority had
given insufficient consideration "to the countervailing goal of
protecting citizens from unfounded or unwanted intrusions." 99
These, again, are the competing concerns omnipresent in consti10 0
tutional criminal cases.
In People v. Duuvon,'0 the Court addressed the admissibility of "showup" identifications. The identification in question
was made minutes after a robbery when the police returned the
defendant to the scene of the crime-arrested, handcuffed, and
97. Id. at 591, 585 N.E.2d at 771, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 459 (Titone, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 589, 585 N.E.2d at 769, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
99. Id. at 591, 585 N.E.2d at 770, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 458 (Titone, J., dissenting).
100. Other less significant decisions upholding warrantless searches were:
People v. Coutin, 78 N.Y.2d 930, 931-32, 578 N.E.2d 431, 431, 573 N.Y.S.2d 633,
634 (1991) (affirming, in a unanimous memorandum, determinations of reasonable
suspicion to stop the car in which defendant was a passenger and subsequent probable cause to search the car's interior where the underlying factual findings of the
trial court were undisturbed by the Appellate Division); People v. Smith, 78 N.Y.2d
897, 577 N.E.2d 1050, 573 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1991) (affirming, in a unanimous memorandum, a mixed legal/factual determination that the police were justified for
safety reasons in patting down the defendant who happened to be present in an
apartment which was entered pursuant to a warrant authorizing a search of the
apartment and its renters for illegal drugs and handguns).
In People v. Offen, 78 N.Y.2d 1089, 1091, 585 N.E.2d 370, 372, 578 N.Y.S.2d
121, 123 (1989), the Court, in a unanimous memorandum, sidestepped the issue of
whether a canine sniff of something other than a residence constitutes a search
under the state constitution, since there was the requisite reasonable suspicion for
a canine search where officials confirmed that defendant was receiving shipments
from Florida which two informants said contained cocaine. Id. at 1090-91, 585
N.E.2d at 371-72, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 122-23. The Court also held that the subsequent canine alert upon sniffing the package in question constituted probable
cause to support a search warrant. Id. at 1091, 585 N.E.2d at 372, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
123; cf People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 25-26, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d
388, 392 (1990) (holding that a canine sniff of the air emanating from the defendant's apartment constituted a "search" under the state constitution).
In People v. Cloud, 79 N.Y.2d 786, 587 N.E.2d 270, 579 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1991),
the Court, in a unanimous memorandum, affirmed a mixed factual/legal determination of exigency justifying a warrantless entry and arrest where police received
"direct and reliable information" that the defendant was armed, had previously
killed in the course of a robbery, and was holding hostages in a hotel room. Id. at
786-77, 587 N.E.2d at 270-71, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33.
101. 77 N.Y.2d 541, 571 N.E.2d 654, 569 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1991).
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seated in the back of the patrol car-to show him to an eyewitness. 10 2 The witness, who was likely aware that at least one
other witness had just identified the defendant, made a positive
10 3
identification himself.
The majority, speaking through Judge Bellacosa, held that
the identification fell "within the permissible boundaries of the
governing legal principles." 10 4 Those "principles" were apparently confined to the "temporal and spatial considerations"10 5
upon which the majority rested its decision. Acknowledging
that showup, i.e., one-on-one, identifications are normally disfavored because their suggestiveness undermines their reliability, 10 6 the majority nevertheless noted that "at-the-crime-scene
civilian showup identifications" are not necessarily invalid. 07
Explaining how these broad parameters applied to the facts of
the case, Judge Bellacosa stated:
[S]howup identification evidence should not be routinely admissible either. It must be scrutinized very carefully for unacceptable
suggestiveness and unreliability. The admission or suppression
of these street showup protocols thus turns on specific and varying circumstances in individual cases. The apprehension of this
perpetrator very near the crime scene coupled with the temporal

proximity0 8to the commission of the crime, withstands this
scrutiny

The fact that the showup in question occurred immediately
following another witness's at-the-scene identification admittedly "add[ed] another factor of concern and heightened scrutiny."10 9 And the fact that the defendant was handcuffed in the
back seat of a police car during the showup was "suggestive and
not preferred." 10 But, insisted the majority, the "exigent circumstances" of the case"',-everything happened "within min102. Id. at 543-44, 571 N.E.2d at 656, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
103. Id. at 545, 571 N.E.2d at 657, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
104. Id. at 544, 571 N.E.2d at 656, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
105. Id. at 545, 571 N.E.2d at 657, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
106. Id. at 543, 571 N.E.2d at 655, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
107. Id. at 543, 571 N.E.2d at 655, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
108. Id. at 543, 571 N.E.2d at 655, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (emphasis added) (citing People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921, 923, 549 N.E.2d 462, 463, 550 N.Y.S.2d 260,
261 (1989)).
109. Id. at 545, 571 N.E.2d at 657, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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utes and within a New York City block and a half"112-justified
the fact findings of the lower courts that the identification was
1 13
not unduly suggestive.
Ultimately, in the majority's view, the "probing,.. . skeptical fact finding" by lower courts will check against identification
abuse." 4 In Judge Bellacosa's concluding words: "Law enforcement officials, faced with rigorous review by the appropriate
courts will thus be made to understand that their evidencegathering work will not be tolerated whenever routinized, unduly suggestive identification modalities taint or rob the evi5
dence of reliability.""
Concurring in the Court's result, Judge Titone, joined by
Judges Simons and Hancock, objected that the majority was
11 6
equating temporal and geographic proximity to exigency.
"The majority's holding," Judge Titone wrote, "leads to the conclusion that, absent extraordinary circumstances, all 'prompton-the-scene' showups are permissible precisely because they
are prompt and conducted at or near the crime scene."" 7 As the
concurrence noted, such reasoning necessarily renders "prompton-the-scene" showups, by definition, per se or presumptively
admissible." 8
The concurring judges agreed that there should be an affirmance because the "virtually air tight proof" against the defendant rendered the identification evidence harmless." 9 But
they protested the majority's disregard of the due process analysis traditionally used to test the validity of showups.120 As
noted by the concurrers, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court have both recognized that showing a suspect singly to a
112. Id. at 545, 571 N.E.2d at 656, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
113. Id. at 545, 571 N.E.2d at 657, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
114. Id. at 546, 571 N.E.2d at 657, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
115. Id. (citing People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 530-31, 517
522 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846 (1987)).
116. Id.. at 546, 571 N.E.2d at 658, 569 N.Y.S.2d at
concurring).
117. Id. (Titone, J., concurring).
118. Id. (Titone, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 546, 571 N.E.2d at 657, 569 N.Y.S.2d at
concurring).
120. Id. at 547, 571 N.E.2d at 658, 569 N.Y.S.2d at
concurring).

N.E.2d 520, 524,
350 (Titone, J.,

349 (Titone, J.,
350 (Titone, J.,
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witness is "inherently suggestive." 12 1 Showups are nevertheless
tolerated, the concurring opinion clarified, when the need for a
speedy identification or some other exigency justifies the less
than ideal procedure. 122 Because there was no need in this case
for another on-the-scene identification-there had already been
two123 -nor any other exigency present to justify the suggestive
showup, 124 the due process standards applied in a long line of
12 5
Court of Appeals decisions were simply not met.
As Judge Titone explained in conclusion:
[T]he majority's holding in this case makes it difficult to foresee
when, if ever, a "prompt-on-the-scene showup" would be suppressed as unnecessarily suggestive. Despite their inherent
suggestiveness, such procedures would all be deemed "necessary"
under the majority's analysis, precisely because they are "prompt"
and conducted near the scene of the crime. And, even such additionally suggestive procedures as displaying the suspect in handcuffs and seated in the back of a patrol car would not be sufficient
to render the procedure "unnecessarily suggestive" . . . . Given

the majority's tolerance for such practices in a case where the police were already sure that they had the "right man," one is left to
wonder what the "rigorous review" that the majority mandates
126
really means.
To be sure, there is little due process analysis in the majority opinion. Rather, there is a deference to police "involv[ed] in
fast-paced street episodes and encounters" 127 and to the "skeptical factfinding of lower courts."128 By contrast, the concurring
121. Id. (Titone, J., concurring) (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302
(1967); People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 529, 517 N.E.2d 520, 523, 522 N.Y.S.2d 842,
845 (1990)).
122. Id. (Titone, J., concurring) (citing People v. Love, 57 N.Y.2d 1023, 1024,
443 N.E.2d 948, 949, 457 N.Y.S.2d 474, 475 (1982); People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d
241, 249, 423 N.E.2d 379, 382, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902, 905 (1981); People v. Rivera, 22
N.Y.2d 453, 239 N.E.2d 873, 293 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1968)).
123. Id. at 548-49 n.1, 571 N.E.2d at 659 n.1, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 351 n.1 (Titone,
J., concurring).
124. Id. at 549, 571 N.E.2d at 659, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
125. Id. at 547-48, 571 N.E.2d at 658, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 350 (Titone, J., concurring). See, e.g., supra notes 121-22.
126. Id. at 550, 571 N.E.2d at 660, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 352 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
127. Id. at 545, 571 N.E.2d at 657, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
128. Id. at 546, 571 N.E.2d at 657, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
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opinion was more concerned with adherence to due process safeguards because "the circumstances which surround these oneon-one procedures.., involve a high degree of suggestiveness,
which gives rise in turn to a substantial risk of error."129 The
risk of error was apparently irrelevant in Duuvon itself because
of the overwhelming evidence. But the concerns raised by the
concurrence will likely prove more critical in subsequent cases
where the evidence is not so strong and the showup identifications cannot so readily be deemed harmless. In such cases, the
130
majority's reasoning will be put to the test.
2.

Fair Trial, Sentencing, and Appeal

In People v. Jackson,'3' a four to three majority of the Court
of Appeals diluted 32 the fair trial protection of New York's Rosario rule. 33 Under that rule, adopted in the 1961 decision in
People v. Rosario,3 4 which was authored by then-Judge Stanley
H. Fuld, the prosecution must provide the defense with all prior
statements of prosecution witnesses that relate to the subject
matter of their testimony.' 35 Thirty years later in Jackson, the
129. Id. at 549, 571 N.E.2d at 659, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
130. Additional identification cases decided in 1991 were: People v. Burts, 78
N.Y.2d 20, 23-25, 574 N.E.2d 1024, 1026-27, 571 N.Y.S.2d 418, 420-21 (1991)
(holding, in a unanimous opinion by Judge Bellacosa, that the Appellate Division
could not remit the case for a post-trial hearing to determine the existence of an
independent source for the already admitted suggestive identification evidence because the error in permitting the jury to hear the flawed identification cannot be
cured after the evidence has been considered in rendering a guilty verdict; a reversal, new Wade hearing, and trial were ordered); People v. Williamson, 79 N.Y.2d
799, 800-01, 588 N.E.2d 68, 69, 580 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (1991) (holding, in a unanimous memorandum, that restricting the defendant's right to cross-examine the
complainant at the pre-Wade hearing was reversible error requiring a new preWade hearing where the central issue, the complainant's prior familiarity with the
defendant, was crucial to determining whether the photo identification was merely
confirmatory and therefore not suggestive).
131. 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585'N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991).
132. See Sidney H. Stein, Dilution of the Rosario Ruling, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 13,
1992, at 3, 8.
133. See supra note 19.
134. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
866 (1961).
135. Id. at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
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Court both weakened the enforcement of that rule, 136 and
stripped the rule of its constitutional underpinnings. 3 7 The
first the Court did as part and parcel of the resolution of the
issue presented in the case; the second, as a seemingly gratuitous undermining of a rule with sometimes disagreeable
consequences. 138

A long line of decisions applying the Rosario rule held that
the prosecution's failure to turn over witness statements was
not subject to harmless error analysis. 139 As the Court ex140
plained in its 1987 decision in People v. Jones:
When, as a result of the prosecutor's violation of the Rosario rule,
defense counsel has been deprived of material of which he or she
is unaware or cannot otherwise obtain, there is no way, short of
speculation, of determining how it might have been used or how
its denial to counsel might have damaged defendant's case.141
The automatic reversal requirement was thus deemed a logical
imperative of the Rosario decision itself. In Rosario, the Court
had reasoned that "omissions, contrasts and even contradictions, vital perhaps, for discrediting a witness, are certainly not
as apparent to the impartial presiding judge as to singleminded counsel for the accused; the latter is in a far better position to appraise the value of a witness' pretrial statements for
142
impeachment purposes."
136. This the majority did by creating an exception to the per se reversal rule
for Rosario violations. People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578
N.Y.S.2d 483; see discussion infra notes 180-92 and accompanying text.
137. This the majority did by insisting that the Rosario rule was merely a
policy decision, and not based on the federal or state constitution. Jackson, 78
N.Y.2d at 643-44, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487; see discussion infra
notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
138. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 643-44, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
139. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 552-53, 517 N.E.2d 865, 868-69,
523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 56-57 (1987); People v. Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490, 498-500, 517
N.E.2d 219, 224-25, 522 N.Y.S.2d 504, 509-10 (1987); People v. Ranghelle, 69
N.Y.2d 56, 63-64, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 1015-17,511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 584-86 (1986); People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 160, 480 N.E.2d 361, 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750
(1985); People v. Mattiace Indus., 52 N.Y.2d 739, 741, 417 N.E.2d 563, 564, 436
N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (1980); People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446, 454, 354 N.E.2d
801, 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62, 66 (1976).
140. 70 N.Y.2d 547, 517 N.E.2d 865, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1987).
141. Id. at 552, 517 N.E.2d at 868, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
142. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 290, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
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The Court in Rosario actually did apply a harmless error
analysis. 143 The conviction there was affirmed on the ground
that there was no "rational possibility" that the Rosario violation had any effect on the defendant's case because there was
"no possible question" of guilt. 44 But fifteen years later in People v. Consolazio,145 the Court held that Rosario violations were
per se reversible error, largely for the very reasons given in Rosario for the rule itself.146 As then-Judge Wachtler re-empha47
sized in his 1985 opinion for the Court in People v. Perez:
"[t]he essence of the Rosario requirement ... is that a judge's [or
appellate court's] impartial determination ... is no substitute
for the single-minded devotion of counsel for the accused" in determining the value of the witness' prior statement. 148 Hence in
Perez, as in Consolazio and every Court of Appeals decision
thereafter, a judicial assessment of the withheld statement's
possible use to the defense-i.e., judicial determination of the
possible harm of the Rosario violation-has been considered in49
appropriate, purely speculative, and even impossible.
But six years after Perez, in Jackson, in another opinion by
then-Chief Judge Wachtler, the Court's bare majority ordered
just such a judicial assessment. 50 The high court reversed the
decisions of the lower tribunals that had applied the precedentdictated per se reversal rule and had thus declined to engage
in the theretofore considered "impossible" appraisal of
prejudice. 15 1
After exhausting direct appeals, 52 the defendant in Jackson brought a postjudgment motion to vacate his conviction be143. Id. at 290-91, 173 N.E.2d at 884, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
144. Id. at 291, 173 N.E.2d at 884, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
145. 40 N.Y.2d 446, 354 N.E.2d 801, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1976).
146. Id. at 454-55, 354 N.E.2d at 805-06, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 66-67.
147. 65 N.Y.2d 154, 480 N.E.2d 361, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1985).
148. Id. at 160, 480 N.E.2d at 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51 (emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., Jones, 70 N.Y.2d at 551-52, 517 N.E.2d at 868, 523 N.Y.S.2d at
56; Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d at 498-99, 517 N.E.2d at 224, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 509; Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d at 454, 354 N.E.2d at 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
150. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 647-48, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
151. Id. at 642, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
152. See People v. Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d 265, 480 N.E.2d 727, 491 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1985).
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cause of a conceded Rosario violation. 153 The prosecution had
failed to provide the defendant with a written synopsis of its
15 4
pretrial interview with an important prosecution witness.
The trial judge, relying on Court of Appeals precedent that
harmless error analysis was inapplicable to Rosario violations,
vacated the convictions; the Appellate Division, relying on the
same, affirmed. 155 But the Court of Appeals, insisting that
postjudgment motions should be treated differently than direct
appeals, held that harmless error analysis was appropriate in
56
the former.
Of course, it is difficult to fathom how judicial assessment
of Rosario prejudice becomes less "impossible" or less "specula57
tive" on postjudgment motions than it is on direct appeals.
The majority did not even pretend to explain that. 53 Rather, it
59
said that its decision was dictated by the state legislature.
The statute governing postjudgment motions authorizes a
vacatur of an otherwise final conviction if the prosecution engaged in "[i]mproper and prejudicial conduct."160 According to
the majority, the statute thus "compels an inquiry into the presence or absence of prejudice."' 6' The majority ruled that a defendant seeking to vacate a conviction in a postjudgment
proceeding "must demonstrate a reasonable possibility" that the
Rosario violation "contributed to the verdict." 6 2 Judge Wachtler insisted that the "per se error rule is still the law in this
State" on direct appeals. 163 But cases where appeals have been
exhausted must be treated differently, he said:
The existence of the Judge-made per se error rule does not permit
us to subvert the language of [the statute] with impunity. Ulti153. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 640, 642, 585 N.E.2d at 796, 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
484, 486.
154. Id. at 642, 585 N.E.2d at 796, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
155. Id. at 642, 585 N.E.2d at 797-98, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 486; see People v. Jackson, 162 A.D.2d 470, 556 N.Y.S.2d 165 (2d Dep't 1990).
156. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
157. See id at 656, 585 N.E.2d at 806, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 494 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
160. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 440.10(1)(f) (McKinney 1983) (emphasis added).
161. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 646, 585 N.E.2d at 800, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
162. Id. at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
163. Id.
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mately, it is our responsibility as Judges to harmonize the common-law rule and the statutory remedy as far as practicable. This
is what we seek to do today. 164
Judge Titone, whose strongly worded dissent was joined by
Judges Alexander and Hancock, responded that the majority
"cannot seriously suggest" that the statutory language actually
dictated the abandonment of the per se reversal rule for
postjudgment motions. 65 The term "prejudice" in the governing
statute, explained the dissent, is surely satisfied by the "impairment of the 'substantial rights' of the accused" involved whenever Rosario is violated. 166 Such violations are "intrinsically
prejudicial." 67 Judge Titone elaborated:
When a prosecutor fails to disclose Rosario material during trial,
the defense is deprived of the opportunity to make the necessary
strategic judgments and do "the careful preparation required for
planning and executing an effective cross-examination." Further,
the defense has been prevented from exploring potential areas of
weakness in the prosecution's evidence. This deprivation goes to
the heart of counsel's ability to provide a meaningful defense
168

According to the dissenters, that is precisely why the Court
has been applying the per se reversal rule to Rosario violations. 69 As they further explained: "The use of the term 'per se'
in this context does not denote a complete absence of prejudice;
rather, it represents a short-hand way of saying that errors
164. Id. at 648, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
165. Id. at 654, 585 N.E.2d at 805, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 493 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
166. Id. (quoting N.Y. CRLm. PRoc. LAw § 470.05(1) (McKinney 1983)). Section 470.05(1) governs direct appeals generally and requires that they be determined "without regard to technical errors or defects which do not affect the
substantialrights of the parties." § 470.05(1) (emphasis added). As explained by
the dissent, the Court had been applying the per se reversal rule to direct appeals
because Rosarioviolations necessarily affect the "substantial rights" of defendants.
Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 654, 585 N.E.2d at 805, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 493 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
167. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 654, 585 N.E.2d at 805, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 493
(Titone, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing People v. Jones, 70
N.Y.2d 547, 552, 517 N.E.2d 865, 868, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 56 (1987); People v.
O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 279-80, 579 N.E. 2d 189, 193-94, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 16364 (1991)).
169. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
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within that class are prejudicial by their very nature and that,
accordingly, nothing further need be shown to compel
170
reversal."
As Judge Titone argued, "the majority's choice to reach a
different result" could not, therefore, really be attributed to the
use of the term "prejudice" in a statute. 17' Indeed, laced
throughout the majority opinion is recognition that the result
reached was not in fact dictated by statutory language; that it
was instead a policy judgment preferring finality of convictions
to the values underlying Rosario and the per se rule. In the
majority's own concluding words:
[Olur decision to treat [postjudgment] motions differently [where]
the defendant has exhausted direct review is not a product of
whim or caprice. Rather, it is a reflection of our ongoing effort to
accommodate both society's interest in finality and the defendant's right to examine impeachment evidence. We have endeavored to fashion a rule that addressed our concerns regarding the
infinite duration of the [postjudgment] remedy without undermin172
ing the fairness concerns that are at the core of Rosario.
The dissent's point was not only that the majority's result
was the majority's own choice-rather than a result actually
compelled by statutory language-but that the majority's
choice was the wrong one. It contravened the line of decisions
applying the per se rule to Rosario violations, including a recent
precedent where the violation was in fact raised on a postjudgment motion. 73 And it compromised the fundamental fair trial
170. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 650, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490 (emphasis added); see
also id. at 647, 585 N.E.2d at 800, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489 ("[iut is for us... to look at
the statutory requirement of prejudice and to determine the reading that this language should be given") (emphasis added); id. at 648, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578
N.Y.S.2d at 488-89 ("[u]ltimately, it is our responsibility as Judges to harmonize
the common-law [per se] rule and the statutory remedy as far as practicable")(emphasis added); id. at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490 ("[tlhe interest in
finality implicated by [postjudgment] motions has led us to conclude that defendants must be prepared to show . . . actual, ascertainable prejudice") (emphasis
added).
173. Id. at 656-57, 585 N.E.2d at 807, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 495 (Titone, J., dissenting) (discussing People v. Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490, 517 N.E.2d 219, 522 N.Y.S.2d
504 (1987)).
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values underlying Rosario in order to insure the repose of judgments of conviction. As Judge Titone put it:
[O]ur responsibility in the judiciary is to apply reasoning and precedent with a view toward fairness, both to society and the accused. While society's interest in the finality of criminal
convictions is, no doubt, an important value, so too is society's interest in the "fundamental objective" of providing the accused
with a fair opportunity to test the People's witnesses through the
crucible of cross-examination-the value that informs the Rosario rule. To the extent that we remain committed to that value,
we are also duty bound to uphold it even in contexts where the
174
consequences may be viewed by some as undesirable.
The merits of the per se reversal rule are certainly debatable. 175 But the majority opinion's professed fidelity to the
rule, 176 even as it carved out a questionably explained exception, seems dubious. 7 7 More forthright was Judge Bellacosa's
categorical criticism of the per se rule in his recent concurrence
in People v. Jones.78 There, calling the rule an "errant footstep[ ]" in the application of Rosario, he called for its outright
79
repeal by the state legislature.
174. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 660, 585 N.E.2d at 809, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 497
(Titone, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 550, 517 N.E.2d 865,
867, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55 (1987) (quoting People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 158, 480
N.E.2d 361, 363, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (1985))).
175. See, e.g., Jones, 70 N.Y.2d at 553, 517 N.E.2d at 869, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 57
(Bellacosa, J., concurring); Stephen J. Bogacz, Appellate Conflict Over 'Rosariol
Ranghele' Rule, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 24, 1992, at 1, 4-5; see also People v. Young, 172
A.D.2d 790, 569 N.Y.S.2d 162 (2d Dep't 1991) (carving a "common senses" exception to the per se rule), rev'd, 79 N.Y.2d 365, 591 N.E.2d 1163, 582 N.Y.S.2d 977
(1992); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 240.45 commentary at 288 (McKinney 1993) (stating that in some cases, courts have confined the scope of Rosario in order to avoid
seemingly absurd results from application of the per se rule).
176. See Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 648, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489
('[tihis holding does not represent a de facto elimination of the per se error rule");
id. at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490 ("we would like to emphasize
that the per se error rule is still the law in this State when a Rosario claim is the
subject of a direct appeal .... We continue to believe that defense counsel is in a
far better position than the trial judge to determine the impeachment value of
Rosario material.").
177. See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
178. 70 N.Y.2d 547, 553, 517 N.E.2d 865, 869, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53, 57 (1987) (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 557, 517 N.E.2d at 871, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 59 (Bellacosa, J.,
concurring).
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The Jackson majority, by contrast, "balanc[ing]" and
"harmoniz[ing]" policy considerations with Rosario values, 180 insisted that its determination against the per se rule was limited
to postjudgment
motions where the statutory language required
"prejudice."' 81 But the dissenters made a strong case that "the
...majority's rationale [was] nothing more than an exercise in
result-directed statutory construction that simply does not
182
withstand scrutiny."
It may well be that the per se reversal rule exacts too high a
cost in unsettling judgments that are otherwise final and in reversing convictions that are in fact untainted by a Rosario violation. It may well be that convictions should be left undisturbed
where there is no rationalconnection between the Rosario violation and the outcome of the criminal trial. This is the test
actually applied in People v. Rosario.8 3 Under such a standard,
a conviction would stand-whether challenged on direct appeal
or on postjudgment motions-where the evidence was "airtight"'8 and there was "no possible question" that the Rosario
185
violation was inconsequential.
But having one rule for direct appeals and then another for
postjudgment proceedings is perhaps the most unsatisfactory
180. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 648, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
181. Id. at 648-50, 585 N.E.2d at 801-03, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489-91.
182. Id. at 652, 585 N.E.2d at 804, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 491 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
183. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 291, 173 N.E.2d 881, 884, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, 451 (1961). In
Rosario, the Court weighed "whether... there was a rationalpossibility that the
jury would have reached a different verdict...." Id. There, the Court found that
there was "no possible question of the appellant's guilt, even apart from the testimony of the witnesses whose statements had been requested and refused." Id.
(emphasis added). This rationalitystandard would seem to require the reversal of
a conviction unless the claim of prejudice from the Rosarioviolation is utterly without merit, senseless or illogical; this is somewhat more protective than the "reasonable possibility" standard of Jackson, which would seem to require a reversal only
where the defendant could show some particularized substantial, or distinct
chance of harm. See Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
490 (stating that "defendants must be prepared to show that actual, ascertainable
prejudice resulted") (emphasis added).
184. See People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 546, 571 N.E.2d 654, 657, 578
N.Y.S.2d 346, 349 (1991) (Titone, J., concurring).
185. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 291, 173 N.E.2d at 884, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 451. The
Court in Rosario concluded that "we are as convinced as judges may ever be, in
view of the overwhelming proof of guilt and the absence of any real inconsistency
between prior statement and trial testimony, that the jury would not have decided
the case differently." Id.
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resolution of all. Its ramifications are particularly arbitrary
and counterproductive to the purposes of Rosario. So for example, after Jackson, the application of the per se rule is contingent upon the fortuity of when the Rosario violation is
discovered; 8 6 only those discovered prior to final appeal are unconditionally vindicated. Moreover, because the government's
position under Jackson is strengthened on postjudgment motions, the prosecution has a strong disincentive against acknowledging any Rosario failure until after appeals have been
exhausted. 187 As the dissenters elaborated:
[T]he rule the majority adopts will lead to an unacceptable disparity in the administration of the Rosario rule. On the one hand,
defendants who are able to demonstrate [a Rosario violation] on
direct appeal ...

will be entitled to a new trial without further

inquiry. In contrast, defendants who have equally meritorious
Rosario claims but are relegated to [postjudgment] challenges will
be required to make a particularized showing of actual prejudice....

This disparity is especially troubling because it makes

the outcome depend largely upon the timing 18of8 disclosure, a matter that is solely within the People's control.
The dissenting judges continued:
[B]ecause the timing of disclosure will now be all but dispositive,
the rule the majority adopts creates a strong incentive for prosecutors who belatedly discover potential Rosario material to postpone disclosure until... the only remedy the defendant has is to
seek [Criminal Procedure Law section] 440.10 postjudgment
relief. Such a result is objectionable because it rewards
prosecutorial gamesmanship and runs directly counter to the
underlying Rosario policy of encouraging prompt and full
9
disclosure.' 8
It is unlikely that the Jackson majority was unaware of
such evident discrepancies. It is, perhaps, more likely that
there was sentiment within the majority for "harmonizing" the
treatment of direct appeals and postjudgment motions by elimi186. See Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 657, 585 N.E.2d at 807, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 495
(Titone, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 659, 585 N.E.2d at 808, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 496 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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nating the per se rule for both. 190 Indeed, the dissenting opinion
expressed "a degree of skepticism" about the majority's support
for the per se rule under any circumstance.' 19 As the dissenters
noted, the majority's "demotion" of the per se rule "certainly
opens the way for its further curtailment-or even its
92
reversal."1
The dissent further observed that the majority, by characterizing the per se rule as a mere "policy decision," 93 had rendered the rule "susceptible to attack by a court that wishes to
emphasize other values or policy considerations." 94 But the
majority did more than that. It "demoted" not only the per se
rule, but Rosario itself. Like the per se rule, and like the exception to that rule carved out for postjudgment proceedings, the
Rosario requirement itself was, according to the Jackson majority, merely a judicialpolicy choice among competing considerations. 95 The majority argued that Rosario was not dictated
by 196 or even predicated on 97 constitutional mandates.
"Rosariois not based on the State or Federal Constitution,"
claimed the majority. 198 Instead, according to the Wachtlerwritten opinion, it is a mere "discovery rule, based" on the
Court's belief in "simple fairness." 99 These assertions, however, are difficult to reconcile with a fair reading of the Court's
prior decisions delineating and enforcing the Rosario rule.
190. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 553, 517 N.E.2d 865, 869, 523
N.Y.S.2d 53, 57 (Bellacosa, J., concurring); see also supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
191. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 660 n.6, 585 N.E.2d at 809 n.6, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
497 n.6 (Titone, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 660, 585 N.E.2d at 809, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 497 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
193. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 645, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
194. Id. at 660, 585 N.E.2d at 809, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 497 (Titone, J., dissenting)
(referring to the majority's argument that "[a]pplying a per se error rule in the
Rosario cases that reached this Court on direct appeal was thus a policy decision").
195. See Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 644, 585 N.E.2d at 798, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 486
("It is, in essence, a discovery rule"); id. at 648, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
489 ("in Rosario ...and the other per se error reversal cases [that followed] we
struck a balance").
196. Id. at 648, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
197. Id. at 644, 585 N.E.2d at 798, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
198. Id. at 644, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
199. Id.
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The Court's use of the per se reversal rule over the years
rested, in fact, on the determination that Rosario's protection
was crucial to a fair trial. Rosario violations were treated as
"inherently prejudicial" 20 0 because they "damaged [a] defendant's case" by depriving counsel of the opportunity to do "the
careful preparation required for planning and executing an effective cross-examination." 20 1 Indeed, Rosario was predicated
on "a right sense of justice" and "substantial right."20 2 Further,
that seminal decision and its progeny have left no room for
doubt that the purpose of the Rosario rule is to protect the
rights to confront adverse witnesses and to present an effective
20 3
defense.
But the Jackson majority made a point of denuding the Rosario rule of any constitutional foundation. "In Rosario,"as well
as the decisions establishing the per se rule, "[wle were not impelled by constitutional mandates to make the choices that we
did,"20 4 the majority insisted. "Rather," the Wachtler-authored
opinion continued, "we were motivated by a desire to treat defendants fairly... [, but] today [we are] striking a different balance."205 As Judge Titone responded for the dissenters: "after
reading the majority's opinion, one is left with the impression
that rules of law are merely matters of policy preferences to be
200. See People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 279-80, 579 N.E.2d 189, 193-94,
574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 163-64 (1991) (referring to People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547, 517
N.E.2d 865, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1987) and People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 480 N.E.2d
361, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1985)).
201. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d at 552, 517 N.E.2d at 868, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
202. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 291, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 884, 213 N.Y.S.2d at
450, 452.
203. See People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 551, 399 N.E.2d 924, 929,
423 N.Y.S.2d 893, 898 (1979) (stating that "the right to cross-examine witnesses
subsumes the right to obtain disclosure of their prior statements") (citing Rosario,
9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450); Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289,
173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450 (stating that witness' statements 'will
prove helpful on cross-examination"); Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 290, 173 N.E.2d at 883,
213 N.Y.S.2d at 451 (stating that defendants should have " ' the benefit' of any 'information that can legitimately tend to overthrow the case made for the prosecution... '") (quoting People v. Davis, 18 N.W. 362, 363-64 (Mich. 1884)); see also
Jones, 70 N.Y.2d at 552, 517 N.E.2d at 868, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 56; Perez, 65 N.Y.2d at
158, 480 N.E.2d at 363, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 749; People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 150,
186 N.E. 422, 425 (1933).
204. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 648, 585 N.E.2d at 801, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (emphasis added).
205. Id. (emphasis added).
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invoked, modified, or simply ignored when their consequences
are, in the eyes of four members of this Court, inconvenient or
20 6
undesirable."
Though the dissenting opinion was particularly addressing
the abandonment of the per se rule, its observation was a fortiori apropos for the majority's recasting of the Rosario rule itself.
Rosario may not be an explicit dictate of a specific state constitutional provision. But, contrary to the Jackson majority's assertions, it is unquestionably "based" on constitutional values
which, in turn, unquestionably "impel" appropriate safeguards.
The Rosario rule is just such a safeguard; its overriding purpose
has always been to help safeguard a criminal defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial.
The majority's recharacterization of Rosario as a mere "discovery rule" and "policy choice" is, of course, more than academic. By denying the Rosario rule's constitutional
underpinnings, the majority "render[ed] the law susceptible to
sudden directional changes based upon nothing more than a
change in the prevailing judicial sentiment .. "2o7 The majority thus also exposed the "nonconstitutionally based" Rosario
rule to modification-including substantial alteration and even
outright overruling-by legislative action, as well as by judicial
decisionmaking. These possibilities, not lost on the dissenters, 208 were surely appreciated by the majority that created
206. Id. at 650, 585 N.E.2d at 803, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 491 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
207. Id. at 659, 585 N.E.2d at 808, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 497 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
208. Id. at 659-60, 585 N.E.2d at 808-09, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
Curiously, the Court took an unusually long seven months to decide Jackson.
Oral arguments were held in May, but the decision was held over summer recess
and not rendered until December. See id. at 638, 585 N.E.2d at 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d
at 483. The case was apparently the source of protracted debate and considerable
dissension within the Court.
Shortly after Chief Judge Wachtler's resignation, the Court in People v.
Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 593 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1992), refortified the
Rosario rule. It became again a "fundamental precept of this state's criminal jurisprudence," in the words of then-Judge Kaye who wrote for the majority. Id. at 615,
608 N.E.2d at 1071, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 493. In dissent, Judge Bellacosa claimed that
the Court was applying the per se reversal rule contrary to the teaching of Jackson. Id. at 622, 608 N.E.2d at 1076, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 498 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Prior to Banch, however, the Court rendered other decisions less favorable to the
Rosario rule. See, e.g., People v. Rogelio, 79 N.Y.2d 843, 844, 588 N.E.2d 83, 84,
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them. 209
The Court, in 1991, revisited the confusing and confused
related issues of the defendant's right to be present, the trial
judge's nondelegable duties, and the critical stages of a trial. In
the several cases specifically posing questions about the scope of
the right to be present, the Court's decisions seemed somewhat
ad hoc, and thus, did little to clear an increasingly muddied
area of the law.
The right of a defendant to be personally present at all material stages of his criminal trial has long been recognized as a
constitutional imperative by the Court of Appeals, 210 as well as
by the United States Supreme Court, whose seminal decision on
the subject under federal law was authored by New York's revered former chief judge. 211 But in recent years, it has been difficult to divine some consistency in the application of that right
or coherence in its delineation by the Court of Appeals. A pair
of cases decided by the Court in the year immediately preceding
the one under review is illustrative.

580 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (1992) (holding that the defendant failed to preserve the
prosecution's alleged Rosario violation for review).
209. On the same day Jackson was decided, the Court issued a decision in
People v. Bin Wahad, 79 N.Y.2d 787, 587 N.E.2d 274, 579 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1991).
There, the majority, applying Jackson and reversing the Appellate Division which
had applied the per se reversal rule on a postjudgment motion, People v. Bin
Wahad, 172 A.D.2d 403, 568 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1st Dep't 1991), remitted the case for a
hearing to determine whether the defendant could prove a reasonable possibility of
prejudice from the Rosario violation. Bin Wahad, 79 N.Y.2d at 789, 587 N.E.2d at
275, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 637. The three Jackson dissenters dissented again, arguing
once more that "no further showing need be made" than that Rosario was in fact
violated. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
Other 1991 decisions implicating a criminal defendant's right of confrontation
were: People v. Charles, 78 N.Y.2d 1044, 1046, 581 N.E.2d 1336, 1337-38, 576
N.Y.S.2d 81, 82-83 (1991) (holding, in a unanimous memorandum, that it was error to permit the prosecution to use against the defendant testimony about a joint
statement of the defendant and his co-defendant, where the prosecution was unable to ascertain which admissions were attributable to whom); People v. Cardwell, 78 N.Y.2d 996, 998, 580 N.E.2d 753, 754, 575 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (1991)
(holding, in a unanimous memorandum, that a severance should have been
granted where the separate defenses of the co-defendants were irreconcilably conflicting, one co-defendant, in effect, becoming a second prosecutor offering damaging evidence beyond that elicited by the prosecution).
210. See, e.g., People v. Thorn, 156 N.Y. 286, 50 N.E. 947 (1898).
211. See Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (Cardozo, J.).
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In People v. Cain,2 12 the Court held that it was per se reversible error for the trial judge, at a post verdict conference
attended by counsel and the prosecutor but in the defendant's
absence, to discuss his instructions with a juror who had initially indicated some reservations during a poll on the verdict. 2 13 Judge Bellacosa, alone in dissent, complained that the
post verdict discussion and the defendant's absence therefrom
"had absolutely nothing to do with the integrity of the verdict";
he argued that automatic reversal of the conviction was there214
fore "unwarranted."
Several weeks thereafter, in People v. Harris,215 the Court
reached the opposite result where the trial judge, in the presence of counsel and prosecution but not the defendant, spoke
with the deliberating jury to clarify its request for a read back of
trial testimony.21 6 Judge Titone, the author of the Cain majority, was now in dissent with Judge Kaye, challenging the
Court's characterization of the judge's colloquy with the jury as
merely "ministerial."21 7 The dissent also noted that a personally present defendant might well have had views about the
jury's inquiry and about an appropriate response. 2 8 Moreover,
as Judge Titone pointed out, 219 the Court had recently held in
People v. Torres220 that a single sentence communication to a
jury to continue deliberating could not be treated as
"ministerial."221
In 1991, there was less disagreement within the Court on
those issues, but no less confusion as to the import of prior decisions or on the current reach of the right to be present. In Peo212. 76
213. Id.
214. Id.
dissenting).
215. 76
216. Id.
217. Id.
dissenting).
218. Id.
dissenting).
219. Id.
dissenting).
220. 72
221. Id.

N.Y.2d 119, 556 N.E.2d 141, 556 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1990).
at 123-24, 556 N.E.2d at 142-43, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 849-50.
at 127, 556 N.E.2d at 145, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (Bellacosa, J.,
N.Y.2d 810, 559 N.E.2d 660, 559 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1990).
at 811, 559 N.E.2d at 661, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
at 813, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968 (Titone, J.,
at 814, 559 N.E.2d at 663, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (Titone, J.,
at 813, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968 (Titone, J.,
N.Y.2d 1007, 531 N.E.2d 635, 534 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1988).
at 1009, 531 N.E.2d at 636, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
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ple v. Velasco,222 each of the defendant's multiple claims was
rejected in a unanimous unsigned opinion. Though the Court
reaffirmed the constitutional due process foundation for a223defendant's right to be present at all material stages of a trial, it
dismissed in short order all of the defendant's arguments that
his right was in various ways violated. 224 According to the
Court, the defendant's presence was not required at a precharge
conference where, among other things, the attorneys for both
sides discussed a stipulation about evidence and the trial
court's instructions to the jury, and the judge entertained motions to dismiss some of the charges. 225 The Court of Appeals'
the "conference involved only
unelaborated rationale was that
226
questions of law or procedure."
But that would seem to fly in the face of the previous year's
reasoning in the aforementioned Harris decision. 227 There, in
another unsigned opinion, the majority had rejected the right to
be present claim for the very reason that the discussion in question was "unrelated to the substantive legal or factual issues of
the trial."228 In short, both the involvement and the noninvolve-

ment of legal issues has been used by the Court to deny the
right to be present. It would thus appear that something other
than the Court's expressed rationale was driving its decision in
Velasco.
The Court in Velasco also rejected the defendant's contention that he had a right to be present at the "side-bar voir
dire."229 The trial judge had directed all prospective jurors

wishing to respond to his questions about juror disqualification
to approach the bench. Several jurors did, and the judge en222. 77 N.Y.2d 469, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 568 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1991).
223. Id. at 472, 570 N.E.2d at 1070, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (citing People v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 4-5, 374 N.E.2d 369, 370-71, 403 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471-72 (1977)).
The Court failed, however, to distinguish the state from the federal protection;
instead it spoke in Velasco generally of "due process" and the "constitutional right."
Id. at 472-73, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
224. Id. at 472-73, 570 N.E.2d at 1071-72, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722-23.
225. Id. at 472, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. People v. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d 810, 559 N.E.2d 660, 559 N.Y.S.2d 966
(1990); see also supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
228. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968 (emphasis added).
229. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d at 472, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
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gaged in side-bar discussions with them in the presence of the
prosecutor and counsel but, again, not the defendant himself.
Following these discussions, some jurors were excused and
230
others retained.
The Court of Appeals held that the defendant had no right
to be present at these side-bar discussions. It offered as reasons
that juror disqualification is "a matter for the [trial] court," that
the defendant "was present during the initial questioning," and
that he was "represented by counsel ... at the bench." 23 1 The
Court did not explain how these factors fit within standards established in previous decisions-i.e., how these factors determined that the side-bars were not "material stages" of the trial.
Surely, for example, the fact that the defendant was "represented by counsel at the bench" is not an answer. Rather,
whether such representation obviates a defendant's presenceand if so why-is the question. So too, neither the fact that
juror disqualification was to be decided by the judge nor that
the defendant was present at an earlier part of the proceeding
answers the question of whether the defendant should have
been present at the ensuing side-bar which ultimately led to the
judge's decisions.
The Court's conclusion that the defendant's presence
would, "under the circumstances, . . . have been useless,"232
while possibly accurate as a practical proposition, was not really shown to be true as a factual matter; nor was it shown to be
the governing legal standard applied in prior Court of Appeals
cases. Indeed, the Court of Appeals was relying on the 1934
2 3 3 for the
Supreme Court decision in Snyder v. Massachusetts
"would have been useless" test.234 But that test made sense in
Snyder where harmless error analysis was applied. 235 It did not
make nearly as much sense in Velasco where, presumably, the
Court of Appeals' own absolute right/per se reversal rule was
230. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1072, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1934)).
233. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
234. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1071-72, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722-23
(citing Synder, 291 U.S. at 108).
235. 291 U.S. at 122.
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applicable-as the Court has repeatedly insisted in right to be
236
present cases.
Finally, in Velasco, the Court also rejected the defendant's
contention that his right to be present was violated when he
was absent from a robing room conference in which the attorneys advised the court of their preemptory challenges and argued for challenges for cause. 237 The Court said it was enough
that the defendant "had an opportunity to consult with his attorney" on these matters and that the challenges were "later
effectuated in open court" in the defendant's presence. 23 8 For
these reasons, according to the Court, the in-chambers discussions and arguments "did not constitute a material part of the
23 9
trial."
Again, it is not clear how the Court's conclusion follows, nor
how its reasoning conforms to prior right to be present decisions. Surely, the Court could not seriously be suggesting-as
it seemed to be-that a defendant could be absented from trial
proceedings solely because he previously consulted with counsel
and was subsequently present for the ensuing decisions in the
courtroom. The question remains: which trial proceedings are
"material" and thus trigger a defendant's purportedly "absolute" right to be present?
The conclusory determinations in Velasco shed little light
on that question. Instead, they suggest that the court's decisions were more ad hoc than faithful to any theretofore asserted
standards. Very possibly, the rigid absolute right/per se reversal rule was operating as a powerful disincentive against the
Court's finding any violation of the right to be present-unless
236. See, e.g., People v. Cain, 76 N.Y.2d 119, 124, 556 N.E.2d 141, 143, 556
N.Y.S.2d 848, 850 (1990) (stating that a defendant's right to be present is "absolute," hence, lack of prejudice is irrelevant where defendant was absent during
judge's post verdict discussion of jury instructions with reluctant juror); People v.
Brooks, 75 N.Y.2d 898, 899, 553 N.E.2d 1328, 1329, 554 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (1990)
(holding that when a defendant is absent during summations and jury instructions, and a judge has failed to inquire as to the reasons behind his absence, it is
reversible error for the court to proceed with the trial without the defendant being
present); People v. Mehmedi, 69 N.Y.2d 759, 760, 505 N.E.2d 610, 611, 513
N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (1986) (stating that a defendant's right to be present during jury
instructions is absolute).
237. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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the trial proceeding at issue was truly critical and integral to a
defendant's right to participate in his own defense.
Such a proceeding was at issue, for example, in People v.
Turaine,240 decided several weeks later. There, the defendant
had been excluded, over counsel's objection, from a hearing conducted by the trial judge to examine a prospective prosecution
witness, who would testify that the defendant had threatened
him.24 1 In a unanimous memorandum, the New York Court
ruled generally that "[p]roceedings where testimony is received
are material stages of the trial."242 In particular, the Court held
that the "Id]efendant was entitled to confront the witness
against him" and to "advise counsel of any errors or falsities in
243
the witnesses' testimony."
The Court then specifically rejected the Appellate Division's ruling that the defendant's rights were sufficiently protected when he was present during the witness's subsequent
testimony in open court before the jury. 2 " "At that stage of the
trial," the Court of Appeals reasoned, the trial judge "had already decided the evidence had probative value and would be
245
received."
But such reasoning was absent from Velasco. There, the
Court deemed it acceptable for the defendant to be excluded
from the decisionmaking proceedings as long as he had the opportunity to consult with counsel beforehand and to be present
afterward when the judge's decisions were announced or carried
6
out in open court.2
Evidently, considerations other than those asserted by the
Court as dispositive were guiding these decisions. Whatever is
a "material" stage at which a defendant's "absolute" right to be

240. 78 N.Y.2d 871, 577 N.E.2d 55, 573 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1991).
241. Id. at 872, 577 N.E.2d at 56, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.; see People v. Turaine, 162 A.D.2d 262, 556 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1st Dep't
1990).
245. Turaine, 78 N.Y.2d at 872, 577 N.E.2d at 56, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
246. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722; see
also supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
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present attaches is hardly clearer as a result of the Court's rul247
ings in these cases.
In People v. Bonaparte,248 the defendant's right to be present claim was rejected on the ground that the function carried
out by the court officer in the absence of the defendant and his
attorney was merely ministerial. 249 The court officer, at the direction of the trial judge, informed the deliberating jurors to
cease their deliberations for the evening; he also told them that
they would be taken to dinner and sequestered until the morning. 250 No instructions were given, by the court officer or any247. Related 1991 decisions were: People v. Ortega, 78 N.Y.2d 1101, 1102,
585 N.E.2d 372, 373, 578 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (1991) (holding, in a unanimous memorandum, that the trial judge's private conference with a prosecution witness to
induce disclosure of a confidential informant's identity "violated defendant's
rights") (citing Turaine, 78 N.Y.2d at 872, 577 N.E.2d at 56, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 65);
People v. Richards, 77 N.Y.2d 969, 969, 575 N.E.2d 391, 391, 571 N.Y.S.2d 905,
905 (1991). In Richards, the Court, in a unanimous entry, adopted the Appellate
Division's ruling in People v. Richards, 157 A.D.2d 753, 551 N.Y.S.2d 790 (2d Dep't
1990), which upheld the trial judge's closure of the courtroom during the testimony
of an undercover officer, reasoning that closure was necessary to protect the officer's safety and the integrity of ongoing operations. 157 A.D.2d at 753, 551
N.Y.S.2d at 790. The Appellate Division had relied on the state's open trial/fair
trial analysis in People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 418 N.Y.S.2d
359 (1979). Richards, 157 A.D.2d at 753, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
In People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 579 N.E.2d 189, 574 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1991),
the Court, in a unanimous opinion by Judge Titone, held that it was a per se reversible denial of the meaningful participation of counsel in a critical stage of trial
where the trial judge, who in open court urged the stalemated jury to continue
deliberating, refused to disclose to the defendant and his counsel the contents of a
juror's note which had requested the judge's help in resolving the jury's difficulties
in reaching agreement. Id. at 292, 579 N.E.2d at 193, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
Other right to counsel cases were: People v. Slaughter, 78 N.Y.2d 485, 492,
583 N.E.2d 919, 923, 577 N.Y.S.2d 206, 210 (1991) (holding, in a unanimous opinion by Judge Hancock, that the defendant's waiver of right to counsel was ineffective and that it was prejudicial error for the trial judge to permit the defendant to
proceed pro se without first conducting an inquiry to ensure that the defendant
understood the benefits of counsel he was foregoing); People v. Blount, 77 N.Y.2d
888, 888, 571 N.E.2d 78, 78, 568 N.Y.S.2d 908, 908 (1991) (adopting, in a unanimous entry, the Appellate Division's ruling in People v. Blount, 159 A.D.2d 579,
580, 552 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (2d Dep't 1990), that it was a reversible violation of the
defendant's right to counsel where the trial judge forbade the defendant's attorney
to discuss the defendant's testimony with him during an overnight recess called in
the course of cross-examination).
248. 78 N.Y.2d 26, 574 N.E.2d 1027, 571 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1991).
249. Id. at 30-31, 574 N.E.2d at 1030, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
250. Id. at 29, 574 N.E.2d at 1029, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
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one else, that the jurors should not discuss the case until
deliberations resumed. 251
The Appellate Division reversed the ensuing conviction on
the grounds that the trial judge had improperly delegated a judicial function to the court officer and, thus, violated the defendant's right to be present at the communication with the
deliberating jurors. 252 The Court of Appeals, in a unanimous
decision by then-Chief Judge Wachtler, reversed. "[Nlot every
communication with a deliberating jury," said the Court, "requires the participation of the [trial judge] or the presence of
the defendant." 25 3 According to the Court, the communication
here was among those ministerial functions that a trial judge
254
might delegate.
The Court actually expressed its disapproval of the trial
judge's procedure, and indeed, prescribed the "better practice"
of the judge herself communicating with the jurors and directing them not to discuss the case during sequestration. 255
Nevertheless, the Court held that the trial judge had not improperly delegated any judicial authority and that defendant's
presence was not required during the communications with the
jury because "the court officer did not deliver any instructions to
the jury concerning the mode or subject of their
deliberations." 256
The Court contended that this case was "easily distinguished"257 from People v. Torres.258 In Torres, according to the
Court of Appeals, the court officer handled a "particularly sensitive matter" when he told a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating.259 Actually, the court officer in Torres did no more than
relay, without embellishment, the trial judge's one sentence directive to the jury; there were no questions, no answers, no dis251. Id. at 28, 274 N.E.2d at 1028, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
252. See People v. Bonaparte, 161 A.D.2d 774, 774-75, 556 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364
(2d Dep't 1990).
253. Bonaparte, 78 N.Y.2d at 30, 574 N.E.2d at 1029, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
254. Id. at 30-31, 574 N.E.2d at 1029-30, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24.
255. Id. at 32, 574 N.E.2d at 1031, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
256. Id. at 31, 574 N.E.2d at 1030, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
257. Id. at 31, 574 N.E.2d at 1030, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
258. 72 N.Y.2d 1007, 531 N.E.2d 635, 534 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1988); see supra
notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
259. Bonaparte, 78 N.Y.2d at 31, 574 N.E.2d at 1030, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 424
(citing Torres, 72 N.Y.2d at 1008, 531 N.E.2d at 636, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 915).
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cussions whatsoever. 260 The Court of Appeals in Torres
nevertheless characterized the simple straightforward message
to the jury as a per se reversible delegation of a non-ministerial
judicial function. 261 Now in Bonaparte, the Court seemed
clearly to be trimming whatever standard it had applied to
262
reach the result it did in Torres.
Finally, it is also curious that the Court based its decision
in Bonaparteon the fact that the court officer did not advise the
jurors about anything legally significant. In fact, they should
have been told, by the court officer or the trial court itself, about
their duty to refrain from discussing the case until deliberations
resumed. 26 3 Stated otherwise, the trial judge's delegation was
permissible, according to the Court of Appeals, on the ground
that no information of substance was communicated to the jury
by the court officer, even though this meant that the trial judge
had thus wholly failed to inform the jurors of their duties and
obligations during sequestration.
But the Court refused to address that failure. Instead, the
Court insisted that the defendant's complaint-that the trial
judge had a duty to speak with the jury personally in the defendant's presence-did not sufficiently raise an issue about the
264
trial judge's failure to advise the jurors adequately.
260. Torres, 72 N.Y.2d at 1008, 531 N.E.2d at 635, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
261. Torres, 72 N.Y.2d at 1008-09, 531 N.E.2d at 636, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
262. See also People v. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d 810, 813, 559 N.E.2d 660, 662, 559
N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (1990) (Titone, J., dissenting); see supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
263. Bonaparte, 78 N.Y.2d at 31-32, 574 N.E.2d at 1030-31, 571 N.Y.S.2d at
424-25.
264. Id. at 31-32, 574 N.E.2d at 1030-31, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 424-25.
Related 1991 decisions were: People v. Ford, 78 N.Y.2d 878, 880, 577 N.E.2d
1034, 1035, 573 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (1991) (holding, in a unanimous memorandum,
that the trial judge did not improperly delegate judicial authority in directing the
court officer to take the jury to dinner and then to a hotel; the failure of the defendant specifically to request a sequestration instruction to the jury precluded its review); People v. Nacey, 78 N.Y.2d 990, 991, 580 N.E.2d 751, 752, 575 N.Y.S.2d 265,
266 (1991) (holding, in a unanimous memorandum, that the court officer performed a mere ministerial function in telling the jurors to stop deliberating until
they returned in the morning. [Does this not implicate the rules governing deliberations? See Bonaparte, 78 N.Y.2d at 31, 574 N.E.2d at 1030, 571 N.Y.S.2d at
424.]); People v. Bayes, 78 N.Y.2d 546, 551, 584 N.E.2d 643, 645, 577 N.Y.S.2d 585,
587 (1991) (finding, in a unanimous opinion by then-Judge Kaye, an improper delegation of judicial responsibility, where the attorneys were permitted to explain the
judge's instructions to the jury; the improper delegation was held to violate the
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defendant's rights to a jury trial and to a fair trial).
Other 1991 decisions involving state constitutional jury trial, fair trial, and
other procedural due process rights were: People v. Webb, 78 N.Y.2d 335, 339, 581'
N.E.2d 509, 511, 575 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (1991) (holding, in a unanimous opinion by
Judge Hancock, that the statutory requirement of N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 310.10,
does not implicate a fundamental right, integral to a fair trial, that cannot be
waived).
In People v. Tucker, 77 N.Y.2d 861, 569 N.E.2d 1021, 568 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1991),
the majority, in an unsigned memorandum, over the dissenting opinion of Judge
Titone, held that it was not reversible error for the trial judge, over counsel's objection, to permit a juror to take his notes on supplemental instructions into deliberations where the judge had cautioned the jury against undue reliance on the notes.
Id. at 863, 569 N.E.2d at 1022, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 343. Judge Titone argued that the
error was per se reversible, relying on state constitutional fair trial case law unconditionally prohibiting jurors, absent counsel's consent, from taking a written
copy of the judge's instructions into deliberations. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting). See,
e.g., People v. Brooks, 70 N.Y.2d 896, 519 N.E.2d 293, 524 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1989).
In People v. Patterson, 78 N.Y.2d 711, 587 N.E.2d 255, 579 N.Y.S.2d 617
(1991), the Court, in an opinion by Judge Alexander, held that the concededly illegal use of a photograph, taken from a file on a dismissed unrelated charge, in order
to obtain an identification, did not require suppression of the identification evidence or reversal of the ensuing conviction. Id. at 713-14, 587 N.E.2d at 255-56,
579 N.Y.S.2d at 617-18. Judge Titone, joined by Judge Kaye (Judge Hancock took
no part), argued in dissent that the constitutional presumption of innocence underlying the statutory requirement of N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 160.50, which provides
that records and evidence of dismissed charges be sealed, dictated the sanction of
suppression. Id. at 727, 587 N.E.2d at 264, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 626 (Titone, J., dissenting). Note the majority's insistence that the statutory protection "does not implicate the fundamental constitutional interests or considerations." Id. at 717, 587
N.E.2d at 258, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 620; see also discussion of Jackson, supra notes
131-209 and accompanying text.
In People v. Colon, 78 N.Y.2d 998, 580 N.E.2d 754, 575 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1991),
the majority, in an unsigned memorandum, upheld the prosecution's cross-examination of defense witnesses which elicited testimony linking the defendant to drug
trafficking that was not charged. Id. at 1000, 580 N.E.2d at 754, 575 N.Y.S.2d at
268. Judge Titone, in lone dissent, argued that the highly prejudicial evidence of
an uncharged large scale drug selling enterprise deprived the defendant of a fair
trial. Id. at 1000, 580 N.E.2d at 755, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 269 (Titone, J., dissenting).
In People v. Hunt, 78 N.Y.2d 932, 579 N.E.2d 208, 574 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1991),
the majority, in an entry, adopted the Appellate Division's ruling that neither state
nor federal double jeopardy precluded the prosecution from trying to prove a different predicate felony at a second felony offender resentencing proceeding. Id. at
933, 579 N.E.2d at 208, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 178. Then-Judge Kaye, in lone dissent,
argued that the enhanced sentencing procedure required beyond-a-reasonabledoubt proof, thereby resembling a trial, and thus precluding a second try by the
prosecution after its failure to prove a predicate conviction at the first sentencing
proceeding. Id. at 933, 579 N.E.2d at 208, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 178 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
In People v. Moquin, 77 N.Y.2d 449, 570 N.E.2d 1059, 568 N.Y.S.2d 710
(1991), the Court, in an opinion by Judge Titone, held that (federal) double jeopardy barred prosecution of a charge dismissed at trial but reinstated on appeal,
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B. Civil Liberties and Equality
The 1991 decisions adjudicating claims of civil liberty and
equal protection involved a host of various issues including the
visitation rights of a nonbiological lesbian "parent,"26 5 the rights
of developmentally disabled children to a free public educa267
tion, 26 6 the vested property rights of insurance companies,
2
68
and the limits on gubernatorial power.
But the highlight of the year was a trio of free expression
decisions. 269 The trio reveals a great deal about the Court's
where the defendant had already pleaded guilty and was serving a sentence on the
remaining charges. Id. at 455, 570 N.E.2d at 1063, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 714. In dissent, Judge Bellacosa, joined by Judge Simons, argued that double jeopardy principles (in state as well as federal decisions) did not bar the prosecution where the
prosecutor had not consented to the defendant's original plea. Id. at 458, 570
N.E.2d at 1065, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 716 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Under New York
decisional law, state constitutional double jeopardy renders a second prosecution a
nullity, double jeopardy may be raised at any time, and it is always an issue. See,
e.g., People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1, 349 N.E.2d 1134, 420 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1979).
Hence, the dissenters in Moquin would seem necessarily to have rejected state, as
well as federal, constitutional double jeopardy claims.
See also People v. Zanghi, 79 N.Y.2d 815, 818, 588 N.E.2d 77, 79, 580 N.Y.S.2d
179, 181 (1991) (vacating, in a unanimous memorandum, a guilty plea on the
ground that the information on which the defendant was prosecuted was jurisdictionally defective because an accusatory instrument may not contain an offense
greater than that charged in the felony complaint where the defendant waives his
state constitutional right to indictment); People v. Smith, 79 N.Y.2d 779, 780, 587
N.E.2d 286, 286, 579 N.Y.S.2d 648, 648 (1991) (adopting, in a unanimous entry,
the Appellate Division's ruling, 166 A.D.2d 385, 385, 561 N.Y.S.2d 189, 190 (1st
Dep't 1990), that the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial where, in a departure from the normal order of trial, the trial judge directed the defendant, who had
already chosen to testify, to do so before the prosecution rested); People ex rel.
Strachan v. Colon, 77 N.Y.2d 499, 504, 571 N.E.2d 65, 68, 568 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898
(1991) (holding, in a unanimous opinion by Judge Bellacosa, that due process did
not require the governor to conduct a hearing prior to extraditing the petitioner to
the demanding state solely because the offense charged there was a capital one; cf
People ex rel. Neufeld, 71 N.Y.2d 881, 885, 552 N.E.2d 1060, 1061, 527 N.Y.S.2d
762, 763 (1988) (Bellacosa, J., concurring)).
265. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586
(1991); see infra notes 444-68 and accompanying text.
266. Catlin v. Sobol, 77 N.Y.2d 552, 571 N.E.2d 661, 569 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1991);
see discussion infra notes 469-95 and accompanying text.
267. Alliance of Am. Insurers v. Chu, 77 N.Y.2d 573, 571 N.E.2d 672, 569
N.Y.S.2d 364 (1991); see infra notes 496-527 and accompanying text.
268. Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy v. Cuomo, 78 N.Y.2d 398, 582
N.E.2d 568, 576 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1991); see infra note 527.
269. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566
N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991); see infra notes 271-316 and accompanying text; Children of
Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453
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state constitutional jurisprudence in 1991. The three cases find
the Court of Appeals unsettled about its basic approach to state
constitutional law, reversed by the United States Supreme
Court for giving too little protection to expressive freedom, and
harshly unsympathetic to attorney speech critical of judges. To
270
these cases we now turn.

1.

Civil and PoliticalFreedoms

In Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski (Immuno I/),271 on re-

mand from the United States Supreme Court, 272 the Court of
Appeals adhered to its original decision dismissing a defamation action. 273 This time, in a second opinion by then-Judge
Kaye, the Court based its decision on a "separate [state]
ground," 274 "independent"275 of the federal analysis it also
applied. 276
The plaintiff, a manufacturer of biologic products, brought
a libel action against the defendant, the co-founder and editor of
a scientific journal, for publishing a letter by an animal rights
advocate who was highly critical of the plaintiff's proposed project for conducting research with chimpanzees. 277 The Court of
Appeals originally dismissed the suit on the ground that the
statements of opinion were absolutely protected under the Fed278
eral First Amendment.
(1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 859 (1992); see infra notes 317-50 and accompanying
text; In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39, cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 648 (1991); see infra notes 351-412 and accompanying text.
270. The author has discussed each of these decisions elsewhere. See Bonventre, The New York Court of Appeals: An Old Tradition Struggles with Current Issues, supra note 10, at 150-51; Bonventre, supra note 2, at 135-40; Vincent M.
Bonventre, ProfessionalResponsibility, 1991 Survey of N.Y Law, 43 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 505, 511-14 (1992).
271. 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991).
.272. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990), vacating 74
N.Y.2d 548, 549 N.E.2d 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1989).
273. See Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 549 N.E.2d 129,
549 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1989).
274. Immuno 11, 77 N.Y.2d at 248, 567 N.E.2d at 1276, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
275. Id. at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
276. See id. at 242-48, 567 N.E.2d at 1273-77, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909-13.
277. Id. at 240, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
278. See Immuno, 74 N.Y.2d at 555, 549 N.E.2d at 132, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
Dictum in prior Supreme Court case law implied that the Federal First Amendment's guarantee of free speech cloaked statements of opinion, as opposed to state-
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Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court vacated that
judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration 279 in light
of its recent decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.280 In
Milkovich, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the First
Amendment created a "wholesale defamation exemption" for
statements labeled "opinion."281 According to the nation's high
Court, any statement containing "provably false factual conno28 2
tations" might be actionable.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
held that the defamation action should still be dismissed under
federal constitutional law, 283 and in any event, that the action
was barred for wholly separate and independent reasons by the
free speech protections of the state constitution. 28 4 In its federal
analysis of the case, the Court of Appeals determined that the
letter in question did contain some provably false assertions of
fact. 285 The Court held that the libel complaint must, nonetheless, be dismissed because the plaintiff had failed to prove that
28 6
the assertions were in fact false.
The Court then turned to state law. 287 It adopted an independent state constitutional test derived from its 1986 decision in Steinhilber v. Alphonse. 288 Under that test-"whether
the reasonable reader would have believed that the challenged
statements [, viewed as a whole and in context,] were conveying
facts about the libel plaintiff" 289-the Court concluded that the
letter "would not have been viewed by the average reader of the
Journal as conveying actual facts about plaintiff," but rather, as
"voicing no more than a highly partisan point of view." 290
ments of fact, with absolute immunity from defamation liability. See Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
279. 497 U.S. 1021 (1990).
280. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
281. Id. at 17.
282. Id. at 20.
283. Immuno 11, 77 N.Y.2d at 248, 567 N.E.2d at 1276, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 246, 567 N.E.2d at 1275, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
286. Id. at 245-47, 567 N.E.2d at 1275-76, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 911-12.
287. Id. at 248, 567 N.E.2d at 1276, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
288. 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1986); see Immuno II,
77 N.Y.2d at 252, 254, 567 N.E.2d at 1280-81, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
289. Immuno H, 77 N.Y.2d at 254, 567 N.E.2d at 1280, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 916;
see also Steinhilber, 68 N.Y.2d at 293, 501 N.E.2d at 554, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
290. Immuno H, 77 N.Y.2d at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
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constituHence, the letter was held by the Court to be a state
291
opinion.
individual
of
tionally protected expression
The Court, speaking through Judge Kaye, explained its
preference for the state standard:
[W]e believe that an analysis that begins by looking at the content
of the whole communication, its tone and apparent purpose better
balances the values at stake than an analysis that first examines
the challenged statements for express and implied factual asserfigurations, and finds them actionable unless couched in loose,
292
tive or hyperbolic language in charged circumstances.
The state test, according to the Court, avoids the "fine
parsing" of statements, the "isolating" and "extracting" of "expressed and implied factual statements" that might well result
in identifying more provably false assertions than a reasonable
person would in reading the communication as a whole and in
context. 293 The state constitutional standard, continued the
Court, "takes into account the full content of [the] challenged
speech," and that, continued the Court, better assures the "full
and vigorous exposition and expression of opinion on matters of
294
public interest."
Judge Simons, separately concurring, argued that the
295
Court's application of the state constitution was unnecessary.
Inasmuch as the complaint had to be dismissed under federal
law, it was "unnecessary," according to Judge Simons, for the
Court to resort to the state constitution.296 Clearly, Simons had
a point.
The majority decided the case under both federal and state
law. It actually issued two full opinions-the first applying fed291. Id.
292. Id. at 254, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (citing Steinhilber, 68
N.Y.2d at 293, 501 N.E.2d at 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 901; Rodney W. Ott, Fact and
Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the FormativePower of Context, 58 FoRDHAM
L. REV. 761 (1990)).

293. Id. at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
294. Id. (quoting Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369,
384, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1309, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 953 (Jasen, J.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 969 (1977)).
295. Id. at 257, 567 N.E.2d at 1282, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (Simons, J., concurring). Judge Hancock agreed with Judge Simons in his own separate concurring
opinion. Id. at 268, 567 N.E.2d at 1290, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 926 (Hancock, J.,
concurring).
296. Id. at 261, 567 N.E.2d at 1285, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
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eral analysis, 297 the second state.298 Either the federal or state
opinion was advisory; either the federal or state analysis was
299
wholly unnecessary dictum.
Moreover, as Judge Simons noted, this so-called "dual reliance" approach 30 0 to constitutional adjudication precludes any
review of the state court's interpretation and application of federal law. 30 1 As he explained, "Supreme Court jurisdiction to review a Federal question fails if the decision of the State Court is
30 2
[also] based on adequate and independent State grounds."
Judge Simons, who has adhered to a set of guidelines in
applying the state constitution, 30 3 set forth his position for advocating a "federal law first approach"-one which initially calls
for the application of federal law alone and welcomes Supreme
Court review. As he explained in Immuno II:
When Federal questions are presented, [the Court of Appeals'] institutional functions are subordinated to the Supreme Court and
it acts, in effect, as an intermediate court.... Inasmuch as the
Supreme Court is charged with the ultimate responsibility for
pronouncing Federal law,... it should be given the opportunity to
accept, modify or reject a State court's determination of what the
30 4
Federal Constitution requires.
297. See id. at 241-48, 567 N.E.2d at 1273-77, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909-13.
298. Id. at 248-56, 567 N.E.2d at 1277-82, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913-18.
299. See id. at 262-63, 567 N.E.2d at 1285-86, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22
(Simons, J., concurring).
300. See Linda Matarese, Other Voices: The Role of Justices Durham, Kaye,
and Abrahamson in Shaping the "New Judicial Federalism",2 EMERGING ISSUES
ST. CONsT. L. 239, 250-51 (1989); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent
State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEx. L. REV. 977, 983 (1985); Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the
Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal Constitutional Issues
when Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEx. L. Ray. 1025,
1029 (1985).
301. Immuno II, 77 N.Y.2d at 261, 567 N.E.2d at 1284, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 920
(Simons, J., concurring).
302. Id. (Simons, J., concurring).
303. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d
702 (1991); People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907
(1986). See also People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 78, 555 N.E.2d 915, 921, 556
N.Y.S.2d 518, 524 (1990) (Simons, J., concurring).
304. Immuno 11, 77 N.Y.2d at 260-61, 567 N.E.2d at 1285, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
921 (Simons, J., concurring) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972);
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)).
A different jurisprudential view, but one resulting in similar practical effect,
was that apparently adopted by Chief Judge Wachtler. He regarded state consti-
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By contrast, Judge Titone, also concurring separately, argued that the case should have been decided solely on the basis
of state law. 30 5 The Court's "first obligation," as Judge Titone
explained, "is to determine whether the dismissal of this plaintiff's complaint is consistent with our State's common-law and
constitutional defamation rules. Resolution of this question is,
in my view, a necessary and logically prior step that must be
30 6
taken before any federal constitutional issue is considered."
Because the letter in question in Immuno II was not actionable
under state law, "[t]hat conclusion," said Judge Titone, "ends
30 7
the inquiry."
An identical view has, in fact, been advocated on prior occasions by Judge Kaye. 30 But in Immuno II, noting that the
"proper approach may vary" from case to case, 30 9 she justified
tutional law as a means of supplementing or correcting federal decisions. See, e.g.,
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d
844, 846 (1986), on remand from 478 U.S. 697 (1986), rev'g 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480
N.E.2d 1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985). But such an "instrumentalist" view effectively treats the state's fundamental law as a "grab bag" of principles to be "exploited in order to circumvent disfavored United States Supreme Court decisions,"
or to "insulate a controversial [state court] decision from Supreme Court review."
See Collins, supra note 83, at 2-3, 13-14. In practice, approaches such as Chief
Judge Wachtler's and Judge Simons' both operate such that, as Chief Judge Wachtler once remarked, "[uin those instances where [the Court of Appeals' judges]
think the Supreme Court Justices are dead wrong, we go back to our own constitution." See Joel Stashenko, Depew Raid Spotlights a Rights Dilemma, BUFFALO
NEWS, June 9, 1986, at A7. "The effect [of such approaches] is to make independent state grounds appear not as original state law," as Hans Linde has noted, "but
as a kind of supplemental rights that require an explanation." Hans A. Linde, E.
Pluribus- ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 177 (1984).
Worse than that, when a state court adopts the "instrumentalist" position taken by
Wachtler, "the sovereign law of the state constitution becomes little more than a
plaything." Collins, supra note 83, at 14; see also Bonventure, The New York Court
of Appeals: An Old Tradition Struggles with Current Issues, supra note 10, at 151.
305. Immuno 11, 77 N.Y.2d at 263, 567 N.E.2d at 1286, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 922
(Titone, J., concurring).
306. Id. at 264, 567 N.E.2d at 1287, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (Titone, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
307. Id. at 268, 567 N.E.2d at 1289, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 925. Specifically, Judge
Titone would simply have applied the state's "common law defamation precepts."
Id. at 265, 567 N.E.2d at 1288, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Titone, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
308. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 530, 523 N.E.2d
277, 281, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1988) (Kaye, J., concurring); Judith S. Kaye, Contributions of State ConstitutionalLaw to the Third Century of American Federalism,13
VT. L. REV. 49, 56 (1988).
309. Immuno 1I, 77 N.Y.2d at 251, 567 N.E.2d at 1279, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
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"dual reliance" on the basis of the "unusual procedural posture
of the case" 3 1 0 -i.e., that the case was on remand from the
31
Supreme Court. '
It is not at all clear how that "posture" counseled a purely
advisory federal analysis in addition to the fully independent
and adequate state constitutional disposition of the case. Indeed, considering Judge Kaye's repeated advocacy of the "primacy" or state-law-only approach, 31 2 and considering also the
Court's sharp divisions over state constitutional decisionmaking evident here and elsewhere, 3 13 it is likely that other, institutional realities led her to "dual reliance." The compromises
necessary to accommodate colleagues, and thereby, to forge and
maintain a majority in the face of pronounced differences of
opinion, might well explain Judge Kaye's approach in Immuno
II more than anything she could acknowledge in writing the
opinion for the Court.
Free speech did not fare so well in the other two major expressive rights cases decided by the Court in 1991. In one, the
Court of Appeals declined to safeguard expression to the extent
subsequently mandated by the Supreme Court under the First
Amendment. 31 4 In the other, the New York court refused to protect attorney criticism of judges to the same extent the Supreme
Court has immunized defamation of public officials generally
under the Federal Constitution. 315 In neither decision of the
Court of Appeals was there much evidence of the "exceptional
history and rich tradition" of expressive freedom proudly touted
earlier that year in Immuno 11'316
310. Id.
311. Id. at 251-52, 567 N.E.2d at 1279-80, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16.
312. See Matarese, supra note 300, at 264; Galie, supra note 2, at 242-43.
313. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d
702 (1991); People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1992); see also infra notes 592-602 and accompanying text.
314. Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541,
570 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1991), vacated, 112 S.Ct. 859 (1992); see infra notes 317-50 and
accompanying text.
315. See In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 570 N.Y.S.2d 37, cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 648 (1991); cf New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
316. See Immuno 11, 77 N.Y.2d at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
913 (stating that New York State, as "a cultural center for the Nation, has long
provided a hospitable climate for the free exchange of ideas") (citing Beach v.
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In Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis,317 the Court upheld the so-called "Son of Sam" law318 against a challenge that it
violated state, as well as federal, freedom of speech.3 19 The statute had been enacted in the wake of the notorious "Son of Sam"
murders to address the prospect of criminals profiting from
their crimes by writing books about them.320 It targeted all
profits derived from expressive works discussing the author's
"thoughts, feelings, opinions, or emotions" about any crime he
was "accused or convicted of" committing in New York; it required that such profits be deposited in escrow to be available to
compensate the crime victims or their representatives.3 2'
The Court, in an unanimous opinion by Judge Simons, 322
acknowledged that the statute was content-based and that it
Shanley, 62 N.Y.2d 241, 255-56, 465 N.E.2d 304, 311-12, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765, 772-73
(1984) (Wachtler, J., concurring)).
317. 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1991), vacated, 112 S.
Ct. 859 (1992).
318. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1982) (amended by Act of July 24,
1992, ch. 618, § 10, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1671-73 (McKinney) (codified as amended at
N.Y. Exxc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1994)). The previous version of the statute was invalidated in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). As paraphrased by the Court, the statute
provided:
[Tihose contracting with "any person or the representative or assignee" of
any person accused or convicted of a crime in New York, "with respect to the
reenactment of such crime" or for "the expression of such . . . person's

thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime" shall submit
a copy of the contract to the Crime Victims Board. If the Board determines
that the criminal's work comes within the statute, any moneys owing under
the contract must be paid to the Board. The funds are deposited in escrow
for the benefit of the victims or legal representatives of the victims of the
crime.
N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a, quoted in Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 719-20, 573
N.E.2d at 544, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
319. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 718, 573 N.E.2d at 543, 570 N.Y.S.2d
at 455.
320. See Assembly Bill Memorandum regarding A. 9019, July 15, 1977, reprinted in Legislative Bill Jacket, 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 823; see also Memorandum
from Robert Schlanger, Division of Criminal Justice Services, to Judah Gribetz
regarding S.6923, Aug. 3, 1977, reprinted in Legislative Bill Jacket, 1977 N.Y.
Laws ch. 823.
321. See Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 720, 570 N.E.2d at 544, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 456.
322. Neither Judge Kaye nor Judge Titone participated in the case.
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imposed a direct burden on speech. 323 The statute applied only
to expressive works dealing with an author's criminal activity,
and it placed special restrictions on the financial earnings
otherwise gained from such works.3 24 Nonetheless, the Court
upheld the statute on the ground that it served compelling government interests and that it did so by narrowly tailored
25
means.
Among the compelling interests served by the statute were
the compensation and rehabilitation of crime victims 3

26

and the

prevention of criminals' benefiting from their crimes.3 27 As
Judge Simons put it: "[T]he statute is a codification of the fundamental equitable principle that criminals should not be permitted to profit from their wrongs and also an expression of the
penological concept which provides that victims expect and are
entitled to 'retributive satisfaction' from our criminal justice
3 28

system."

Moreover, according to the Court, the statute was narrowly
tailored to serve those interests. Judge Simons explained:
The statute regulates only the criminal's receipt of money, not the
right to speak about the crime and it does not impose a forfeiture
of all profits-it merely delays payment ....

[It] direct[s] pay-

ment of the balance remaining to the criminal after other authorized claims are satisfied. Moreover the statute does not prohibit
anyone else from telling or publishing the criminal's story....
[And t]he statute is not designed to compensate all victims, only
those who possess claims to the proceeds earned by the criminal
as a result of their victimization. 329
In concluding, the Court addressed the issue of whether the
state constitutional guarantee of free speech demanded more
323. See Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 724, 573 N.E.2d at 546, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 458.
324. Id. at 724-25, 573 N.E.2d at 546-47, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 458-59.
325. Id. at 725-30, 573 N.E.2d at 547-50, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 459-62.
326. Id. at 725, 573 N.E.2d at 547, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
327. Id. at 726-27, 573 N.E.2d at 547-48, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60.
328. Id. at 727, 573 N.E.2d at 548, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 460 (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); Petrie v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 33 N.Y.2d 846, 307 N.E.2d 253, 352 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1973); Riggs v. Palmer,
115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889); Stephen Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime
- An Old CorrectionalAim Modernized, 50 MiN. L. REV. 243, 244 (1965)).
329. Id. at 730, 732, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 551, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462, 463 (citations omitted).
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protection than was provided by the foregoing standard, which
was based on Federal First Amendment case law. 33 0 The Court
said that whatever the state constitutional test might be, it "is
no more burdensome than requiring that the statute be narrowly tailored to meet its objective" 331-a test the Court had already determined the statute satisfied. 332 Hence, the "reach of
the law [being] limited to its [compelling] purpose," 333 it did "not
violate petitioners' rights to free speech under either the Federal or State Constitution," 334 according to the Court of Appeals.
335
Several months thereafter, a unanimous Supreme Court
reached the opposite result and invalidated the statute. 336 In
Simon & Schuster,Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board, the Supreme Court agreed that New York has
compelling interests "in ensuring that victims of crime are compensated by those who harm them" 337 and "that criminals do not
profit from their crimes."338 But the high Court, finding the
statute to be poorly tailored to its purpose, and thus unnecessarily burdensome on free speech, concluded without a dissenting
33 9
vote that it violated the Federal Constitution.
The Supreme Court ruled explicitly that the statute was
"significantly overinclusive,"3 40 and at least implicitly, that it
was "underinclusive as well." 34 1 Regarding the latter, although
the Court refrained from attaching the "underinclusive" label, it
330. Id. at 731, 573 N.E.2d at 551, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
331. Id. at 732, 573 N.E.2d at 551, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 730, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
334. Id. at 732, 573 N.E.2d at 551, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
335. Justice Clarence Thomas, however, took no part.
336. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
337. Id. at 509.
338. Id. at 510. The Court cited and quoted then-Judge Robert Earl's seminal
opinion for the New York Court of Appeals a century earlier in Riggs v. Palmer,
115 N.Y. 506, 511-12, 22 N.E. 188, 189-90 (1889) (stating that "no one shall be
permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to
found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime").
339. Simon & Schuster, 112 S.Ct. at 512.
340. Id. at 511.
341. Id. at 512 n.** (declining to decide whether the statute was underinclusive as Justice Blackmun had urged, see id. at 512 (Blackmun, J., concurring),
despite having already explained that the statute was inappropriately limited to
"expressive activity," id. at 510); see discussion infra note 350 and accompanying
text.
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emphatically objected to the statute's focus on speech alone.
Speaking through Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court said
that there was no good reason for New York to "compensat[e]
victims from the proceeds of. . . 'story telling' [rather] than from
any of the criminal's other assets."342 In the Court's view, there
was
[no] justification for a distinction between this expressive activity
and any other activity in connection with [New York's] interest in
transferring the fruits of crime from criminals to their victims....
The distinction drawn by the Son of Sam law has nothing to do
with the state's interest ....In short, the state has a compelling
interest in compensating victims from the fruits of the crime, but
little if any interest in limiting such compensation
to the proceeds
343
of the wrongdoer's speech about the crime.
Regarding overinclusiveness, the Supreme Court noted
that the statute applied not only to expressive works about the
author's criminal activity, but "to works on any subject" that
happened to mention, "however tangentially or incidentally,"
the author's thoughts or recollections about a crime he committed. 344 Hence, according to the Court, the Son of Sam law would
have covered
such works as The Autobiography of Malcolm X, which describes
crimes committed by the civil rights leader before he became a
public figure; Civil Disobedience,in which [Henry David] Thoreau
acknowledges his refusal to pay taxes and recalls his experience
in jail; and even the Confessions of Saint Augustine, in which the
author laments "my past foulness and the carnal corruptions of
my soul," one instance of which involved the theft of pears from a
neighboring vineyard.3 45
The Court, suggesting that it would be easy to create a long
list of prominent figures whose autobiographies would be covered by a statute such as the Son of Sam law,346 added the
names of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was dubiously convicted of
treason, Jessie Jackson, who was arrested for seeking service at
a whites-only lunch counter, and Bertram Russell, who was
342. Id. at 510.
343. Id. at 510-11.
344. Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
345. Id. at 511 (alterations added) (citations omitted).

346. Id.
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jailed for his sit-down protest against nuclear weapons. 34 7 Finally, the Court noted that the Son of Sam law would even control the profits of "a prominent figure [who] wr[o]te his
autobiography at the end of his career, and include[d] in an
early chapter a brief recollection of having stolen (in New York)
348
a nearly worthless item as a youthful prank."
The fact that the Son of Sam law could actually produce
such results, the Court concluded, "indicates that the statute is,
to say the least, not narrowly tailored to achieve the State's objective of compensating crime victims from the profits of
crime.'349

The Supreme Court's opinion revealed how very intrusive
the Son of Sam law was to free speech interests. It is difficult to
read that Court's opinion without being struck by how plainly
unnecessary and unjustified were the burdens imposed by the
statute on a wide range of expression-and on expression alone.
Perhaps the particular overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness that proved fatal for the statute at the Supreme Court
would have been addressed at the Court of Appeals had there
been a dissenting voice at the tribunal to advance them. 350 In
any event, in its failure to address these concerns, the Court of
Appeals failed adequately to safeguard expressive rights under
both the federal and state constitutions.
Though the Court of Appeals' decision in Children of Bedford was eventually overruled by the Supreme Court and its
shortcomings thus made evident, Judge Simons' opinion for the
New York Court was clear, well reasoned, and at least on the
specific questions it addressed, persuasive. Whatever the mer347. Id.
348. Id. at 512.
349. Id.
350. Notably in this regard, Judges Kaye and Titone, authors of the dissenting opinions in another recent expression-restrictive decision, did not participate.
See Town of Islip v. Cavitlia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 578-79, 540 N.E.2d 215, 235-36, 542
N.Y.S.2d 139, 159-60 (1989) (Kaye, J., dissenting); 73 N.Y.2d at 565-78, 540
N.E.2d at 226-35, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 150-59 (Titone, J., dissenting).
At the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, then-Judge Jon 0. Newman, of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals (now Chief Judge of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals), did raise such objections to the Son of Sam law in his dissent to that
tribunal's decision upholding the statute; the Supreme Court directly reversed in
Simon & Schuster. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 784-87,
(1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
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its of the Court of Appeal's ultimate conclusion to uphold the
Son of Sam law, the opinion in Children of Bedford confronted
the presented issues carefully, comprehensively, and candidly.
The same can hardly be said for the unsigned opinion of the
3 51
Court in the important case of In re Holtzman.
In an unanimous per curiam opinion, notable for its superficial treatment of the factual and legal issues involved, as well
as its perfunctory disregard of vital free speech interests, the
Court in Holtzman upheld a disciplinary sanction against an attorney for her public criticism of a judge which, allegedly,
turned out to be false. 352 Elizabeth Holtzman, while District Attorney of Kings County, publicly released a letter in which she
complained that an identified judge, presiding over a sexual
misconduct trial, had
asked the victim-to get down on the floor and show the position
she was in when she was being sexually assaulted.... [T]he victim reluctantly got down on her hands and knees as everyone
stood and watched. In making the victim assume the position she
was forced to take when she was sexually assaulted, [the trial
353
judge] profoundly degraded, humiliated and demeaned her.
When a judicial misconduct investigation concluded that
the complaint was not supported by the evidence, the matter
was referred to an attorney grievance committee to investigate
Holtzman's actions. 354 Following preliminary inquiries, the
committee voted to send Holtzman a private letter of admonition.355 The committee had concluded that Holtzman violated
disciplinary rules that prohibit "knowingly mak[ing] false accusations against a judge,"356 "engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,"357 and "engag[ing] in
351. 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
648 (1991).
352. Id. at 193, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43. Then-Chief Judge
Wachtler did not vote in Holtzman.
353. Id. at 188-89, 577 N.E.2d at 31, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
354. Id. at 189, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
355. Id.

356. N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-102(B)
(McKinney 1992).
357. N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1102(A)(5) (McKinney 1992).

57

410

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:353

conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to prac358
tice law."
When Holtzman exercised her option for formal charges
and proceedings, the committee conducted further hearings and
voted to issue her a letter of reprimand. 35 9 The committee found
Holtzman guilty of two of the charges; it made no determination
about the charge regarding "false accusations." 36 0 Indeed,
although that charge was presented to the committee, its determination made no mention of the charge whatsoever.3 6 1 In an
unreported decision, 362 the Appellate Division upheld the reprimand on limited grounds. 363 That tribunal unanimously found
that:
[P]etitioner Holtzman is guilty only of Charge one in the Statement of Charges, which alleged, inter alia, that Ms. Holtzman, as
District Attorney of Kings County, made public accusations of
misconduct against a judge without first determining the certainty of the merits of the accusations in violation of DR 8-102
and DR 1-102(A)(6). 36
Charge one, as more fully stated by the Appellate Division
earlier in its decision, alleged "professional misconduct" for "releasing a copy of a letter to the public, written by Ms. Holtzman
as District Attorney to Judge Katheryn McDonald [the Chair of
the Committee to Implement Recommendations of the New
York State Task Force on Women in the Courts], accusing [the
named trial judge], of misconduct without first determining the
358. N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1102(A)(6) (McKinney 1992).
359. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
360. Id.
361. Id.; see also In re Holtzman, Motion No. 571 Atty. (2d Dep't July 17,
1990) (unpublished opinion) [hereinafter Appellate Division opinion] ('The Committee sustained only two charges") (attached as Appendix B in Holtzman's Petition for a Writ for Certiorari, Holtzman v. Grievance Comm., 60 U.S.L.W. 3189
(U.S. Sept. 24, 1991) (No. 91-401)).
362. The Appellate Division opinion, though unpublished, was attached as
Appendix B to Holtzman's Petition to the Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari.
In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1991), petitionfor
cert. filed sub nom. Holtzman v. Grievance Comm., 60 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Sept.
24, 1991) (No. 91-401).
363. See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42;
see also Appellate Division opinion at 3.
364. Appellate Division opinion at 3.
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certainty of the merit of the accusations." 365 That charge would
seem to be reflected in the Appellate Division's finding of guilt
for violation of DR 1-102(A)(6)-"conduct that adversely reflects
on the lawyer's fitness." But the Appellate Division's citation to
DR 8-102-"knowingly making false accusations"-is, at the
least, more ambiguous.
Nowhere in its decision did the Appellate Division state
that Holtzman's complaint was false, let alone that she knew it
to be. Moreover, the grievance committee, whose reprimand the
Appellate Division upheld, 366 neither sustained the charge of violating DR 8-102 nor otherwise made any finding that Holtzman knowingly made a false accusation. 367 Indeed, the letter of
reprimand, both as issued by the committee and as upheld in
part by the Appellate Division, never even referred to DR 8102.368 Nor did the letter of reprimand assert that Holtzman's
accusation against the trial judge was false-or that she knew
369
it was false.
The most likely explanation for the Appellate Division's citation to DR 8-102, without any mention of falsity or knowing
falsity, would seem to be related commentary contained in Ethical Consideration [EC] 8-6.370 Counsel for the grievance committee took the position that "DR 8-102(B) must be read along
371
with the ECs included within Canon 8 [particularly] EC 8-6."
365. Id. at 2.
366. In fact, as already noted, the Appellate Division sustained the reprimand
only with regard to charge one. See Appellate Division opinion at 3; Holtzman, 78
N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
367. See discussion supra notes 360-61 and accompanying text.
368. Id.
369. See Appellate Division opinion at 2-3; see also Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 23-24, 34-35, In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1991) (No. 123) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner-Appellant].
370. N.Y. JUD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry EC 8-6 (McKinney 1994), states in pertinent part:
While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize [adjudicatory officials]
publicly, he should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use appropriate
language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate
statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal system. Criticisms
motivated by reasons other than a desire to improve the legal system are not
justified.
Id.
371. See Brief for Respondent-Respondent at 31, In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d
184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1991) (No. 123) [hereinafter Brieffor Respondent-Respondent]; see also id. at 32.
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The committee's initial letter of admonition, rejected by Holtz372
man, included a violation of EC 8-6 among its stated findings.
Additionally, and perhaps most significantly, the single charge
that the Appellate Division upheld, as it was stated in the committee's letter of reprimand and subsequently paraphrased in
the Appellate Division's decision, 373 tracked the language of EC
8-6. That charge, that Holtzman accused a judge of misconduct
"without first determining the certainty of the merit of the accusation," is clearly adopted from the wording of EC 8-6 that a
lawyer "should be certain of the merit of his complaint" against
a judge.
It would thus seem quite evident that the Appellate Division actually found Holtzman guilty of violating DR 8-102 only
in the sense of violating EC 8-6. There is no indication that the
Appellate Division intended to refer to DR 8-102 literally, i.e.,
referring to "knowingly false accusations." Such a literal reference would have been inconsistent with the committee's determination not to sustain the DR 8-102 charge, as well as with
the absence of any mention of DR 8-102 by title or text in the
letter of reprimand, and with the omission in the Appellate Division decision of any reference whatsoever to "false accusations" or "knowingly" false ones.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals, in affirming the Appellate Division's ruling and thus upholding the reprimand, simply
accepted as established fact that Holtzman's accusation was
false. 374 The Court summarily adopted the "finding of falsity"

that it claimed was rendered by both the grievance committee
and the Appellate Division. 375 The Court's entire treatment of
the factual issue was as follows: "The factual basis of charge
one is that petitioner made false accusations against the Judge.
This charge was sustained by the Committee and upheld by the
Appellate Division, and the factual finding of falsity (which is
376
supported by the record) is therefore binding on us."

372. See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 189, 577 N.E.2d at 31, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 40;
Appellate Division opinion at 2.
373. See Appellate Division opinion at 2, 3.
374. See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32-33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41-42.
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An examination of the evidence and evaluation of the parties' arguments on this critical threshold issue would surely
have been more appropriate. The falsity or not of Holtzman's
complaint was central to the case. It was debated vigorously at
the Court of Appeals by the parties, 377 and as already discussed,
was in fact not clearly determined-if even addressed at all-in
the Appellate Division's decision or in the grievance committee's letter of reprimand. 378 But the Court of Appeals simply did
not address these concerns.
Moreover, despite the Court's claim that it was bound by
the supposed findings of falsity below, the Court in fact does not
always treat factual determinations of lower tribunals as binding. The Court has been especially willing to reject factual findings where, as in Holtzman, fundamental constitutional rights
have been at stake, and even where, unlike in Holtzman, fac379
tual findings were clearly made.

With regard to the legal issues-and the additional facts
relied upon to resolve them-the Court's opinion was equally
unsatisfactory. Though it upheld the "finding" of falsity below,
the Court actually declined to render any decision specifically
addressing "knowingly false accusations" under DR 8-102.380

Instead, the Court merely "agree[d] with both the Grievance
Committee and the Appellate Division that petitioner's conduct
violated DR 1-102(A)(6),... provid[ing] that a lawyer shall not

'[e]ngage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on [the
lawyer's] fitness to practice law.' "381 Rejecting arguments that
Holtzman's conduct could not be deemed violative of such a
377. See Brieffor Petitioner-Appellantat 2-3, 32; Brieffor Respondent-Respondent at 5-33.
378. See discussion supra notes 359-74 and accompanying text; see also Brief
for Petitioner-Appellantat 3, 34-35; Brief for Respondent-Respondent at 2, 35.
379. See, e.g., People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 194, 590 N.E.2d 204, 211,
581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 626 (1992) (rejecting a factual finding of consent); People v.
Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 495, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183 (1984)
(rejecting a factual finding of reasonable suspicion); People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d
210, 221-25, 352 N.E.2d 562, 571-74, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 383-87 (1976) (rejecting a
finding of reasonable suspicion); People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 127-31, 347
N.E.2d 575, 580-82, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215, 219-21 (1976) (rejecting a finding of voluntary consent).
380. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
381. Id. at 190, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42 (quoting N.Y. JuD. LAw
app., CODE Of PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILY DR 1-102(AX6) (McKinney 1992).
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vague provision, 382 the Court held that "petitioner was plainly
on notice that her conduct in this case, involving public dissemination of a specific accusation of improper judicial conduct
under the circumstances described, could be held to reflect ad383
versely on her fitness to practice law."
The Court relied on the fact that Holtzman's accusation
was "made without any support other than the interoffice memoranda of a newly admitted trial assistant."384 The Court also
emphasized that Holtzman's "staff, including the person assigned the task of looking into the ethical implications of release
to the press, counseled her to delay" until the trial minutes were
385
reviewed.
What the Court failed to mention, however, was that the
"newly admitted trial assistant" was the very prosecutor in
Holtzman's office who had personally handled the underlying
trial and who personally observed the victim's reenactment of
the sexual assault in the judge's robing room. 386 Nor did the
Court of Appeals explain that this prosecuting attorney had reported the robing room incident on several occasions, to several
members of the district attorney's staff, both formally and informally, both orally and in writing, including in several memoranda and a sworn affirmation which were prepared at the
direction of his bureau chief.387 Nor did the Court say that the
contents of all these reports were relayed to Holtzman or read
38 8
by her personally prior to the release of the letter.
Furthermore, regarding Holtzman's staff, the Court failed
to note that her senior assistants-including those most familiar with the prosecutor and his reports-did share Holtzman's
belief that the reports were true. 38 9 Finally, the Court omitted a
most significant fact when it stated that members of Holtzman's
staff, including her ethics advisor, counseled her to delay release of her letter. In fact, just prior to the letter's release, the
382. Id.
383. Id. at 191, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 6-8; Brief for Respondent-Respondent at 10.
387. Brief for Petitioner-Appellantat 8-13, 36-37.
388. See id.
389. Id. at 37.
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ethical advisor, the Special Counsel to the district attorney, had
advised both Holtzman and Holtzman's chief assistant that,
own direction,
based on her research undertaken at Holtzman's
390
it was both legal and ethical to go public.
If Holtzman's conduct was as reckless as portrayed by the
Court, then the final critical issue did not need to be addressed-i.e., whether the "actual malice" standard of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan applied. 391 If Holtzman's public accusation was in fact false, if her support for it was so inadequate, if her ethics advisor warned against publication
(impliedly for ethical reasons, if it was so imperative that she
await more reliable corroboration, and if her conduct was so obviously unwarranted), then even the enhanced constitutional
protection of Sullivan would not have afforded immunity to
Holtzman. A fair reading of the Court of Appeals decision suggests that Holtzman released her complaint against the trial

392
judge "with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."

If so, Holtzman's expressive conduct was subject to discipline
390. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellantat 14-15; Brieffor Respondent-Respondent at 16.
Regarding generally the lack ofjudicial candor, a problem raised by the treatment of facts in Holtzman, but one that is rarely discussed by lawyers or judges
publicly, see Anthony D'Amato, Self-Regulation of Judicial Misconduct Could be
Mis-Regulation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 609, 610, 619, 622 n.49 (1990) ("[Olne of the most
significant areas of judicial misconduct [is] lack of candor in judicial opinions ....
One of the worst things a judge can do is to ignore or misstate the critical facts or
critical legal issues in a case .... [Tihundering silence is not due to a general lack
of awareness of the problem, but rather reflects a deeply imbedded fear that such a
matter is the dirtiest of linen that should not be displayed in public.... [Attorneys] invariably add that they are themselves in no position to blow the whistle for
fear of retaliation."); see also Anthony D'Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: When a
Court Misstates the Facts, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 1323 (1990) (federal appeals court
omitted mention of critical uncontroverted evidence exculpating criminal defendant in an opinion upholding conviction); Monroe Freedman, Speech to the Seventh
Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (May 24, 1989), in 128 F.R.D. 409, 439 (1989) ("Frankly, I have had more
than enough ofjudicial opinions that bear no relationship whatsoever to the cases
that have been filed and argued before the judges. I am talking about judicial
opinions that falsify the facts, [etc.].").
391. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 279-80 (1964) (where
the Supreme Court ruled that, in order to ensure that debate on public issues is
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," a defamatory falsehood relating to a public
official is actionable only if made with "'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").
392. Id. at 280.
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even if Sullivan's protective standard applied. The Court did
393
not, however, render such a decision.
Instead, the Court specifically addressed the applicability
of Sullivan and, moreover, chose to strip Sullivan's protection
from attorney criticism of judges. The Court categorically rejected any suggestion that the expressive freedom under the
New York Constitution, or the federal, 394 required application of
Sullivan to attorney discipline for speech about judges.
"Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court," declared the Court
of Appeals, "has ever extended the Sullivan standard to lawyer
discipline and we decline to do so here."395
According to the Court, the Sullivan standard is "wholly at
odds with the policy underlying the rules governing professional
responsibility, ... [which are intended to set] a 'minimum level
of conduct'" for lawyers. 396 Attorney discipline, continued the
Court, is concerned with whether the conduct in question "adversely affects the administration of justice and adversely reflects on the attorney's judgment and, consequentially, her
ability to practice law."39 7 Applying Sullivan, reasoned the
Court, "would immunize all accusations, however reckless or irresponsible, for censure as long as the attorney uttering them
398
did not actually entertain serious doubts as to their truth."
But, a false accusation that is truly "reckless"-e.g., where
3 99
the speaker did have some good reason to doubt its truth would not, in fact, be immunized by Sullivan. Moreover, it is
not at all clear that the Sullivan "reckless disregard" standard
is as inappropriate as the Court asserted.
393. Without any explanation, the Court simply stated that, "petitioner's
course of conduct satisfies any standard other than 'constitutional malice.'" Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 193, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
394. Both state and federal constitutional claims were raised by Holtzman.
See Brieffor Petitioner-Appellant at 28-32.
395. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
396. Id. at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (quoting N.Y. JuD. LAw
app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (McKinney
1992).
397. Id. (citing In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 332 (Minn.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 820 (1990)).
398. Id.
399. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968); Trails West, Inc. v.
Wolff, 32 N.Y.2d 207, 219, 298 N.E.2d 52, 58-59, 344 N.Y.S.2d 863, 871-72 (1973).
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The Court invoked the public's general interest in the "administration of justice" and the "integrity of the judicial system."40 0 Not once, however, did the Court even mention the

public's special interest in the expressive rights involved in the
case. It said nothing, for example, about free speech about public officials and, particularly, attorney speech about judges;
nothing about the public's right to know and, specifically, to
know about the workings of courts and judicial officers; and
nothing about the responsibility of lawyers to help improve the
legal system and, particularly, to help expose those who are unsuited to the bench. 40 1 Perhaps only by disregarding these interests, rights, and responsibilities could the40 2Court reject the
Sullivan standard so readily and adamantly.
To be sure, other courts that have considered the issue have
varied in their conclusions. Some have held that the Sullivan
40 3
standard should apply to protect attorney criticism of judges.
400. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 192-93, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
401. See generally N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Cannon 8 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994) (stating that "a lawyer should assist in
improving the legal system"); N.Y. Jun. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 8-6, (McKinney Supp. 1994) (stating that "lawyers should protest earnestly against the appointment or election of those who are unsuited for the
bench"); see also Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lewis, 282 S.W.2d 321, 326 (Ky.
1955).
402. See Stacy Berg, In re Westfall and Rule 18.2: Silence by Sanction, 6 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHIcS, 343, 382 (1992) (stating that "the [Holtzman] court never balanced the interests involved .... The court failed to mention the attorney's free
speech rights, the public's right to know or the encouragement of attorneys to improve the judicial system.").
403. See, e.g., Committee on Legal Ethics v. Douglas, 370 S.E.2d 325, 332 (W.
Va. 1988); Ramirez v. State Bar of California, 619 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1980); State
Bar of Texas v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429, 432-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Eisenberg
v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp. 1360, 1364-65 (W.D. Wis. 1969); see also In re Hinds,
449 A.2d 483, 491 (N.J. 1982) (clear and present danger standard); In re Cannon,
240 N.W. 441, 455 (Wis. 1932) (stating that "[i]t best conforms to the spirit of our
institutions to permit everyone to say what he will about courts ...").
Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals itself seems previously to have
adopted and applied the Sullivan standard to attorney discipline. See In re Baker,
28 N.Y.2d 977, 978, 272 N.E.2d 337, 337, 323 N.Y.S.2d 837, 837 (1971), aff'g 34
A.D.2d 229, 311 N.Y.S.2d 70 (4th Dep't 1970).
The weight of scholarly commentary seems clearly to support application of
the Sullivan standard, or a standard even more protective of attorney speech. See,
e.g., Berg, supra note 402; Jay Carlisle, The Legal Profession, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15,
1991, at S-9, S-30; GEOFFREY HAZARD & WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 8.2:101, at 933 (2d ed. Supp. 1993); Alan M. Dershowitz, Lawyers Lips are
Sealed, NEWSDAY, Feb. 19, 1991, at 34, 36 (nationally syndicated column); Jeanne
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Some have rejected that speech-protective standard in order to
protect, instead, the public's confidence in the courts. 404 In view
of the Court of Appeals' self-proclaimed exceptional history and
rich tradition of safeguarding expressive freedom, 405 one might
have expected the Court to side with those tribunals favoring
free speech. At the least, the critical importance of the expressive interests involved demanded more than the Court's cursory
dismissal of arguments in favor of the Sullivan standard.
As stated at its inception, the purpose of the Sullivan
rule-i.e., immunizing defamatory speech against public officials except where shown to be made with "actual malice" 4 6-is
to ensure that discussion of public issues be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," even though such discussion "may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials." 407 But in Holtzman, there was not so much as an allusion to that purpose, or to
the vital interests it represents. Instead, the Court of Appeals
simply recited, as though in a vacuum, its own objective: "to
adequately protect the public interest and maintain the integrity of the judicial system."408
The "public interest" relied upon by the Court of Appeals
surely ought to have included the "profound national commitment" to free speech on public issues, as the Supreme Court in
Sullivan called it.409 But the New York court in Holtzman
never even referred to that.
Dodd, The FirstAmendment and Attorney Disciplinefor Criticismof the Judiciary:
Let the Lawyer Beware, 15 N. Ky. L. REV. 129 (1988); Saundry Molley, Restrictions
on Attorney Criticism of the Judiciary:A Denial of First Amendment Rights, 56
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 500 (1981).
404. See, e.g., In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 836 (Mo. 1990), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 648 (1991); Louisiana St. Bar Ass'n v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406, 409 (La. 1983);
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Ky. 1980); see also In re
Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 324-25 (Minn.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 820 (1990) (applying an "objective" version of Sullivan).
405. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 249, 567 N.E.2d 1270,
1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 913 (1991).
406. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (stating that
"actual malice" means "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not").
407. Id. at 270.
408. In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184, 192-93, 577 N.E.2d 30, 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d
at 39, 43 (1991).
409. Sullivan, 376 U.S at 270.
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The Supreme Court in Sullivan was well aware of the need
to protect our public institutions, including the judiciary. Quoting at length from Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California,410 the Sullivan court reaffirmed the "classic formulation" of the "principle" of free public speech:
Those who won our independence believed.., that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government. They recognized the risks
to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that
order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction [and]... that the path of safety lies in the opportunity
to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies
411

But the Court of Appeals in Holtzman gave not the slightest indication of considering Brandeis' admonition. Rather, the
Court seemed merely to assume, without examination, that
maintaining respect for the judiciary required stringent control
of attorney criticism of judges. As the Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Black, recognized more than two decades before
it mandated the Sullivan standard:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by
shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the
character of American public opinion. For it is a prized American
privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect
good taste on all public institutions. And an enforced silence,
however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of
the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and
412
contempt much more than it would enhance respect.
The Supreme Court has never specifically decided whether
the Federal Constitution requires application of the Sullivan
standard to attorney discipline for criticism of judges. But in
410. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

411. Sullivan, 376 U.S at 270 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 37576 (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
412. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) (applying a "clear and
present danger" standard and vacating contempt citations imposed on a union
leader and newspaper publisher for extrajudicial criticism ofjudges); see also State
v. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, 455 (Wis. 1932) (stating that "[iut best conforms to the
spirit of our institutions to permit every one to say what he will about courts, and
leave the destiny of the courts to the good judgment of the people. They may err
occasionally, but the combined sober judgment of the voters can be relied upon in
the long run to protect the courts from calumny, abuse, and unfounded criticism.").
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the same year it decided Sullivan, that Court did apply the "actual malice" standard to an attorney's public accusations of ju4 14
dicial misconduct. 4 13 The Court, in Garrison v. Louisiana
made clear its belief that the Sullivan standard was critical to
ensure free speech on public affairs. It held that the Sullivan
standard was intended to apply to all civil and criminal proceedings, and it made no exception where the public official is a
41 5
judge or where the critic or accuser is an attorney.
Invalidating an attempt to hold a district attorney criminally liable for his defamatory statements to the press about
several judges, the Court in Garrisonexplained:
[S]ince... erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and
... it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have
the 'breathingspace' that they 'need ...to survive,' . . . only those
false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their
probable falsity demanded by [Sullivan] may be the subject of
either civil or criminal sanctions. For speech concerning public
affairs is more than self expression; it is the essence of self4
government. 16
In the past, the Court of Appeals itself seemed fully mindful that "speech concerning public affairs" must have "breathing
space." So, for example, in its 1974 decision in Justices of the
Appellate Division v. Erdmann,417 the Court dismissed disciplinary proceedings against an attorney who publicly called New
York's intermediate appeals court judges "the whores who became madams." 41 8 In a brief per curiam decision, the Court of
Appeals summarily disposed of the matter. It ruled that "without more, isolated incidences of disrespect for the law, judges,
and the courts expressed by vulgar and insulting words or other
incivilities, uttered, written or committed outside the precincts
41 9
of the court are not subject to professional discipline."
413. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). The attorney had held a
press conference railing against the "inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations
of the judges" and raising "interesting questions about the racketeer influences on
our eight vacation-minded judges." Id. at 66.

414. 379 U.S. 64, 66 (1964).
415. Id. at 74-75.
416. Id. (alterations and emphasis added) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-

71).
417. 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973).
418. Id. at 560, 301 N.E.2d at 427, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 442 (Burke, J., dissenting).
419. Id. (Burke, J., dissenting).
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A few years later, the Court of Appeals specifically addressed the propriety of the Sullivan standard to defamatory
criticism of judges. The critic in Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, Inc.420 was not a lawyer, and the proceeding involved
was not for professional discipline. But the Court's affirmation
of Sullivan to protect both free speech and the public's right to
know-and specifically about judges-was emphatic. Its recognition that the work and character of judges are important public issues that should be subject to uninhibited public discussion
was unequivocal. Speaking through Judge Matthew J. Jasen,
the Court declared that:
Especially in a state in which judges are elected to office, comments and opinions on judicial performance are a matter of public
interest and concern. The rule of the [Sullivan] case was designed
to protect the free flow of information to the people concerning the
performance of their public officials.... The public, clearly, has a
vital interest in the performance and integrity of its judiciary. 421
Rinaldi is completely absent from the Holtzman decision.
It was not discussed, not distinguished, not even cited. Indeed,
in the curt disposition of vital issues in the anonymous Holtzman opinion, not even casual reference was made to those principles and interests previously recognized as nothing less than
critical to a free democratic society. There is nothing in the
Holtzman decision that even suggests the Court's consideration
of the principles of free speech or the interests of an informed
public that prevailed in Rinaldi, as well as in the Supreme
Court's decisions in Sullivan, Bridges and Garrison. To be sure,
there is nothing in the per curiam Holtzman opinion derived
from the New York Court's professed "long," "rich," and "exceptional" tradition of safeguarding expressive liberty. 422
420. 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1977).
421. Id. at 380 (citations omitted); see also State Bar of Texas v. Semaan, 508
S.W.2d 429, 432-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (stating that "[t]he right of a lawyer as a
citizen to publicly criticize adjudicatory officials . . . is particularly meaningful
where, as in Texas, [they] are selected through the elective system").
422. See, e.g., Immuno 11, 77 N.Y.2d at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d
at 913; People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 503 N.E.2d
492, 494-95, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1986). But see Bonventre, supra note 2, at
129-41 (stating that the Court's protection of free expression changed from "fetish
to fizzle" during the latter years of the Wachtler era).

69

422

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:353

Instead, ignoring that tradition and summarily rejecting
the Sullivan standard, the Court of Appeals adopted a speechstifling test. Previously applied by a few other state supreme
courts, 423 the test exposes to discipline any lawyer whose criticism of a judge would not have been voiced by some undefined,
objectively reasonable attorney. "In order to adequately protect
the public interest and maintain the integrity of the judicial
system," the Court of Appeals held, "there must be an objective
standard of what a reasonable attorney would do in similar circumstances." 424 Other than a citation to a Louisiana decision,425
the Court offered only this elaboration: "It is the reasonableness of the belief, not the state of mind of the attorney, that is
26
determinative."4
A facile turn of phrase hardly suffices for thoughtful analysis. But as with so much else in Holtzman, the Court offered
precious little of substance to buttress or explain its position.
This is particularly disturbing because of the "vital interest[s]"
involved-as the Court in Rinaldi had recognized them to be. 427
Speech about the "performance and integrity" of judges, 428 as
much as about other power-wielding public servants, is the "essence of self-government." 429 Speech about judges, as much as
about other government officials, stands on the "highest rung of
the hierarchy of [free speech] values and is entitled to special
protection."4 30 Distressingly, the Holtzman opinion is utterly
indifferent to such free speech values, and indeed, the standard
adopted by the Court of Appeals is hostile to them.
423. See Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 192-93, 557 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43
(citing In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn. 1990); Louisiana St. Bar Ass'n v.
Karst, 428 So. 2d 406 (La. 1983).
424. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 192-93, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43
(citations omitted).
425. Louisiana St. Bar Ass'n v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406, 409 (La. 1983), cited in
Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 193, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
426. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 193, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
427. Rinaldi, 42 N.Y.2d at 380, 366 N.E.2d at 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
428. Id.
429. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75.
430. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); see also Koumngsberg v.
State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 269 (1957) (stating that "[c]itizens have a
right under our constitutional system to criticize government officials and agencies. Courts are not, and should not be, immune to such criticism.").
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Attorneys are especially qualified by education and experience to comment on judges and their work. 43 ' Moreover, as an
integral part of their ethical obligation to help improve the legal
system, 432 "one of the most important societal duties of lawyers
is the duty to criticize the courts."43 3 But the Holtzman standard potently discourages candid attorney speech about judges.
The flattery of judicial sycophants is not at risk, nor is other
favorable commentary or even neutral description. But attorneys who speak critically of judges-and particularly if they do
so forthrightly-now speak at their peril in New York.
Under Holtzman, an attorney is subject to discipline regardless of how sincere she is in her criticism, regardless of how
confident she is in its truth, and regardless of how benevolent
are her motives. "[S]tate of mind," according to the Court of Appeals, is not the issue when an attorney faces discipline for
speaking critically about a judge. 434 Rather, the relevant question is the "objective" "reasonableness of the belief."435 Hence,
even if an attorney has good reason to believe her criticism,
even if she has no real doubts about its accuracy, 43 6 and even if
her purpose is to improve the legal system, she is still subject to
431. See Berg, supra note 402, at 357-58, 379-80; Roger Miner, Should Lawyers Be More Criticalof the Courts?, 71 JUDICATURE 134, 134 (1987); Dodd, supra
note 403, at 144; Molley, supra note 403, at 505; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1 (1981) ("By reason of education and experience, lawyers are

especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to initiate corrective measures therein."); EC 8-6 ("Judges and administrative officials having
adjudicatory powers ought to be persons of integrity, competence, and suitable
temperament. Generally, lawyers are qualified, by personal observation or investigation, to evaluate the qualifications of [such] persons.").
432. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1993) Canon 8 ("A
Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1981) ("A lawyer is... an officer of the legal system
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.").
433. Miner, supra note 431, at 134; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 8.2 cmt. 1 (1983) ("Expressing honest and candid opinions on such
matters contributes to improving the administration of justice."); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-9 (1981) ("[L]awyers should encourage, and
should aid in making, needed changes and improvements."); Berg, supra note 402,
at 356, 381-82; Molley, supra note 403, at 501, 505; HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS 59-62 (1953).
434. Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d at 193, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 192, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (rejecting a subjective
argument which would take into account whether "the attorney uttering [accusations] did not actually entertain serious doubts as to their truth").
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discipline if speaking her mind is not "what a reasonable attor437
ney would do."
Of course, a "reasonable attorney" concerned about the values of free speech and the public's right to know might do one
thing; a "reasonable attorney" worried about a notion of professionalism that penalizes attorneys for speaking frankly would
likely do something else. After Holtzman, a "reasonable" New
York attorney speaking or writing publicly about judges has
good cause to be reluctant to share her candid critical assessments. The attorney's comments-however honest and seemingly accurate-might later be deemed harmful to the
"integrity of the judicial system" 438 and, therefore, not the kind
that would have been uttered by some "objective," more "reason439
able" lawyer.
The Holtzman decision is antithetical to a commitment to
"robust" speech about public affairs 440 and the "free flow of information" about public officials." 1 The Holtzman rule stands Sullivan and Rinaldi on their heads. It shields public servants at
the expense of public speech, and it elevates cautious restraint
over "uninhibited" discussion." 2 The unfortunate, but almost
certain, effect of the Holtzman decision will be to inhibit candid
3
commentary about judges. and to silence much criticism.4
One would hope that the Court of Appeals did not intend
such chilling results. As deficient as the opinion is in Holtzman
and as lamentable as its rule is, the decision will hopefully
prove to be an aberration that the Court revisits and revises at
first opportunity.
2.

Equal Justice and Government Regularity

In yet another unsigned opinion, again superficially resolving weighty issues of rights and interests, the Court in Alison D.
v. Virginia M." denied standing to a lesbian nonbiological
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id. at 193, 577 N.E.2d at 34, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
Id.
Id.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
Rinaldi, 42 N.Y.2d at 380, 366 N.E.2d at 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
See Berg, supra note 402, at 369-71, 382; Carlisle, supra note 403, at S-9.
77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991).
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"parent" who claimed visitation rights with a child she nurtured
and supported as her own for six years.
Petitioner and her partner planned the conception and
birth of the child and agreed to share all parental rights and
obligations; the partner was artificially inseminated and gave
birth, and the two did in fact share all child rearing expenses
and responsibilities. 4 5 During the child's third year, petitioner
and her partner ended their relationship and petitioner left the
household; as the parties agreed however, petitioner visited the
child regularly and continued to share expenses-the child continuing to consider both parties "Mommy.""

6

This arrangement

lasted for three years; thereafter, the partner restricted peti7
tioner's contact with the child."

Petitioner commenced a proceeding under state Domestic
Relations Law section 70, which authorizes "either parent" to
apply for a determination of a child's care and custody." 8 While
conceding that she was neither a biological nor adoptive parent,
petitioner claimed that she was a "de facto" parent with a legally cognizable interest in the well being of the child and expectation of continued contact. 449 In a somewhat curt three
page opinion, the Court majority held that petitioner "has no
right under Domestic Relations Law section 70 to seek visitation [because s]he is not a 'parent' within the meaning" of the
0
statute.45
Without acknowledging any legal and constitutional issues
surrounding the concepts of parenthood and parent-child relationship, the Court simply stated:
Section 70 gives parents the right to bring proceedings to ensure
their proper exercise of their care, custody and control ....

We

decline petitioners invitation to read the term parent in section 70
to include categories of nonparents who have developed a relationship with a child or have had prior relationships with a child's
parents and who wish to continue visitation with a child.451
445. Id. at 655, 572 N.E.2d at 28, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 70 (McKinney 1977).
449. Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 656, 572 N.E.2d at 29, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 657, 572 N.E.2d at 29, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The explanation offered by the Court was that "the Legislature did not in section 70 give such nonparent the opportunity"
to seek visitation; 452 by contrast, "other categories of persons"
were given such opportunity in other statutory provisions
"[w]here the Legislature deemed it appropriate."453
But that was no answer to the question actually presented,
and no explanation for the Court's response. Whatever the merits of the bottom-line decision in Alison D., the Court's reliance
on the statute's failure specifically to include "de facto" or functional parents ignores the fact that the statute does not specifically exclude them, nor does it specify "biological" parent or any
other kind. The Court did not answer the critical question of
whether the unadorned statutory term "parent" should be construed in light of all the rights and interests involved to include
a "de facto" or functional parent. Instead, the Court simply refused to do so by pointing to the unadorned term itself, as
though that were explanation enough.
In a thoughtful and heartfelt dissent, Judge Kaye refused
to join the Court's "retreat" from its "proper role" of considering
the interests involved and relationships affected in visitation
cases, where the "bonds that may be crucial to [a child's] development" are at stake. 454 The majority did acknowledge a "parent-child relationship" existing for the first six years of the
child's life. But it adopted an inflexibly limited reading of the
term "parent" that erected an "absolute barrier" to considering
"how close or deep the emotional ties might be between petitioner and child, or how devastating isolation might be to the
child."'455
As Judge Kaye noted, nothing in the statute itself dictated
the Court's limited reading:
Significantly, the Domestic Relations Law contains no such limitation. Indeed, it does not define the term "parent" at all. That
remains for the courts to do, as often happens when statutory
terms are undefined.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 658, 572 N.E.2d at 30, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 589 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
455. Id. at 658-59, 572 N.E.2d at 30, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 589 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
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The majority insists, however, that the word "parent" in this
case can only be read to mean biological parent [and thus] forecloses all inquiry into the child's best interest, even in visitation
proceedings. We have not previously taken such a hard line in
these matters ....456
Instead of taking a "hard line," explained Judge Kaye, the
Court has traditionally "attempted to read otherwise undefined
words of the statute so as to effectuate the legislative purposes."4 57 In determining visitation rights, "'the best interests
of the child' and the child's 'welfare and happiness,'" purposes
explicit in the very text of section 70, "should not be ignored
.. ..

"458

"It is indeed regrettable," Kaye lamented, that the

459
Court in Alison D. did just that.
Finally, Judge Kaye suggested that the ramifications of the
Court's decision were as far ranging as they were "regrettable."
In giving meaning to undefined or ambiguous statutory concepts, the Court in the past has "look[ed] to modern-day realities."460 So for example, the Court in recent years defined
"death" for homicide prosecutions as "brain death" in accordance with modern medical science, 46 1 and it defined "family" for
rent stabilization as including gay partnerships that resemble
marital relationships. 462 But by strictly confining the concept of
parenthood, and thereby disregarding a great deal of modern
reality, the Court may well have jeopardized the interests of a
great many parental relationships falling outside its cramped
biological definition.
As Judge Kaye opened her dissent:
The Court's decision, fixing biology as the key to visitation rights,
has impact far beyond this particular controversy, one that may
affect a wide spectrum of relationships-including those of longtime heterosexual stepparents, 'common-law' and nonheterosex-

456.
457.
458.
1977)).
459.
460.

Id. at 659, 572 N.E.2d at 31, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 590 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kaye, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kaye, J., dissenting) (quoting N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 70 (McKinney
Id. at 662, 572 N.E.2d at 33, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 592 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
Id. at 661, 572 N.E.2d at 32, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 591 (Kaye, J., dissenting).

461. See People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 354 n.27, 472 N.E.2d 286, 294 n.27,
482 N.Y.S.2d 436, 444 n.27 (1984).
462. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 211-13, 543 N.E.2d 49,
53-55, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788-90 (1989).
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ual [sic] partners such as involved here, and even participants in
scientific reproduction procedures. Estimates that more than
15.5 million children do not live with two biological parents, and
that as many as 8 to 10 million children are born into families
with a gay or lesbian parent, suggest just how widespread the im463
pact may be.

But there was as little recognition by the majority of this
potential impact, in the majority opinion, as there was consideration of the child's interests or the lesbian "de facto" parent's
rights. The Alison D. decision thus contrasts sharply with those
aforementioned statutory decisions adopting enlightened definitions of "death"464 and "family."465 It also suffers by comparison
with recent state constitutional decisions where the Court invalidated narrow definitions of "family" in local ordinances in
order to protect the equal protection and due process rights of
bona fide, yet nontraditional, familial households. 466 Those decisions, like so much else raised by Judge Kaye's dissent and
the briefs supporting petitioner's position, 467 were ignored by
468
the majority.
In Catlin v. Sobol, 469 the meaning of "residence" for the purpose of statutorily mandated tuition-free education for handi463. Allison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 657-58, 572 N.E.2d at 30, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 589
(Kaye, J., dissenting).
464. See supra note 461 and accompanying text.
465. See supra note 462 and accompanying text.
466. See McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544,488 N.E.2d 1240,498
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985); Baer v. Town of Brookhaven, 73 N.Y.2d 942, 537 N.E.2d 619,
540 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1989).
467. The amicus briefs submitted to the Court in support of the state constitutional rights of nontraditional parents generally, and of petitioner specifically, included those of the American Civil Liberties Union, the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, and the National Organization of Women Legal Defense and
Education Fund. See Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 653-54, 572 N.E.2d at 28, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 587.
468. As is evident in Alison D, as well as in Holtzman, see discussion supra
notes 351-443 and accompanying text, the hallmark of the Court of Appeals' unsigned opinions is certainly not insight, perspective, rigorous analysis, meticulous
attention to precedent, or any other characteristic of distinguished judicial decisionmaking. Alison D., like Holtzman, is weakly reasoned and short-sighted, and
it disguises the critical issues rather than address them forthrightly. If the result
reached in Alison D., or Holtzman, was the right one, then the Court's unsigned
opinion did more to conceal than reveal the supporting reasons. See also Bonventre, supra note 3, at 53-54; discussion infra notes 543-53.
469. 77 N.Y.2d 552, 571 N.E.2d 661, 569 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1991).
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capped children 470 was at issue. The majority, in an opinion by
Judge Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., upheld a determination of the
State Commissioner of Education that the plaintiff child's residence was that of his parents, who resided in Massachusetts
and, therefore, that the school district in New York State where
he actually lived was not required to furnish his education tui471
tion free.
Shortly after birth, plaintiff, afflicted with Down's syndrome, was placed by his parents, then residents of New York,
in a "family home at board" in Edmeston, where he continued to
live. At five years old, plaintiff entered the educational program
for handicapped children in the Edmeston school district. Several years later, when the child's parents moved to Massachusetts, they requested continued free education for the child
under Education Law section 3202(4)(b). Their request was denied by the school district and, on appeal, by the Commissioner
of Education, on the ground that the child's residence was the
same as his parents, not the district in which he lived and went
472
to school.
In upholding the commissioner's determination, the Court
rejected the contention that a child's "actual and only residence," within the meaning of the statute, should be construed
synonymously with his "physical presence."473 The majority
adopted the view that a child's "residence" should be determined in accordance with the traditional common law presumption: a child's residence is deemed to be the same as the
parents' unless rebutted by proof showing that parental control
474
has been surrendered and been assumed by another.
470. Id. at 552, 571 N.E.2d at 661, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 353. New York State Education Law section 3202(4)(b) provides in pertinent part:
Children cared for in free family homes and children cared for in family
homes at board, when such family homes shall be the actual and only residence of such children and when such children are not supported and maintained at the expense of a social services district or of a state department or
agency, shall be deemed residence of the school district in which such family
home is located.
N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3202(4)(b) (McKinney 1985) (emphasis added).
471. Catlin, 77 N.Y.2d at 556, 571 N.E.2d at 662-63, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 354-55.
472. Id. at 556, 571 N.E.2d at 663, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
473. Id. at 559, 571 N.E.2d at 664, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
474. Id. at 559 n.1, 571 N.E.2d at 664 n.1, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 356 n.1.
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According to the majority, both the overall plan of the statute and the legislative history of the specific section at issue
confirmed such an interpretation of "residence":
This construction is consistent with the general scheme of the free
education statute and furthers its purpose: mandating the provision of free education by a school district for its resident children
but assuring that nonresident parents who have children within
the district must pay tuition for them unless the presumption is
overcome and it is established that their children's actual and
4 75
only residence is within the district.

As for section 3202(4)(b) specifically, the Court concluded
476
that: "[t]here is no reason why a different rule should apply."
Rejecting the plaintiff's argument for a less demanding standard of eligibility, the majority elaborated:
The interpretation urged by plaintiff-that a child's 'physical
presence' in the district, standing alone ...obligates a school district to provide free education-imposes a far heavier financial responsibility on districts in cases where the child is staying in a
family home and comes under section 3202(4)(b) than in other circumstances involving children of nonresident parents. There appears to be no plausible reason for imposing these additional and
unnecessary burdens.

....477

Finally, the Court upheld the factual determination that
478
the parental residence presumption had not been overcome.
The parents had continued financial responsibility for the child,
had retained legal authority over him, and could alter or undo
475. Id. at 560, 571 N.E.2d at 665, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 561, 571 N.E.2d at 665-66, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 357-58 (footnote omitted). The majority also cited legislative history in support of its position:
Indeed, the legislative history of this section demonstrates .. .that a district's responsibility to provide free education would be limited to cases
where the presumption is overcome and the child has established a permanent domicile in the home of the family providing the care... : "This bill...
enacts a new subdivision [of Education Law § 3202] which provides... [that
nion resident children cared for in family homes and not supported by a
social services district may be required to pay tuition.... The principal
purpose of the bill is to relieve school districts of the obligation ... to bear
the financial burden of educating nonresident children."
Id. at 560, 571 N.E.2d at 665, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 357 (quoting Memorandum in Support of State Dep't of Education, Jan. 1, 1974, reprinted in Legislative Bill Jacket,
1973 N.Y. Laws ch. 867) (alterations added and in original).
478. Id. at 562, 571 N.E.2d at 667, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
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the child's custodial arrangement as they wished. 47 9 Hence, in
the majority's view, the Commissioner of Education's ruling
that the child was not a "resident" of the school district was ra4 80
tional and should not be disturbed.
In dissent, Judge Bellacosa complained that "[flacile application of the cold formalism that children are deemed to reside
with their natural parents in genuine circumstances such as
presented here is plainly wrong . .. "481 The dissenter invoked
the state constitutional right to a free education 82' to argue
against undue reliance on the common law presumption and
the fiscal considerations that concerned the majority and the
483
legislature.
Judge Bellacosa-in a rare instance of urging the Court to
be more protective of state constitutional rights, and an equally
rare joinder with Judge Titone 48 4 in a non-unanimous decision 4 8 5-argued that the plaintiff was, as a matter of fact and
policy, a "resident" entitled to a free education. 48 6 As a matter
of fact, the circumstances could not be more compelling in the
dissenter's view: "the developmentally disabled youngster has
been physically, i.e., 'actually', and continuously, i.e., 'only', residing in the same home at board since the age of three weeks
48 7
and has never even visited his natural parents' residence."
479. Id. at 562, 571 N.E.2d at 666, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
480. Id. at 562 n.4, 571 N.E.2d at 666 n.4, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 358 n.4.
481. Id. at 566, 571 N.E.2d at 669, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
482. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
483. Catlin, 77 N.Y.2d at 565, 571 N.E.2d at 668, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
484. Judge Titone's voting record is consistently the Court's most supportive
of individual rights. See, e.g., Bonventre and Powell, Changing Course at the High
Court, supra note 10, at 60; Daniel Wise, Wachtler Court at 5: PanelDefies Labels,
But Individual Trends Emerge, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1991, S-3.
485. Catlin is the only decision in 1991 in which Judge Bellacosa disagreed
with the Court's rejection of a claim of constitutional right or liberty; by contrast,
Judge Titone authored or joined a separate opinion doing so in nine of the Court's
fourteen divided constitutional decisions. See Table A, List of Cases. In 1990, out
of the Court's eighteen divided state constitutional cases, Judge Bellacosa did so,
again, only once; Judge Titone did so eleven times. See Bonventre, supra note 3, at
55; see also discussion infra notes 534-42 and accompanying text.
486. Catlin, 77 N.Y.2d at 564-66, 571 N.E.2d at 668-69, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 36061 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
487. Id. at 566, 571 N.E.2d at 669, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
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As a matter of policy, the dissent argued that the majority's
position led to an absurdity: that the benefit of the statute must
be denied a child because his natural parents have failed to
sever all ties to him. 488 Judge Bellacosa explained:
[I]t is inconceivable that the Legislature would have wanted to
induce parents to cease all financial support in contravention of
existing statutory support obligations and to renounce their developmentally disabled children in order to qualify for a free education in instances where parents seek stable placementsfor those children
sometimes permanent, as here-and education
48 9
away from the natural parents' home.
Lastly, the dissent tackled the "local educational fiscal concerns" 490 that seemed to weigh heavily on the majority, and apparently, the Legislature as well. 49 1 Those concerns, in the
dissent's view, did not override, and perhaps were overridden
492
themselves by, the state's "transcendent" educational policy.
As Judge Bellacosa's dissenting opinion put it:
The undeviating focus of the pertinent provisions in the Education Law is the right of New York children to a free public education . . . . Few things in our society are more fundamental.
Inasmuch as the child is the one guaranteed an education by the
State, the child's circumstance and actual residence ought to dictate the resolution of this issue .... 493
In short, according to the dissent, the majority had issued a
"legal ultimatum" to nonresident parents: "either pay tuition to
the school district where [the child] actually and only resides or
withdraw him from the only home and school he has ever
known."494 By doing so, the Court had failed to honor the "constitutional and statutory entitlement" of its children "to a free
495
public education."
488. Id. at 564, 571 N.E.2d at 668, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 360 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
489. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
490. Id. at 565, 571 N.E.2d at 668, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 360 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
491. See id. at 560-61, 571 N.E.2d at 665-66, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 357-58.
492. Catlin, 77 N.Y.2d at 565, 571 N.E.2d at 668, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 360 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
493. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1).
494. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
495. Id. Another social welfare decision in 1991 was Couch v. Perales, 78
N.Y.2d 595, 600, 585 N.E.2d 772, 774, 578 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (1991) (holding, in an
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In Alliance of American Insurers v. Chu,496 the Court of Appeals protected the rights of insurance companies to income derived from their mandatory contributions to a state created
insurance security fund. The Court based its decision "on the
constitutionally based protection against legislative interference with vested rights, a doctrine with a long tradition."497 Denying that its decision was "a throwback to the discredited
Lochner era,"498 the majority, in an opinion by Chief Judge

Wachtler, insisted that it was "simply giving meaning to the
words used by the Legislature" 499 that "granted . . . rights

500
[which] may not be extinguished" by subsequent legislation.
In brief, legislation was enacted in 1969 requiring insurance carriers to contribute to a "Property and Liability Insurance Security Fund" until the fund reached $200 million; as
part of the legislative scheme, income derived from the contributions was to be credited or returned to the insurers proportionate to their contributions. 50 1 Beginning in 1970, the
insurers contributed to the fund until 1973 when the $200 million goal was reached. Thereafter, in 1979, the legislature
amended the 1969 statute and provided that income from the
fund would no longer be credited or returned to the contributors; it also provided that the fund monies in excess of $240 million would be placed in the state's general fund. 5 2 Additionally,

unanimous opinion by Judge Alexander, that the mandate of New York Constitution article XVII, section 1, to provide "aid, care, and support of the needy," does
not preclude the commissioner of social services from recouping overpayment of
Aid to Families with Dependent Children from the grant to the family unit, rather
than from the proportionate share of the individual recipient of the overpayment;
nor does it preclude such recoupment prior to a determination that the needs of the
children of that family unit have diminished).
496. 77 N.Y.2d 573, 571 N.E.2d 672, 569 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1991).
497. Id. at 586 (citation omitted).
498. Id. (referring to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1903) (striking
down state regulation of wages and hours of workers on the ground that it interfered with freedom of contract, which was part of the "liberty of the individual
protected by the [Due Process Clause] of the 14th Amendment of the Federal
Constitution")).
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Act of Apr. 21, 1969, ch. 189, § 3, 1969 N.Y. Laws 233 (McKinney).
502. Act of Aug. 1, 1979, ch. 503, § 4, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1042, 1043 (McKinney).
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in 1982, the legislature transferred $87 million from the fund to
50 3
the state's general fund.
According to the Court of Appeals majority, "[t]he 1969 legislation granted the contributors rights in the income generated
by their contributions, which rights, we conclude, attached to
all contributions made to the fund [between 1970 and 1973]
while that legislation remained in effect."5°4 The question
before the Court then, in its own words, was "whether the State
may extinguish [those] property right[s] by the simple expedient of repealing the provision which gives rise to it."505 The
majority's answer was given categorically in the opening lines of
its opinion:
The integrity of the State government, upon which the public is
entitled to rely, requires, at the very least, that the State keep its
lawfully enacted promises. When our Legislature grants to contributors property rights in the income of a fund and pledges the
"full faith and credit of the State of New York" for the safekeeping
simply ignore the pledge and abrogate those
of that fund it cannot
50 6
vested rights.
Curiously, as emphatic as the majority was in pronouncing
such overarching principles, it was equally emphatic in disclaiming their application beyond the case at hand. "We emphasize," the majority was strangely compelled to add, "that our
holding is limited to the legislation affecting the Property and
50 7
Liability Insurance Security Fund."
The majority opinion forcefully defends "contributors'
rights,"50 8 "vested rights,"50 9 and "property right[s]," 510 it condemns "legislative interference with"5 11 and "abrogat[ion of]"
those rights, 512 and it insists upon the "constitutionally based
503. See Act of Apr. 12, 1982, ch. 55, § 92, 1982 N.Y. Laws 85 (McKinney).
504. American Insurers, 77 N.Y.2d at 578, 571 N.E.2d at 674, 569 N.Y.S.2d at
366.
505. Id. at 585, 571 N.E.2d at 678, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
506. Id. at 577, 571 N.E.2d at 673, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 365 (quoting Act of Apr.
11, 1947, ch. 801, § 6, 1947 N.Y. Laws 1477, 1480 (McKinney), the precursor of the
1969 legislation).
507. Id. at 578, 571 N.E.2d at 674, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 366 (emphasis added).
508. Id.
509. Id. at 586, 571 N.E.2d at 678, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id. at 577, 571 N.E.2d at 673, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
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protection"5 13 of those rights and upon "the State keep[ing] its
lawfully enacted promises." 514 But language inserted in that
opinion also ensures that the Court could not be held to what it
said-thus ensuring that the Court's decision has precious little, if any, precedential value. Seemingly addressing those who
would take issue with its decision-indeed, as if it were mollifying the fears of those who might take the decision too seriously-the Court included this line: "The validity of the State's
actions with respect to other funds will depend on the unique
set of statutory provisions governing each of the funds affected
and is not controlled by our decision here."515
It would appear that the author of the Court's opinion, or
one or more members of the majority, were troubled by the
ramifications of their own decision. The majority's strikingly
limiting language seems wholly out of place with the grand pronouncements and sweeping sentiment that otherwise mark the
opinion. But that language does limit the Court's decision. In
fact, it seems to render the decision sui generis. Perhaps, the
majority was worried about the concerns raised in the dissent.
Judge Hancock, joined by Judge Titone, warned that the
decision in American Insurers "constitutes a substantial interference in the State's management of [the insurance security]
fund and a deep intrusion into the power of the State to regulate the insurance industry."51 6 Judge Hancock chided the majority for its "concern for the protection of plaintiff insurance
companies' 'property rights' "5 7-for its resurrection of the dis518
credited notion of "economic due process."
What was really being claimed by the insurance companies,
according to Judge Hancock, was that "the State had no right to
repeal the provisions of the 1969 legislation and that with respect to income to be earned on the contributions made between
1970 and 1973 they have what amounts to a perpetual annu513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.
dissenting).
517. Id.
518. Id.

at 586, 571 N.E.2d at
at 577, 571 N.E.2d at
at 578, 571 N.E.2d at
at 609, 571 N.E.2d

678, 569
673, 569
674, 569
at 693,

N.Y.S.2d at 370.
N.Y.S.2d at 365.
N.Y.S.2d at 366 (emphasis added).
569 N.Y.S.2d at 385 (Hancock, J.,

(Hancock, J., dissenting).
(Hancock, J., dissenting).
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ity.... ."59 And what the majority agreed, in Judge Hancock's
view, was "that under some legal theory the State had barred
itself from giving any effect to legislation which would extinguish plaintiffs' prospective rights to refunds or credits ...."520
The real issue in the case, according to the dissent, was not
legislative interference with insurance companies' vested
rights, but judicial interference with legislative regulation of a
"closely controlled industry."52 1 The dissent assessed the majority's treatment of that issue:
[T]he judicial branch [ought] not [to] encroach upon the prerogative of the Legislature to make the laws, particularly in the area
of establishing reasonable conditions on heavily regulated businesses. This decision stands as a precedent that is contrary to
that tenet. It will be law-law which, if it does not affect the
State's right to manage other funds (as the majority assures us,
that, for some reason, it will not), will certainly stand for a signifi522
cant and novel proposition in the law of separation of powers.
Perhaps, beyond this particular case, the majority did not
intend to affect the State's power to manage funds. Perhaps
this decision will, thus, remain a novel, and singular, one. But
if so-if as the majority "assures us," this decision will not control other cases 523-what is to be made of the majority's pronouncements of constitutional doctrine? What of its
declarations about "vested rights"?524 About "constitutionally
protected property interests"? 525 About the State's "integrity"
526
and the Legislature's promises?
It is certainly not clear whether the constitutional pronouncements in American Insurers should be relied upon, or
even taken seriously. In a subsequent case, can the decision be
519. Id. at 595-96, 571 N.E.2d at 684, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 376 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
520. Id. at 596, 571 N.E.2d at 685, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 377 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
521. Id. at 609, 571 N.E.2d at 693, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 385 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
522. Id. at 610, 571 N.E.2d at 693, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 385 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
523. Id. at 609, 571 N.E.2d at 693, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 385 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
524. Id. at 586, 571 N.E.2d at 678, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
525. Id. at 585, 571 N.E.2d at 678, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
526. Id. at 589, 571 N.E.2d at 681, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
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confidently cited to the Court of Appeals in support of a similar
ruling? As the majority opinion surely seems to foretell, the decision in American Insurers and what it appears to stand for
will likely be distinguished away, because the decision is "limited" to the "particular" and "unique" circumstances of the
case.

52 7

527. Id. at 578, 571 N.E.2d at 674, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
The Court rejected another separation of powers challenge in 1991, this one
directed against the executive branch, in Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy,
Inc. v. Cuomo, 78 N.Y.2d 398, 582 N.E.2d 568, 576 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1991). In this
case, a four to three majority, in an opinion by Judge Bellacosa, held that the governor did not exceed his constitutional or statutory authority in entering an agreement with the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) to transfer the Shoreham
nuclear power facility to the Long Island Power Authority (LIPA), which would
oversee the facility's closure. Id. at 411, 582 N.E.2d at 573, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 18890. This transfer was an objective of the LIPA Act of 1986, which created LIPA to
replace LILCO as the power utility for Long Island, close Shoreham, and thereby
reduce power costs. Id. at 407, 582 N.E.2d at 570, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 187; see also
Long Island Power Authority Act, ch. 517, § 1, 1986 N.Y. Laws 1140 (McKinney)
(codified at N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAw §§ 1020-1020(gg) (McKinney 1994)). In dissent,
Judge Hancock, joined by Judges Alexander and Titone, argued that the governor
exceeded the proper limits of executive power and usurped legislative authority
when he entered and implemented the agreement which the legislature had refused to ratify and which contravened the legislative policy, codified in the LIPA
Act, of replacing LILCO in conjunction with closing Shoreham-not retaining
LILCO by transferring Shoreham and taking other measures to save it from economic ruin. Id. at 418-19, 582 N.E.2d at 571, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 194-95 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
Other 1991 decisions implicating the regularity of government activities and
procedures were: In re Colt Indus. Shareholder Litig., 77 N.Y.2d 185, 566 N.E.2d
1160, 565 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1991). In Colt Industries, a unanimous Court, speaking
through Chief Judge Wachtler, held that class members, whether resident or nonresident, have "no [federal or state] due process right to opt out of an otherwise
properly brought New York class action suit seeking predominantly equitable relief." Id. at 195, 566 N.E.2d at 1165, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 760. According to the Court,
a favorable judgment benefits the class as a whole and the importance of obtaining
a single final ruling outweighs any individual interest in controlling the litigation.
Id. at 195, 566 N.E.2d at 1166, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
In Derle v. North Bellmore Union Free Sch. Dist., 77 N.Y.2d 483, 571 N.E.2d
58, 568 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1991), the Court held, in a unanimous per curiam opinion,
that the salary of a teacher could not be withheld pending determination of disciplinary charges where the teacher requested adjournment of the Education Law
§ 3020-a disciplinary hearing until final disposition of the criminal prosecution
based on parallel charges. Id. at 488-89, 571 N.E.2d at 60, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
The teacher's request, based on concerns that his rights to defend himself and
against compulsory self-incrimination, was deemed neither obstructionist nor
otherwise in bad faith. Id. at 488, 571 N.E.2d at 60, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
In ISCA Enterprises v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.2d 688, 572 N.E.2d 610, 569
N.Y.S.2d 927 (1991), the Court held, in an unanimous opinion by Judge Kaye de-
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III. Summary and Assessment
The Court of Appeals rendered a total of forty-seven state
constitutional rights decisions in 1991.528 In each, a state con-

stitutional issue was resolved by the Court's decision, advanced
in a concurring or dissenting opinion, or raised by one of the
parties and necessarily considered by the Court. Thirty of these
decisions were set forth in a signed or per curiam opinion, or
triggered a separate opinion by at least one of the judges.
Hence, in the judgment of the Court's members themselves,
thirty decisions were sufficiently significant to generate at least
one full opinion.
The Court was divided in fourteen cases. That is, there was
disagreement among the judges in 47% or nearly half of the
thirty "significant" decisions involving a substantial state constitutional rights question. It is these non-unanimous cases
that are, perhaps, the most revealing. As C. Herman Pritchett
first stated nearly fifty years ago in his seminal study on the
Roosevelt [Supreme] Court:
A nonunanimous opinion admits the public to the Supreme
Court's inner sanctum.... For the fact of disagreement demon-

strates that the members of the Court are operating on different
assumptions, that their inarticulate major premises are dissimilar, that their value systems are differently constructed and
weighted, that their political, economic, and social views contrast
529
in important respects.
ciding two consolidated cases, that a mortgagee's challenge to the constitutionality
of New York City's "notice by request" procedure for in rem tax foreclosures under
the Administrative Code of the City of New York, Title 11, was time barred where
the mortgagee received actual notice well within the two year period from the recording of the tax deed to apply for release of the property, but had waited nearly
four years from receiving notice to complain of its constitutionality. Id. at 697, 572
N.E.2d at 613, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 930. In the second case, the Court held that, at
least insofar as property owners are concerned, the minimum due process requirements of Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)-which the
Court of Appeals said "we apply for determining the adequacy of notice"-are satisfied by the "notice by request" procedure where the City publishes notices, sends
notices to those who have filed request cards, and if no cards are filed, mails notices to the names and addresses on the assessment record. See id. at 699-701, 572
N.E.2d at 615-16, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 932-33.
528. Each of these decisions is discussed in the preceding sections. The
figures herein are derived from Table A, List of Cases-1991.
529. C. HERMAN PRITCHETr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JuDicIAL
POLTICS AND VALUES xii (1948). To quote Pritchett more fully:
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In these divided decisions, 530 the Court was 79% "conservative" or pro-government. 53 1 Stated otherwise, in the
A unanimous judicial decision throws little light upon ... deliberation in
process. It tells nothing of the conflicts around the judicial conference table,
the alternative lines of argument developed, the accommodations and the
compromises which went into the final result. A unanimous opinion is a
composite and quasi-anonymous product, largely valueless for purposes of
understanding the values and motivation of individual justices.
A nonunanimous opinion admits the public to the Supreme Court's inner sanctum. In such a case the process of deliberation has failed to produce
a conclusion satisfactory to all participants. Having carried the argument
as far as they usually can, the justices find it necessary finally to take a vote,
state and support the winning and losing positions, and place the argument
before the world for judgment. In informing the public of their divisions and
their reasons, the justices also supply information about their attitudes and
their values as is available in no other way. For the fact of disagreement
demonstrates that the members of the Court are operating on different assumptions, that their inarticulate major premises are dissimilar, that their
value systems are differently constructed and weighted, that their political,
economic, and social values contrast in important respects. These differences in contrast are not always evident on the surface of the conflicting
opinions. It may be necessary to search out the true causes of disputes, and
not all the searches will come back with the same findings. But that the
search is appropriate and essential to a fuller understanding of the judicial
process, few will doubt.
Id.; see also Vincent M. Bonventre, New York's Chief Judge Kaye: Her Separate
Opinions Bode Well for Revised State Constitutionalism at the Court of Appeals,
TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 4-7 nn. 18-38, on file with
author).
For reasons stated by Pritchett, and subsequently by others, political scientists and legal commentators have looked to nonunanimous decisions in studying
judicial decisionmaking generally and the voting behavior and ideological disposition of judges particularly. In addition to Pritchett's THE ROOSEVELT COURT, see,
e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 890 (1941); C. Herman Pritchett,
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT (1954); Patrick Brown and William A.
Haddad, JudicialDecision-makingon the Florida Supreme Court: An Introductory
Behavioral Study, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 566 (1966); Jerry Beatty, Decision-makingon
the Iowa Supreme Court-1965-1969, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 342 (1969-70); Sheldon
Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 1965-1971: A QuantitativeAnalysis, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 635 (1973); Robert E. Riggs and Guy L. Black, Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1990 Term, 6 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 1 (1992); Christopher
Smith & Scott Patrick Johnson, The First-Term Performance of Justice Clarence
Thomas, 76 JuDIcATURE 172 (Dec.-Jan. 1993).
530. The following figures for divided decisions in 1991 are derived from Table
A, List of Cases-1991 and are reflected in Tables B and C, and in Graphs A and B.
531. The term "conservative," "pro-government," and "pro-prosecution," as
well as "liberal," "pro-individual," and "pro-individual rights," are used as they previously have been by the author and as they traditionally have been by political
scientists and legal commentators in studies of judicial behavior, such as the Na-
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nonunanimous cases-where the judges openly disagreed, and
thus, where there were presumably reasonable grounds to resolve the issue before the Court either way, for or against the
state constitutional claim-the Court's decision was favorable
to individual rights and liberties approximately one-fifth of the
time, or in three of the fourteen cases. 532 In the previous year,
533
the figures were 78% pro-government, 22% pro-individual.
Hence, the Court's ideological record in divided decisions was
virtually identical in 1990 and 1991.
The ideological spectrum was very nearly the same as well.
In 1991, as in the previous year, Judge Titone's voting record
was the most sympathetic to rights and liberties; Judge Bellacosa's was the least. Judge Titone supported the constitutional claim in 79% of the 1991 split decisions-exactly the

tional Science Foundation's United States Supreme Court Data Base Project. See
Bonventre, supra note 3, at 48 n.331; see also Robert Carp et al, The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298, 299 (Apr.-May
1993) (providing definitions of "liberal" and "conservative" for civil rights and liberties and criminal justice); Goldman, supra note 529, at 642 n. 16 (illustrating "political liberalism").
Hence, "conservative," "pro-government," and "pro-prosecution" are applied to
decisions, votes and positions supporting the government or prosecution against
claims of civil rights and liberties, equal protection, or rights of the accused, or in
favor of limiting the scope or protection of such rights and liberties. "Liberal,"
"pro-individual," and "pro-individual rights" are applied to decisions, votes, and
positions upholding claims of civil rights and liberties, equal protection, or rights of
the accused, or in favor of extending the scope or protection of such rights and
liberties.
Though difficult cases typically involve a multiplicity of considerations, a persistent pattern of ruling or voting or otherwise taking positions favorable to the
government (or the individual), regardless of the competing interests and values
involved in the different cases, is a strong indicator of an overriding pro-government (or pro-individual) judicial ideology or disposition. This is especially true for
divided or non-unanimous decisions. In such decisions, the convictions of individual judges are intense enough that they are willing to disagree amongst themselves publicly. Moreover, because the judges have taken different sides, these
split decisions afford comparisons between the judges' respective commitments to
government authority or to individual freedoms and entitlements. See C. HEfRMAN
PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT, supra note 529, at 191-92; see

also Bonventre, supra note 529; Riggs and Black, supra note 529, at 12.
532. The figures for all 30 "significant" decisions, both unanimous and
nonunanimous, were similar: 70% pro-government, 30% pro-individual rights.
See discussion supra notes 528-29 and accompanying text.
533. See Bonventre, supra note 3, at 59, Table E.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss2/2

88

1994]

COURT OF APPEALS

441

reverse of the Court as a whole. Judge Bellacosa, by contrast,
534
voted in favor of rights and liberties only 14% of the time.

Also, as in the previous year, the records of Chief Judge
Wachtler and Judge Simons for 1991 were at least as pro-government as that of the Court as a whole: Chief Judge Wachtler's was 14% pro-individual; Judge Simons' 21%-or identical
to the Court's record. 535 Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge
Simons, together with Judge Bellacosa, continued to form a
strongly pro-government bloc. As the Court's 79% pro-government record would indicate, that bloc, just one short of a majority, usually got the additional vote it needed. Moreover, the
records of the three remaining judges show why that should not
be surprising.
In 1991, as in 1990, the records of Judges Kaye, Alexander,
and Hancock were significantly more pro-individual rights than
that of the pro-government bloc, as well as that of the Court as a
whole; but their records were not nearly as pro-individual as
that of Judge Titone. Their records were, at least comparatively, ideologically "centrist." Judge Kaye's voting record was
43% pro-individual, Judge Alexander's was 38%, and Judge
Hancock's was 46%.536
In short, the Court's three "centrists" were at least as likely
to vote for the government or prosecution-i.e., the same way
Chief Judge Wachtler, Judge Simons, and Judge Bellacosa did
in a very high proportion of the cases-as they were to vote in
favor of the constitutional claimant. In any given case, it was
thus likely that at least one of the centrists would join the
three-judge pro-government bloc to ensure a majority. In only
one-fifth of the cases-i.e., 21% of the split decisions-that did
5 37
not happen.
534. See Graph A. In 1990, the figures were 83% pro-individual for Judge
Titone; 6% for Judge Bellacosa. See Bonventre, supra note 3, at 59, Table E.
535. See Graph A. In 1990, the figures were 22% pro-individual for Chief
Judge Wachtler; 11% for Judge Simons. See Bonventre, supra note 3, at 59, Table
E.
536. See Graph A. In 1990, the figures were 50% pro-individual rights for
Judge Kaye; 47% for Judge Alexander; 50% for Judge Hancock. See Bonventre,
supra note 3, at 59, Table E.
537. The total number of divided decisions in 1991-i.e., 14-would appear
small. But divided decisions, especially perhaps if every divided decision is considered as is here, would seem to be particularly sensitive data. Indeed, the foregoing
1991 figures are consistent with those found in 1990 (between which time there
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The Court remained a Wachtler-Simons court in 1991.538

The figures themselves cannot tell whether Chief Judge Wachtler, Judge Simons, or both actually led their colleagues. But
the numbers do show that the way the Court decided cases coincided closely with the way those two judges voted.
As already mentioned, the ideological record of the Court's
decisions was identical to Judge Simons' voting record; both
were 79% pro-government. Chief Judge Wachtler's was not
much different at 86%.539 Moreover, Judge Simons was in the

majority 86% of the time, or in twelve of the fourteen divided
decisions. Chief Judge Wachtler's alignment with the majority
was even higher at 93%, or in every divided decision but one.
By contrast, Judge Titone, the most pro-individual rights member of a significantly more pro-government tribunal, was
aligned with the majority-and vice versa-the least: 29% of
the time or in only four of the fourteen nonunanimous decisions. 540 The previous year, the comparative alignment figures
for these three judges were very similar. 541 In both years, none
were no personnel changes or other known changes within the Court that would
have presaged a change in voting or decision records); they also comport with the
figures determined by others-even when different samplings of decisions were
examined for different purposes. See, e.g., Wise, supra note 484, at S-3 (New York
Law Journalsample of 12 divided criminal cases decided in 1990-1991 showing a
pro-prosecution bloc of Judge Bellacosa, Judge Simons and Chief Judge Wachtler,
with Judge Titone being the most pro-defendant, followed by Judges Alexander,
Kaye and Hancock; Legal Aid Society of Greater New York's survey of 43 divided
criminal cases decided during 1989-1990 found Judge Bellacosa at 91% pro-prosecution, followed by Chief Judge Wachtler at 77%, Judge Simons at 74%, Judge
Hancock at 49%, Judge Kaye at 37%, Judge Alexander at 32%, and Judge Titone at
23%; New York Law Journalsample of divided tort cases showing Judge Bellacosa
the most "anti-recovery," Judge Titone the most pro-recovery, and the remaining
judges following a pattern very similar to that seen in the criminal and constitutional cases).
538. See Bonventre, supra note 3, at 49.
539. See Graph A. Though Judge Bellacosa's ideological voting record was the
same as Chief Judge Wachtler's, his alignment with the majority was lower. See
Tables B and C. In 1990, Judge Bellacosa's alignment with the majority was considerably lower than that of either Chief Judge Wachtler or Judge Simons. See
Bonventre, supra note 3, at 59, Table D. Moreover, his record has consistently
been significantly more pro-government or prosecution than that of the Court and
the other judges. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 12, at S2, Graph.
540. See Graph B and Table C.
541. See Bonventre, supra note 3, at 59, Table D. The alignment figures for
1990 were the highest for both Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge Simons, 89%, and
the lowest for Judge Titone, 42%. Id.
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of the other judges were aligned with the majority as frequently
as Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge Simons, or as seldom as
542
Judge Titone.
Beyond these figures, a few observations seem particularly
pertinent. Overall, 1991 was at best a disappointing year for
state constitutional adjudication at the Court of Appeals; for
state constitutional rights and liberties, it was not even that.
Among the various reasons, many already discussed in the preceding commentaries on individual cases, some are especially
troubling and merit a specific recounting.
The Court continued in 1991 to decide many state constitutional cases in unsigned opinions. In fact, some of the most significant cases, raising the most critical issues of rights and
liberties, were decided by the Court in these typically superficial and abrupt writings whose authors chose not to be identified. An unsigned opinion-memorandum or per curiammight be appropriate in the most routine cases where only wellsettled law is involved, where an obvious result is dictated, and
where there is no disagreement within the Court. But a short,
shallow, sketchy statement of the Court's ruling-whose author, for usually apparent reasons, wishes to remain anonymous-would seem wholly inappropriate in those cases where
significant constitutional issues are raised, where the law is not
or ought not to be settled, where the result is not preordained,
and, especially, where at least one member of the Court disagrees with that result and advances an opposing constitutional
543
argument in a separate signed opinion of his or her own.

542. Notable also is that Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge Simons authored
the majority opinions in the cases which seemed to divide the Court the most
deeply in 1991. In People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d
483 (1991), Chief Judge Wachtler held together a bare majority to curtail the per
se reversal rule for Rosario violations. See discussion supra notes 131-209 and
accompanying text. In People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568
N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991), Judge Simons broke from the Court's pro-government bloc,
and the Supreme Court as well, and carried a five-judge majority to suppress a
confession he believed was obtained by means of deliberate and flagrant police
misconduct. See discussion supra notes 25-89 and accompanying text.
543. See discussion supra note 468. For a similar discussion about 1990 see
Bonventre, supra note 3, at 53-54. One-third of the divided decisions were rendered in an unsigned writing in that year. Id.
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In 1991, more than one-third of the divided state constitutional decisions were rendered in an unsigned writing. 5 4 The
figure the previous year was virtually the same. 545 To appreciate the import of these figures, it must be recalled precisely
what they mean: in one out of every three cases, where at least
one member of the Court believed the constitutional issue to be
serious enough and the Court's resolution to be wrong enough
to justify authoring, signing and publicly registering a disagreement, the majority nonetheless issued its decision in an anonymous writing.
Not surprisingly, these decisions include some of the more
dubious ones rendered by the Court. They include, for example,
Alison D. v. Virginia M. ,546 in which a nonbiological but wholly
functional "parent" was conclusorily denied status as a parent,
v
and thus, precluded from even seeking visitation rights.M
Over the sensitive and sensible dissent of Judge Kaye, 548 the
unsigned majority opinion paid little heed to the child's best interest, and utterly disregarded the factual background of the
functional parent's nurture and support of the child for six
years. These decisions also include People v. Hunt.549 There, in
a one line entry approving the decision below, the Court summarily dismissed the dissenting argument, again by Judge
Kaye, that double jeopardy protection ought to bar the prosecution's second attempt at enhanced sentencing after its first ef550
fort had failed.
The unsigned rulings among the unanimous cases were at
least as troublesome. These decisions even lacked the benefit of
a signed separate opinion to point out the deficiencies in the
544. The precise figure, derived from Table A, was 36% or five out of the fourteen non-unanimous decisions. For all thirty "significant" decisions, unanimous as
well as nonunanimous, the figure, also derived from Table A, was 27% or eight out
of thirty. See Table A.
545. The figure for 1990 was 33%. See Bonventre, note 3, at 53-54.
546. 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991); see discussion
supra notes 444-68 and accompanying text.
547. See discussion supra notes 450-53 and accompanying text.
548. Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 657, 572 N.E.2d at 30, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 589 (Kaye,
J., dissenting); see discussion supra notes 454-68 and accompanying text.
549. 78 N.Y.2d 932, 579 N.E.2d 208, 574 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1991); see discussion
supra note 264.
550. Id. at 933, 579 N.E.2d at 208, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
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Court's anonymous writing. They include People v. Velasco. 551
There, in rejecting all of the defendant's various claims in court
language that was at odds with prior holdings, 552 the Court added a yet another layer of befuddling rules to its already con55 3
fused law of the right to be present. And in In re Holtzman the year's most pernicious decision in this writer's view-the
Court embraced a chilling standard for penalizing pure speech.
Moreover, it did so in a doubtful opinion that treated the facts of
the case with less than complete candor, and refused even to
address the fundamental values supporting the protection of
uninhibited discussion of public affairs.
But the principal point here is not that the ultimate outcomes in such unsigned decisions are always or necessarily
wrong. Rather, it is that the care and consideration reflected in
these anonymous opinions typically fall well below the standard
that distinguishes thoughtful from shoddy judicial decisionmaking.
Holtzman is also illustrative of another phenomenon that
continued to afflict the Court of Appeals in 1991. Commencing
a few years into Sol Wachtler's tenure as chief judge-i.e., since
the late 1980s-the Court had been back-pedaling on state constitutional rights and liberties. 554 By the end of 1991, the
Court's direction became unmistakable.5 5 5 Whatever the merits
of the Court's retrenchment, in general or in any particular area
of the law, freedom of speech was not spared. With the decision
in Holtzman, the Court's decreasing regard for the liberty of
public expression reached a sort of nadir.
In the early years of the Wachtler Court, New York's high
tribunal added to a list of recent precedents 556 in which it had
551. 77 N.Y.2d 469, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 568 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1991); see discussion
supra notes 222-39 and accompanying text.
552. Id. at 472, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 722; see discussion supra
notes 227-28, 236 and accompanying text.
553. 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1991); see discussion
supra notes 351-412 and accompanying text.
554. See generally Bonventre, supra note 2; Bonventre, State Constitutional
Recession: The New York Court of Appeals Retrenches, supra note 10; Bonventre,
supra note 4.
555. See Bonventre, supra note 2, at 122.
556. See, e.g., Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 429
N.E.2d 765, 445 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1981). In Bellanca, topless dancing was given state
constitutional protection following the Supreme Court's decision that the Federal
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demonstrated a strong inclination to expand the scope of protected expression. In its 1986 decision in People v. P.J. Video,
Inc.,557 the Court invalidated the police seizure of certain
"adult" videotapes. 558 According to the Court's majority, the affidavit used to obtain the seizure warrant-which the Supreme
Court had found adequate "beyond peradventure" 559-was held
insufficiently descriptive under the state constitution to establish probable cause to believe the alleged obscenity. 56 0 That
same year, in People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,561 the
Court blocked the closure of an "adult" bookstore that concededly violated an otherwise applicable nuisance statute. The
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the case had "nothing to
do with books or expressive activity" but with "an establishment
used for prostitution."5 2 In response, the Court of Appeals held
that, under the state constitution, even an incidental burden on
an expressive activity is prohibited, unless first shown to be "no
Constitution permitted state restriction. Id. at 230-31, 429 N.E.2d at 766, 445
N.Y.S.2d at 88; see also Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
In People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983),
the Court held that public solicitation of deviant sexual intercourse was protected
because such sexual conduct itself is protected. Id. at 937-38, 447 N.E.2d at 62-63,
460 N.Y.S.2d at 514-15. The Supreme Court dismissed certiorari because of inability to determine the basis of the Court of Appeals' decision. See New York v.
Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984). Notably, the Court ofAppeals' majority opinion was
unsigned. See Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d at 937, 447 N.E.2d at 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
In People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981),
rev'd, 458 U.S. 747, on remand, 57 N.Y.2d 256, 441 N.E.2d 1100, 455 N.Y.S.2d 582
(1982), the Court invalidated a child pornography statute as an infringement of
free expression. 52 N.Y.2d at 680-81, 422 N.E.2d at 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 867. The
statute was upheld under the United States Constitution by the Supreme Court.
458 U.S. at 747, 765. On remand, the Court of Appeals summarily conformed the
state constitution to the Supreme Court's decision. 57 N.Y.2d at 259, 441 N.E.2d
at 1101, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 582-83. Notably again, the opinions for the Court of Appeals, before and after Supreme Court reversal, were unsigned. See Ferber, 52
N.Y.2d at 677, 422 N.E.2d at 524, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 864; 57 N.Y.2d at 259, 441
N.E.2d at 1101, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 582-83.
557. 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986), on remandfrom
475 U.S. 868 (1986).
558. 68 N.Y.2d at 309, 501 N.E.2d at 571, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
559. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 876 (1986).
560. 68 N.Y.2d at 304-05, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912-13.
561. 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986), on remand from
478 U.S. 697 (1986).
562. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986).
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broader than necessary to accomplish [the governmental]
purpose."563

If Arcara represented an outer limit of expression-protection,564 a remarkably sharp and persistent contraction began as
soon as the Court revisited that decision a few years thereafter.
In 1989, in Town of Islip v. Caviglia,565 the Court of Appeals
upheld a zoning ordinance forcing adult bookstores to relocate
to an industrial area of town. Over the dissents of Judges
Titone and Kaye, who both decried the abandonment of Arcara's
highly protective standard, 66 the majority insisted that Arcara's "no broader than necessary" test was satisfied because
the town adopted an "appropriate method" to address its
problems,5 67 regardless of less burdensome possibilities. 568 The
following year in Golden v. Clark, 69 the Court upheld a New
York City provision barring political party officials from holding
high office in city government. Over Judge Hancock's dissenting complaint that the Court was breaking with its tradition of
broadly protecting expression-related activities, 570 the majority
ruled that political leaders could be denied the right to run for
office-and government officials the right to run for party positions-because the burdens on those rights were "at most, only
572
incidental," 571 and thus, readily justifiable.
The very next year, 1991, the Court decided Children of
Bedford v. Petromelis573 and In re Holtzman.574 In the former,
563. Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d at 559, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
564. Some, evidently including the Supreme Court (and, to be candid, this
writer), found the Court of Appeals' reasoning and decision in Arcara difficult to
take seriously. Perhaps unexpectedly, Professor Lawrence Tribe also criticized the
reasoning adopted by the Court of Appeals, labelling it "First Amendment fetishism." Lawrence Tribe, Remarks at the U.S.L.W. Constitutional Law Conference,
55 U.S.L.W. 2225, 2227 (Oct. 8, 1986).
565. 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1989).
566. Id. at 565, 540 N.E.2d at 226, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 150 (Titone, J., dissenting); Id. at 579, 540 N.E.2d at 236, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 160 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
567. Id. at 560, 540 N.E.2d at 223-24, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 147-48.
568. Id. at 559, 540 N.E.2d at 223, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
569. 76 N.Y.2d 618, 564 N.E.2d 611, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1990).
570. Id. at 632, 564 N.E.2d at 619, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 9. (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
571. Id. at 628, 564 N.E.2d at 616, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
572. Id. at 630, 564 N.E.2d at 617, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
573. 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1991), vacated, 112 S.
Ct. 859 (1992); see discussion supra notes 317-50 and accompanying text.
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the Court of Appeals, in the view of a unanimous Supreme
Court, provided too little protection for expression-related activity. Thus, in a recently unimaginable switch in roles, the New
York tribunal was overruled by the Supreme Court for falling
below federal strict scrutiny standards. 575 And finally, in Holtzman, the Court of Appeals applied its own strict scrutiny, not to
protect speech, but to prevent it. Henceforth, attorney speech
about judges is free speech in New York only if it compares favorably-in the view ultimately of judges-to what a reason576
able, and presumably reverential, attorney would have said.
From Arcara to Holtzman-"from fetish to fizzle"577 in concern for expressive freedom-constituted a dramatic transformation in the Court's free speech decisions. No longer could
New York's high tribunal accurately boast of its exceptional
protection and toleration of expression. 578 Indeed, despite an
occasional indication to the contrary, 57 9 by the end of 1991 the
Court of Appeals jurisprudence of expressive liberty was
neither exceptional nor particularly tolerant.
574. 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39, cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
648 (1991); see discussion supra notes 351-412 and accompanying text.
575. Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 112 S. Ct. 859 (1992), vacating 77
N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1991).
576. See discussion supra notes 394-443 and accompanying text.
577. Bonventre, supra note 2, at 141. As noted therein:
In Arcara, taking a stand on behalf of selling "adult" books, the court barred
a penalty on non-expressive activity, even though the burden on speech was
strictly incidental, and the court did so by adopting an exceptionally speech
protective test that scrutinized government action. In Holtzman, refusing to
take a similar stand on behalf of public criticism ofjudges, the court permitted a sanction on purely expressive activity, thereby approving a direct burden on speech itself, and the court did so by adoption a distressingly speechrestrictivetest that focuses scrutiny on expressive conduct. If the court's ruling in Arcara reflected a "fetish" for protecting expression, Holtzman certainly seems to indicate that the court's enthusiasm for doing so has fizzled.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
578. See Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski (Immuno II), 77 N.Y.2d 235, 249,
567 N.E.2d 1270, 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 913 (1991).
579. See, e.g., id., at 251, 567 N.E.2d at 1279, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 915 (ruling,
notably, however, that its decision was dictated by federal law and it chose not to
rely on state constitutional law exclusively); see supra notes 271-313 and accompanying text; see also People v. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d 47, 51, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 1168, 550
N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (1989) (stating that its decision to invalidate a harassment statute which criminalized mere "abusive" language was dictated by federal law as
well as the state constitution).
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If there were bright spots in an otherwise unfortunate year,
580
the brightest were perhaps to be found in People v. Harris
and Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski (Immuno 11).581 In Harris, a majority of the Court refused to tolerate flagrant official
disregard of state constitutional rights of the accused. 582 In Immuno II, the Court of Appeals, in the face of an apparent dilu583
tion in the Supreme Court's protection of defamatory opinion,
refused to budge from the broad immunity it had previously af5
forded to statements of opinion in defamation actions. 8
But-to take a cue from Immuno II-"tak[ing] into account
the full content of" 585 the Court's decisions in Harris and Immuno II, even these two decisions were hardly unqualified victories for state constitutionalism. Both cases represent "state
constitutional law on the rebound."5 86 The Court resorted to the
state constitution only after its interpretation of federal law met
with disapproval or uncertainty at the United States Supreme
Court. Protection of rights and liberties under the state constitution was treated in both cases as a fall-back position, such an
580. 72 N.Y.2d 614, 536 N.E.2d 1, 532 N.Y.S.2d 1229 (1989); see discussion
supra notes 25-89 and accompanying text.
581. 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991), on remand
from 497 U.S. 1021 (1990), see discussion supra notes 271-316 and accompanying
text.
582. See People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 440-41, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1055, 568
N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (1991) (HarrisII). Regardless of the merits of the Court's ultimate decision in Harris11 to suppress the confession-to be candid, this writer
disagrees with that result-the Court made clear that it will not tolerate violations of state constitutional rights with impunity. Id.; see also supra notes 25-89
and accompanying text.
583. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
584. See Immuno II, 77 N.Y.2d at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1282, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
918. Prior Court decisions reaffirmed in Immuno II include: Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 N.Y.2d 369, 384-85, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1308-09, 397 N.Y.S.2d
943, 952-53 (1977) (holding that defamatory statements about judges are protected
by the New York Times v. Sullivan standard; Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d
283, 292, 501 N.E.2d 550, 554, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (1986) (holding that defamatory statements should be analyzed as a whole and in context to determine
whether they are protected as opinion). But see discussion of In re Holtzman, 78
N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1991), supra notes 351-412 and accompanying text).
585. Immuno 11, 77 N.Y.2d at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
586. Bonventre, The New York Court of Appeals: An Old Tradition,Struggles
with Current Issues, supra note 10, at 151. See generally Vincent M. Bonventre,
New York and the Supremes: State ConstitutionalLaw on the Rebound at the Court
of Appeals, ST. CONST. CoMMENTARIES AND NoTEs (forthcoming 1994).
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approach to state constitutional law detracts from the legitimacy of the Court's independent decision-making, and inevitably fuels suspicions about the result-orientation of state
587
constitutionalism generally.
Although the Court was unanimous in result in Immuno 11,
there was no majority for rendering a decision based exclusively
on independent state grounds. Even the second time around,
following remand by the Supreme Court, only one member of
the Court of Appeals argued that the case could and should be
decided on state law alone.58 8 Two judges wrote separately to
press for an exclusively federal law-based decision. 589 And
Judge Kaye, a vigorous proponent of independent state constitutionalism, 590 was evidently compelled to craft two opinions in
one-a federal opinion together with a state opinion 5 9 1 -in order to secure the remaining bare majority of four.
That the Court was unsettled on its approach to state constitutional law-i.e., the when and the how-was made clear
again in Immuno 11.592 That this was likely due, in substantial
587. See discussion supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text; see generally
Collins, supra note 83, at 2-3, 13-14 (criticizing such a "reactionary" or "reactive"
approach as instrumental, expedient, and unprincipled, thus reducing the state's
constitution to a "grab-bag" of rights to be "exploited in order to circumvent disfavored United States Supreme Court decisions"). Collins elaborated:
a reactionary approach uses the state charter in a piecemeal fashion, whenever the occasion may arise-in the minds of the judges-for purposes of
philosophical disagreement or in order to insulate a controversial decision
from Supreme Court review. Seen in this light, the sovereign law of the
state constitution becomes little more than a plaything.
Id. at 13-14; see also Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Some
Random Thoughts, 54 Miss. L.J. 371, 375 n.15 (1984); Galie, supra note 2, at 236
(stating that "this reactive mode or state constitutional law on the rebound was the
'dominant approach' of the Court of Appeals at the time); Bonventre, supra note
73, at 51-54.
588. Immuno 11, 77 N.Y.2d at 263-64, 567 N.E.2d at 1287, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
923 (Titone, J., concurring).
589. Id. at 262-63, 567 N.E.2d at 1286, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Simons, J. concurring); id. at 268, 567 N.E.2d at 1286, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 926 (Hancock, J.,
concurring).
590. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr. Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 531, 523 N.E.2d
277, 282, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1988) (Kaye, J., concurring); see also Kaye, supra note
84; Kaye, supra note 308; Kaye, supra note 73.
591. See discussion of Immuno II, supra notes 271-313 and accompanying
text.
592. 77 N.Y.2d at 248-56, 567 N.E.2d at 1277-83, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913-18; see
discussion supra notes 295-313 and accompanying text. See also People v. Vilardi,
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part, to actual disagreement within the Court over the very legitimacy of independent state decision-making was made plain
a few weeks later in Harris JJ.593 There, two members of the
Court-including the Court's chief judge 594-railed against the
majority's "affront" to the Supreme Court 595 in rejecting that
court's "wisdom and experience" 596 and "superior perspective."597 In a remarkably vituperative and accusatory writing,
the two dissenters betrayed a distressing lack of understanding
of the role of state courts and state constitutions in the federal
system.
To the HarrisII dissenters, it was "institutional egocentricity"5 98 for the majority to exercise independent judgment instead of simply parroting the Supreme Court. As seen by these
two judges, it represented "a kind of Copernican view of the judicial universe"599 for the majority to take state constitutional
rights seriously, rather than simply conforming state law to the
minimum federal standards set by the Supreme Court.
This overt hostility to independent state constitutionalism
surely belied any protestations to the contrary in the dissenting
opinion.600 And although the dissenters' views were manifested
most stridently in HarrisII, they likely infected other 1991 de76 N.Y.2d 67, 78, 555 N.E.2d 915, 921, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 524 (1990) (Simons, J.,
concurring); People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224, 236, 543 N.E.2d 61, 69, 544 N.Y.S.2d
796, 804 (1989) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr. Inc., 71
N.Y.2d 521, 531, 523 N.E.2d 277, 282, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1988) (Kaye, J., concurring); People v. Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d 191, 204-05, 527 N.E.2d 1182, 1189-90, 532
N.Y.S.2d 45, 52-53 (1988) (Hancock, J., dissenting).
593. 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991), on remand
from New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); see also discussion supra notes 25-89
and accompanying text.
594. Id. at 442, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting, joined by Wachtler, C.J.).
595. Id. at 443, 570 N.E.2d at 1056-57, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
596. Id. at 442, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
597. Id. at 446, 570 N.E.2d at 1058, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 709 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
598. Id. at 447, 570 N.E.2d at 1059, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
599. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Presumably the dissent meant Ptolemy,
who theorized that Earth was the center of the universe, not Copernicus, whose
heliocentric theory corrected Ptolemy's centuries later.
600. See Harris11, 77 N.Y.2d at 444, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (stating that "we remain equal, true, steadfast and
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cisions, 60 1 thus contributing to a rather inhospitable year for
state constitutional rights and liberties. This vehement hostility in HarrisII came to a head the following year in People v.
Scott.6 02 In Scott, involving a pair of consolidated cases, the divisions within the Court were even deeper, angrier, and more
telling.
Scott was one of the most significant Court of Appeals' decisions in 1992. This and the other cases raising questions of
state constitutional rights and liberties and state constitutional
adjudication in Wachtler's final months as Chief Judge will be
60 3
reviewed in a forthcoming work by this author.

proud participants" in the state constitutional right to counsel tradition); see id. at
447, 570 N.E.2d at 1058, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Notably, the voting records of the two dissenters, Chief Judge Wachtler and
Judge Bellacosa, have for several years evinced a rather low level of support for
state constitutional rights and liberties. See, e.g., Bonventre & Powell, supra note
10, at 60, Graph (showing Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge Bellacosa to be the
least supportive of rights and liberties among Court of Appeals judges for the
three-year period, 1990-1992); see also discussion supra notes 534-35 and accompanying text.
601. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 644, 585 N.E.2d 795, 799,
578 N.Y.S.2d 483, 487 (1991) (diluting and de-constitutionalizing the Rosario rule);
see discussion supra notes 131-209; Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 657,
572 N.E.2d 27, 29, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586, 588 (1991) (ignoring the state constitutional
arguments supportive of a broad definition of "parent"); see discussion supra notes
444-68 and accompanying text.
602. 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
603. For the reader who wishes to know, see William 0. Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227 (1965), the author's pro-individual/pro-government voting record in the divided cases in 1991 would have been 50
percent/50 percent. Regarding the most controversial cases, unanimous and
nonunanimous, the author would have voted pro-prosecution in both Harris and
Jackson, but would not have joined the respective dissenting and majority opinions. The author would have voted pro-individual in both Holtzman and Alison D.,
dissenting in Holtzman and joining the dissent in Alison D. The author would
have been aligned most closely with Judges Kaye and Hancock.
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Table A
List of Cases -

453

1991

Criminal Justice

Holding* Majority**
Bayes
Bin-Wahad
Blount
Bonaparte
Burts
Cardwell
Charles
Cloud
Colon
Coutin
Duuvon
Felton
Ford
Harris
Hunt
Jackson, E.
Moquin
Nacey
Offen
O'Rama
Ortega
Patterson
Richards
Rosario
Slaughter
Smith, A.
Smith, D.
Strachan
Turaine
Tucker
Velasco
Webb
Williamson
Zanghi

L
C
L
C
L
L
L
C
C
C
C
L
C
L
C
C
L
C
C
L
L
C
C
C
L
C
C
C
L
C
C
C
L
L

WSKATHB
WSKB (memo)
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKATHB
WSKATHB
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKAHB (memo)
WSKATHB (memo)
WKAR
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKATHB (memo)
SKA(T)H
WSATHB (memo)
WSKB
WKATH
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKATHB
WSKATHB (memo)
WSAB
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKAHB
WSKATHB
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKATHB
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKAHB (memo)
WSKATHB (per curiam)
WSKATHB
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKATHB (memo)

Separate***
[A [T] [H

[T]
(S (T) (H

[W [B]
[K]
[A [T] [H
[S [B]

[K [T]
[T]

[T]
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Civil Liberties and Equality
Holding*
Alison, D.
Amer. Ins.
Amodei
Catlin
Ch. of Bedford
Cit. for Energy
Colt Inds.
Couch
Derle
Holtzman
Immuno
ISCA
w/Campbell****

C
L
L
C
C
C
C
C
L
C
L
C
C

Majority**

Separate***

WSATHB (per curiam)
WSKB, Kooper
WSKATHB (memo)
WSKAH
WSAHB
WSKB
WSKATHB
WSKATHB
WSKATHB (per curiam)
SKATHB (per curiam)
W(S)KA(T)(H)B
WSKAHB
WSKAHB

[K]
[T [H]
[T [B]
[A [T [H]

* "L"indicates a "Liberal" or pro-individual rights, or in a divided decision, a ruling
that is more liberal or pro-individual rights than the position taken in a separate opinion; "C"indicates "Conservative" or pro-government or disapproval of the claim of individual right. For further explanation of the terms "liberal' and "conservative," see
supra note 531.
** A judge's last initial underlined indicates authorship of the majority
opinion, in brackets a dissent, in parentheses a concurrence, in single bracket
or parenthesis joinder in a dissent or concurrence respectively. W=Wachtler,
S=Simons, K=Kaye, A=Alexander, T=Titone, H=Hancock, B=Bellacosa.
Unsigned opinions are identified as "per curiam" or "memo"(memorandum),
as labelled by the Court.
*** A judge is identified as having written or joined a separate opinion only
if there was a "liberal'/"conservative" disagreement with the majority on the
state constitutional rights issue.
**** Consolidated cases are identified individually where they raise different
state constitutional issues, or where the same issue is resolved distinctly.
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Table B
Ideological Voting Patterns W

S

A

K

1991
H

T

B

Court

Criminal Justice
10%(1) 20%(2) 40%(4) 40%(4) 90%(9) 56%(5)
Liberal
Conservative 90%(9) 80%(8) 60%(6) 60%(6) 10%(1) 44%(4)
Civil Liberties and Equality

0%(0) 20%(2)
100%(10) 80%(8)

25%(1)
75%(3)

50%(2) 25%(1)
50%(2) 75%(3)

Liberal
Conservative
Total

25%(1) 25%(1) 50%(2) 33%(1) 50%(2)
75%(3) 75%(3) 50%(2) 67%(2) 50%(2)

Liberal
Conservative

14%(2) 21%(3) 43%(6)
86%(12) 79%(11) 57%(8)

38%(5)
62%(8)

79%(11) 46%(6)
21%(3) 54%(7)

14%(2) 21%(3)
86%(12) 79%(11)

Table C
Alignment with Majority

-

1991

Separate*
Majority
7% (1)
93% (13)
Wachtler
14% (2)
86% (12)
Simons
21% (3)
79% (11)
Kaye
23% (3)
77% (10)
Alexander
71% (10)
29% (4)
Titone
38% (5)
62% (8)
Hancock
21% (3)
79% (11)
Bellacosa
* A judge is deemed to have cast a "separate" vote
only if the judge disagreed with the majority on the
substantial state constitutional issue in a case.
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Graph A
Ideological Voting Patterns
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(14 total divided decisions on state
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Graph B
Alignment with Majority

1991
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